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Drawing on the work of Tocqueville, Nietzsche, Camus, and Marcuse, thi work 
argues that there is an urgent political and societal need for greater support of public art 
projects and better access to these sources of funding. More art in public spaces would 
revive and animate communal environments, create new relationships between the 
individual and the public, strengthen feelings of community, and foster the desire to 
participate in the public. All art creates participatory desire and behavior, but visionary 
art is how political progress through individual rebellion can be best accessed and 
articulated. This work defines visionary artistic creation as the union of instinctual 
creative energies and rational reflection. Mainstream art, despite its aesthetic 
rearrangements, fails to connect the viewer with questions that will engage them over 
time. Visionary art, especially the public and social, is needed to seek out and materialize 
the newest, alternative possibilities for our individual lives, for our societies, and for the 
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Instinctual revolt turns into political rebellion.  
– Herbert Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation 
Even the most realistic oeuvre constructs a reality of its own: its men and women, 
its objects, its landscape, its music reveals what remains unsaid, unseen, unheard 
in everyday life.  
– Herbert Marcuse, Art as Form of Reality 
It is difficult to get the news from poems yet men die miserably everyday for lack 
of what is found there. 
 – William Carlos Williams, Asphodel, That Greeny Flower. 
The Argument 
We generally take for granted that the foundation on which American democracy 
rests is the interactive, ever-evolving landscape of civil society – the social and civic 
associations of Tocqueville’s (1835/2002) observations. But whether or not we agre
with Putnam (1994, 2001) that American civic associations have for decades been on the 
decline, we must confront the question of whether these types of political and social 
activities are enough to sustain the health of our system of democratic representative 




free and involved voices, or is civil society’s sincerity threatened by the excessively self-
interested and conformist tendencies that underlie American democracy? Do our civil 
organizations sustain democratic life? And if they do keep democracy alive, do they 
allow only sporadic breaths, heavy with dust?  
The Left of today, however diluted within mainstream America, contend that true 
democracy – of, by, and for the people – has gone the way of free love and Marxist 
revolution. What remains is the subject of debate. Some say all of our institutions are 
façades for domination by the powerful few; others go only so far as to complain about 
the ineffectiveness of the Electoral College system or of our voting booths. That 
Americans are in crisis is a foundational assumption of this work. Regardless of the 
extent to which  some Americans feel alienated from the governing system, most would 
likely agree that democracy in the United States is not only far from a direct political 
mechanism, it often lacks sincere connection with the average citiz n. It is not a logical 
stretch to conclude that a person who does not feel involved or needed will likely not 
wish to participate. It is an easy conclusion that in America one ca  be quite comfortable 
– politically, emotionally, materially – and “free” without exerting individual political 
will. This “free rider” problem (Putnam, 2001) enables the "gentle herd" mentality that is 
inherent in American life. We must seek new solutions to this lack of public participation 
by the average American by attempting to draw them from their individualistic 
tendencies into a more interested and dynamic public life.1 The sincerity, or genuine 
                                                
1  Hannah Arendt (1998) describes the public in several ways:  the very appearance of the 
public creates the public; the public is all that is not our private worlds; it is created by humans, not Nature; 




belief in and involvement in, of any system, particularly a politica system, which is by 
nature social and interactive, should not be undervalued or avoided because of the 
difficulty involved in attempting to define and evaluate elusive levels of "sincerity". A 
society, seen as a machine with moving parts, is only a stale collection of those parts if 
the machine’s movements fail to convey meaning to the user. Still, we must be wary even 
when "meaning" is conveyed, because meaning in a post-Foucauldian (1991) and post-
Baudrillardian (Baudrillard & Glaser, 1994) world – where even desires can be 
reproduced by the Establishment in a way that they become "hyperreal" simulations of 
their essence, or what we can call sincere or genuine meaning – can take on new forms. 
In the late 20th century, Baudrillard wrote that in the world of simulation, reality 
disappears, and from its ashes rises the hyperreal. This conception of information in the 
late 20th and 21st centuries introduced the possibility that when concepts, meanings, and 
creative forms are co-opted by the ruling Establishment, not only are they simplified and 
sterilized of both their natural emotional force and their uniqueness, but they may 
actually cease to exist. It is this sort of process that has enveloped public life, 
associations, and general notions of both local and universal community today.  
                                                                                                                                                 
concerns), and based on action (the private realm, for Arendt, being that of property, which comprises labor 
and work, and the basic functions of our families and our bodies). Although her definitions of the public are 
comprehensive and useful (albeit sexist), I disagree with her stringent characterization of the public as 
altogether divorced from the private realm, where ev rything messy – emotions and bodily functions -
remain outside the consideration of public life. This denial of the private within the public is both 
unrealistic, and possibly detrimental to political life. Despite her understandable concerns that work and 
labor have taken the place in importance of political discussions, her conclusion that the political must 
proceed freely and “uncorrupted” by the equalizing effects of property and the home paints a picture of an 




Even when the movements of a machine convey "meaning," it is difficult to say 
whether these meanings penetrate beyond diffusing concepts that are so much a part of 
American cultural identity that they are mindlessly inhaled rather than adequately 
digested. Today’s democracy in America is by all accounts more shallow and tepid than 
it could be. Despite the exceptions, democratic life in the United States today 
overwhelmingly yields to the masses and the power of popular opinion, rather than being 
inspired by a true collective of individual passions. Studies calling attention to 
consistently poor voter turnout and the free rider problem have failed eff ctively to 
change the situation. It is as if Americans, though self-conscious enough to take note of 
the lack of citizen involvement in political life (and its accompanying institutions), notice 
only the inaction –- the effect – rather than the cause of the widespread dispassion.  
Those in power – the Establishment– have co-opted many facets of American 
public life, as can be seen in the dominance in public life of mainstream art (commodified 
rebellion) to the persistence of the exclusively bipartisan political process. During co-
optation, elements of public life that offer alternatives to statu  quo ideas are gobbled up 
by the government/media/big business complex, and by popular culture itself, and spit 
out as commodities. The result is that these commodities masquerding as genuine 
artistic expression, appear as they once existed- as fresh ideas-, but their sources of free-
thinking have been sterilized. Thus the meanings they disseminate become like laminated 
playing cards – forever in play but unchanging in character or appearance – and, despite 
the many possible combinations of meaning that can be played, there are cl ar limits well 




find meaning on their own, has the effect of alienating individuals from their own 
emotions and, ultimately, from aspects of public life and from the greater human 
community. 
The most important issue is not that American democracy and public life have, 
especially with the increase of technology in our lives, suffered in participatory 
enthusiasm and inclusivity, owing to a lack of participation in the public sphere. Rather, 
the greater concern is that the very nature of American democracy breeds th dangers of a 
conformist and complacent possessive individualism. Although there is an mportant 
Puritan and republican tradition in American political thought, it is the heritage of 
Lockean (1869/1988) individualism on which our democracy at least partially ests, that 
overwhelms our popular and political culture today. And it is this tendency which must 
be balanced with a force that enables us to access both our true individual beliefs and the 
vital sense of universal unity and community-mindedness that comes of such individual 
contemplation, through the language and imagery of artistic experience. 
This work argues that there is an urgent need for greater support of public art 
projects and better access to these sources of funding. More art in public spaces would, 
first individually and ultimately collectively, revive and animate communal 
environments; create new relationships between individuals and the public; strengthen 
feelings of community; and foster the desire to participate in the public on the basis of 
new relationships to the self and to the public. Individual experience with creativity and 




life.  Artistic experience first enables access to an inherent but latent spirit of community 
within individuals, which can then become a desire to participate in he public realm. 
This link demonstrates the utility of employing art as a tool t encourage political 
participation. According to the National Endowment for the Arts (2007), “[By every 
measure, literary readers lead more robust lifestyles than non readers. These findings 
contradict commonly held assumptions that readers and arts participants are passive, 
isolated, or self absorbed.” The researchers concluded that “Americans who experience 
art or read literature are demonstrably more active in their communities than nonreaders 
and non participants. … Thus, literary reading and arts participation r tes can be regarded 
as sound indicators of civic and community health.” (NEA, 2007, p. 6). 
Using the study’s findings, the NEA Chairman looks to the psychological 
processes that take place within individuals who experience art that inspires them to 
community life and public action: “Something happens when an individual actively 
engages in the arts – be it reading a novel at home, attending a concert at a local church, 
or seeing a dance company perform at a college campus2 – that awakens both a 
heightened sense of identity and civic awareness. We must banish the stereotype that 
reading books or listening to music is passive behavior. Art is not escapism but an 
invitation to activism.” In December 2009, the NEA released its 2008 survey of Public 
Participation in the Arts and reported that educated people had been participating less 
since 2002 and that there are “persistent patterns of decline in participation for most art 
                                                
2  According to Dana Gioia, NEA Chair, “The one alarming note in this study is that arts 




forms” In the new study, Sunil Iyengar, NEA's Director for Research and Analysis, calls 
arts participation a “vital form of personal and social engagement.” (NEA, 2009, p. 1). 
Public art in the formal sense is art that is commissioned and ow ed by the state, 
but my here the focus is on any form of artistic creation,(most often  unregulated 
projects) that is intended for the public and social spaces in our lives. This presence of art 
in daily experience can help to reconceptualize the processes and meanings within a 
public space, and can alert citizens to public concerns, as well as to each other’s 
individual fears and desires, through our creative synapses: “The public artist today 
engages issues of history, site, politics, class, and environment. These multiple visions 
may help to transform communities as they find common grounds" (Mitchell, 1992). 
Hannah Arendt (2006) originated the idea of the "public realm." She used it to mean a 
public where members meet to discuss common political desires and ambitions. My 
concept of "the public" speaks to this understanding, as well as to a more abstract public 
life that is felt in the spirit of individuals, regardless of whether or not they are physically 
participating in the political scene. I argue that this reinvigoration of the sincerity of our 
public lives must first occur so that these new relationships to the public can ultimately 
lead to an inspired and active political body. 
Friedrich Schiller (1794/2004) argues that it is particularly the rol  of the artist in 
society to seek meaning beyond the paternalism of the watered-down symbols of popular 
will: “But how does the artist secure himself against the corruptions of his time, which 




dignity and to Law, not downwards to fortune and to everyday needs” (p. 52). It is key 
that the artistic experience as a social good is a bi-level process; first, the individual 
experiences art and gains access to the vital emotional knowledge that artistic action and 
reflection provide, and, second, that individual rebellion then affects us as members of a 
community and as a democratic society. 
An increase in public art projects would not only create greater respect for and 
involvement in the community, it would also have a transformative effect on the publicas 
viewers. Especially those not often exposed to art would have new opportunities to 
experience the reorganization of reality that art provides. In this way, public art would 
reinvigorate the American individual.  
I will try to clarify the distinction between mainstream artnd visionary art. I 
assert that, although all art has political possibilities for reawakening (through 
rearrangement) and engagement (through the critical thought that the rearrangement 
invites) the participant, there is a crucial difference between mainstream art and visionary 
art. Mainstream art encompasses two primary ideas. The first is that art becomes 
mainstream, however alternative or avant-garde it may have once been, once it is 
unveiled into the public realm and has reached the desire of a critic l mass. This desire in 
our supply-and-demand-run popular culture forces a repetition of the art that yields it 
diluted and drained of its original effect. Once it is repeated many times among 
individuals in society, it loses its ability to create a fresh arrangement of our 
environments and our beliefs and thus cannot be truly transformative. The second is that 




transformation, in mind. Other works of mainstream art, as mentioned, began as 
transformative works, ideas, and movements; but after passing through the filtering 
process of dissemination into popular consciousness, and because of overproduction, 
oversaturation, and overanalysis, have lost or diminished their original power.  
I define visionary or transformative artistic creation, following Nietzsche and 
Camus, as a dialectic of the irrational and the rational. All art creates participatory 
empowered behavior, but rebellious transformative art is the form of art where political 
progress can be best accessed and articulated. Camus (1951/1991) wrote that “[R]ebellion 
is a preliminary to all civilizations.” (p. 273). He defined rebellion first as an act of 
creation and concluded that “[w]ith rebellion, awareness is born” (p.15). Mainstream art, 
despite its rehearsed aesthetic rearrangements, fails to connect the viewers with questions 
that will engage them over time. Transformative art, especially public and social 
visionary art, is needed to seek out and materialize alternate possibilities for our 
individual lives, for our societies, and for the political systems by which they abide.  
Public art encourages participation in public life3 and is a key factor in the 
development of a “civil religion.” While that neither should be nor need be the ultimate 
                                                
3  Hilda Hein (1976) aims to develop a theory that links our aesthetic experiences to our 
political life. She argues that there are three main theories associated with this relationship: the contrapuntal 
theory, which uses art to conserve the status quo by appeasing citizens into conformity; the propadeutic 
theory , which argues that art is the foundation on which we build the structure and order that defines our 
lives;  and finally the propulsive theory, which say  that art functions as a critic of existing reality and is the 
discoverer of new forms for the future. Hein characterizes her view as accepting ideas from all three  
theories, while emphasizing the development of a truly “self-determining and self-transcending” self (p. 
150). I struggle with Hein’s conceptualization of what she calls traditional contrapuntal theories of art. She 
argues that these theories characterize art as an outlet for the inevitable disorder that ultimately sustains the 
stability of existing daily life. By “whole” she means the status quo and therefore labels this understanding 
of art as conservative. I argue that, within this contrapuntal theory, if we view the “whole” as a “universal 




goal in America, the American character is lacking poetry, empathy, and true political 
desire, while pragmatism and possessive individualism is encouraged at all levels of 
social life. Despite the invigorating nature of our recent and historically significant 
presidential election (which is, in itself invigorating), we ar still in a thinly veiled crisis 
and could use an injection of true civic virtue in our society. Since the latter decades of 
the 20th century, the status quo has advanced largely undisputed. Not since the upheavals 
of the 1960s have there been widespread efforts to create a new politics and a society 
with a new arrangement of values. 
Personal artistic experience does not lead directly to institutional political 
participation. But it expands the limits of our conception of what is possible for ourselves 
and for our society. Artistic experience creates action through an expanded engagement 
with the world. This dissertation’s approach does not fault and discard the complacent 
last men; instead it faces them and encourages them to expand their imaginations through 
art by promoting public art projects.  
 
Methodology 
I have consulted a wide variety of sources. Within a paradigm that links our 
driving political questions with the world of art, my primary focus has been on Western 
works of political philosophy that not only provide the basis for many of the arguments 
of this work, but also supply the lens through which to evaluate the multitude of potential 
other sources. Drawing heavily on modern and postmodern thinkers; the ideas of 




foundational influences of this work for their shared belief in the power f art, and their 
adamant refusal to accept everyday life as the Establishment (or Christian morality) 
presents it to us. Following the more directly political works, inquiries into the nature of 
art, and the role of art in society, are important sources. Relevant discussions of art and 
the links between art-making (and experiencing) and political action, by leading art 
critics and curators, as well as by practitioners of social art (the artists themselves), serve 
as an important point of view that both complements and contrasts with the political 
works.  
To address the driving concerns of this dissertation- how to reinvigorate 
American democratic culture with new ideas and new human connections, as well as how 
to reignite with passion the senses and the public participatory desi es of Americans- the 
ideas of a unique combination of theorists was called into examination. The query began 
with a new look at some of Tocqueville’s most salient ideas as presented primarily in 
Volume II of his Democracy in America. This was important as Tocqueville is well 
known for his aristocratic perspective on democratic life in America, and the consequent 
negative characteristics, especially of mediocrity and materialism, that he locates in a 
culture of equality of conditions. While his clear love for fading aristocratic values is 
evident throughout his works, the focus here is not on whether he ultimately sid s with 
democracy or with aristocracy. Rather, I point here to the detailed nd powerful warnings 
he provides on the dangers that democrats may fall prey to, if citizens living in 




The use of the ideas in this work, that I argue are most valuable in Tocqueville’s 
DA, was not only necessary to locate the ideas in this dissertation withi  the unique 
characteristics of the American context, but also to establish a theoretical basis for the 
argument that democratic conditions, while clearly a necessary basis for modern 
government, justice, and social life, also inherently breed a culture that can easily and 
often comfortably relax into conformity and complacency, while still reaping many of the 
benefits of democratic life. Beyond this, that one of Tocqueville’s only solutions to 
safeguard democrats against these dangers is the involvement in spiritual life. 
Tocqueville speaks here of religion, but it can be inferred from his words that it is not the 
religious rules themselves that are important to combat the complacency of excessive 
individualism brought on primarily by a focus on commercial success (though the rules 
of religious life in America, he did argue, create needed structure and order, though this is 
another point altogether), but rather the attention and connection to otherworldly, non-
material feelings and values. This valuable point created the launching pad for the 
argument made here that a spiritual component to everyday democratic life is needed to 
reawaken the spirit, and the self-awareness and self-exploration that is required in order 
to foster interest and participation in the development of the world outside of oneself. In 
this work, the access door to a spiritual life is conceived as encouragement of creativity 
through art. The argument follows that in order to expand the availability of art- often 
considered to be an elitist or intimidating hobby or knowledge- it must be available in the 




Moving forward, in considering why art has the ability to produce deep flings 
of self-awareness, innovation, and connectivity with others, the ideas of both Nietzsche 
and Camus quickly leap to mind. Both of these thinkers understood the vast political 
power involved in the sense of discovery, revolution, and humanitarian justice, that lives 
within art. Inspired by the true individual freedom that can be reached in denying, at least 
temporarily, the norms and morals of society, both Nietzsche and Camus, in varying 
contexts, advocated for increased self-awareness, and a more authentic and empathetic 
approach to questions of justice and morality. Beyond this, it was necessary to seek 
examples of philosophical artists who employed vivid techniques in their work that drew 
readers and viewers into an alternate otherworldly realm of encounter with the spiritual 
and the irrational. Among others, the Romantics, the Dadaists, and the Surrealists, each 
with their own mission in mind, exemplified the notion that valuable knowledge and 
insight into the human condition can be gained through creative and spiritual explorations 
of the irrational and the unconscious. Rimbaud’s unrestrained style of poetry is an oft-
noted inspiration for living by instinct, and de Sade through his subversive wr ting that 
explores the animalistic predisposition of humanity, likewise defends a morality that is 
individually defined, and accessed not through rationality, but rather through nature. Both 
as an overarching foundation and as the conclusive glue that highlights the revolutionary 
power of spirituality, instinct, and art, as seen within all the theorists’ ideas that are 
explored in this work, Marcuse provides valuable insight on the many links between art 




In the course of this project I examined many recent endeavors in soc al and 
public art, with a focus on New York City over the last several yers and on grassroots 
before highly funded ventures. I covered disciplines ranging from the visual arts to 
performance art and culled the most challenging and unique ideas to discuss here. The 
research explained here examined the developments and successes of new public creative 
projects and the artists who conceived and created them. Many of these projects are 
detailed and reviewed in several notable news and cultural sources, particularly New York 
Magazine and The New York Times. Using these often-updated sources as guidance, this 
work also aims to serve as an overview of developments in the public art world, so that 
we may understand better how the philosophical claims of this work are encountered in 
current creative projects. 
The Argument Further Explained 
Psychologists have produced an abundance of studies on the mind processes that take 
place during artistic interaction to examine how it alters our psyches and why creativity 
makes us feel good.4 The field of art therapy alone attests to the importance of these 
processes. Even in the mainstream, it is understood that a creative outlet is vital to a 
balanced life. How many times have we heard stories of a bored Wall Street financial 
analyst who comes alive after he (often by chance) discovers pottery, photography, or the 
art of cooking? This situation is most often described as the need for release in an 
                                                
4  Some of the best work in the area of the psychology f art can be found in: Arnheim 





everyday life that is otherwise patterned and controlled. Not only does creativity provide 
balance in a world dominated by reason, it can also serve as a distraction and escape from 
the difficult realities of life.  
Some say that the creative blanket keeps us warm, just as drugs do – we can lose 
our inhibitions, and forget our troubles and responsibilities, at least for a short while. 
While this may be true, the psychological fulfillment that comes from artistic engagement 
has more important ramifications than the momentary joy of forget. 
Forgetting takes us away from the world around us, whereas artistic engagement 
brings us closer to it by providing the opportunity to engage with the world on our own 
terms. When we create or encounter art, we may momentarily breathe free from accepted 
reality, but we are able to re-imagine the way that we perceive the happenings that 
surround us. This is what makes art inherently political, affording the ability to wield 
power over that which we otherwise have little or no control. Individual ch nge must 
precede a change in everyday reality. We can see Ii the realm of art the world as we 
would like it to be, and we can show others the reality of new possibilities through art.  
To identify the specific nature of the positive political power of artistic experience 
is not an easy task. The relationship between art and democracy, and more generally, 
between art and public life, is fruitful, though it is not often direct.5 Like most 
relationships between realms of life that are intrinsically subjective and ever-changing, 
the correlation between experiencing art and experiencing a more active citizenry is 
                                                
5  See works on how artistic experience influences political life, and on how art can be 





difficult to simplify and cleanly categorize. Despite this relationship’s resistance to easy 
understanding, its existence must be nurtured, not ignored.  
I am not arguing that when one experiences art one is then, as a direct result, 
encouraged to participate in the political system. Unfortunately, there is no easy formula 
for determining a direct route from individual experience to an inclination or desire to 
take an active part in the political process or in political change. Many theorists of 
American politics have picked away at this puzzle. Most have concluded that people are 
guided primarily by self-interest and that therefore – if you subscribe to this belief about 
human nature – game theory adequately determines that they will most likely become a 
part of the free rider problem unless there are clear incentives, or rewards, for 
participation. Before trying to identify why or why not a person votes, we must try to 
understand why or why not that person cares enough about society and others, to vote.  
The real question for American politics, and for the study of politica  behavior in 
general, is, how does one become more inclined to participate in public life? Besides 
offering external, tangible rewards for participating in the political system, it is difficult 
to determine why any person desires (or decides) to participate in our political institutions 
and processes. Ultimately, natural diversity among people, even concerning civic virtue, 
is the determinant for participation. In other words, some are naturally more inclined to 
care, and others not. It may be more fruitful to examine why an individual becomes more 
interested and active in public life in general. Participating in public life is a necessary 
precursor to participation in the system and in politics. Personal artistic experience does 




through an expanded engagement with the world. Experiencing art can draw people 
inward at first, but then it leads to greater participation in public life, which ultimately 
leads to more democratic action (not necessarily in political processes but in political 
change more widely understood).  
Art cannot resist its political nature. In rearranging, it agitates and questions 
reality. An experiment in art extracts moments and cross-sections from the landscape of 
life around us. Art may emphasize or de-emphasize, or invert, or show parts without their 
whole, or show the whole empty of some of its parts. This entirely new view of looking 
at something of which we already have some understanding can foster a much-needed 
reawakening of the everyday.6 Making mention of a poem by Rilke on art, Hannah 
Arendt (1998) writes, “In the case of art works, reification is more than mere 
transformation; it is transfiguration, a veritable metamorphosis in which it is as though 
the course of nature which wills that all fire burn to ashes is reverted and even dust can 
burst into flames” (p. 168). If we believe Baudrillard and Glaser (1994) that life has 
become a mere “simulation” of life, then it follows naturally that art can stimulate the 
simulation and, in creating something new (a new perception of reality), can reattach  
sincere meaning to the daily transactions that have become predictable. When life is 
rearranged, it loses order, if only temporarily. It is in thisde truction that possibilities are 
born.  
                                                
6  See works on the transformative properties of creativ  experience: Booth (1997) and 




I argue that art is a political force with a natural ability to motivate participants in 
a variety of ways. In artistic experience, we can access a true independence and freedom, 
because of our ability within art to rearrange everyday reality s we please, and we can 
also experience known ideas and feelings in new ways, as well as gain empathy through 
universal insight into individual thoughts and emotions. It is emotional vision (the realm 
of poetry) that is able to take precedence over societal or “rational” vision, that which is 
generally accepted as the ‘truth’ of reality. Being able to stake a personal claim – of the 
spirit – over our environments and over life – we can begin to invest ourselves genuinely 
in the way we experience daily life. In all movement(s) of creation there is a vital 
component of ownership – it is an overcoming of the alienation Marx (1844/978) 
described – but through the spirit, not through the mechanisms of the external economy. 
Hence the greater that sphere of the creation of ownership (the more often and varied it 
is), the more that individuals become spiritually tied to the world, an  to the public life 
that they have now at least partially created. 
Through art, we can expand our imaginative capabilities to live beyond the status 
quo. True, or rebellious art, linked with the progress of time (the material conditions), can 
create a stronger democracy (not necessarily direct, but community driven) that can save 
us from the manufactured nature of capitalist society. Capitalism is an economic system, 
but its philosophy inherently contains a need to encompass culture as well, and 
particularly a need to inspire that society to embrace capitalism. Foucault (1991), writing 
about the problem of dispersed bureaucratic powers in the 20th century, termed it 




individuals it works to exploit. The fundamental basis of all politics and economics, even 
if they claim to be limited to their own stated spheres of power, is the individual, and 
consequently they will transform individuals to conform to their needs. Hence a culture is 
an accurate reflection of the political and economic systems it engages. In this sense, 
systems, whether of organization or rules, become like leaders, with egos and a cult of 
personality, who bewitch their followers into obedience.  
Accordingly, artistic production, also does not escape the tentacles of capitalism. 
Artistic creation becomes part of a system simply because we live under a capitalism so 
omnipotent that nothing, not even our own bodies or our ideas (our art), escapes the value 
game. Now, in the 21st century, even the most alternative-seeking ideas are quickly 
commodified and thus stripped of their visionary potential. My concern h e is not with 
the proliferation and popularity of mainstream art, or with the almost instantaneous 
commodification (transformation from visionary to mainstream) of any object or idea that 
is released into the public realm, although recognition of these issues lies behind all the 
ideas presented here.  
Some advise that experimentation not be confused with rebellion. This is a vital 
distinction, although it is true that rebellion often begins with experimental thought and 
behavior. To attempt new possibilities – to be open to the new and to experiment – is the 
foundation of true rebellion. If we do not try, we do not live. Not to attempt the new or 
the unknown is to conform. Experiments transform an unexplained field by expanding its 
contours. Disordering or reordering, even if such rearrangement fails to achieve its 




market), is much like a “failed” revolt that ultimately inspires political change: it has 
nonetheless expanded the imagination of the collective consciousness. Sometimes, a 
stimulating, or strange, or interesting occurrence, does not immediately and noticeably 
change you, but there is rebellion in the sensory experience, even if the subject is not 
fully or immediately aware of the rebellion. Revolt can happen not only in the senses but 
also in our subconscious; this is not the revolt of our material or rati nal world. If we can 
experience our creative selves, it is not creating beauty but creating change that is the 
prime transformation. It is not conformist aesthetics but, rather, rebellious art that matters 
for politics. 
Even intellectual study of an artwork can do a great deal to expand the 
imagination, to tweak one’s senses and perceptions. Arts education is nece sary, but 
visionary public art and interactive social art make the experience of art democratic and 
confrontational in a way that attempts to alter one's everyday view and understanding of 
the outside world. Confrontation with artwork inevitably alters the indiv dual by allowing 
one to feel that new, alternative ideas are conceivable. 
The Social and Political Nature of Art  
The question of what makes an object, or an experience, a work of “art” re ches 
beyond the concern for identifying limits on the validity of an artwo k; it seeks to 
understand what it is about art that permits it to appear in infinite forms and dimensions – 
in the people, objects, and ideas of everyday life. Art, and especially the newest, most 
visionary ideas, is truly a reorganizing – often fantastically or poetically – of the world 




concept, it has become almost elusive – it is difficult to restrain it long enough to 
understand it – as the condition of existence. Art has found its way into countless 
sociological and psychological studies, for the very reason that art is a way to understand 
how people view each other, themselves, the world. We must constantly adjust for a 
fuller understanding of what art is endlessly becoming. 
In one sense, a housewife who draws with her toddler after school is making art 
just as the professional sculptor with the MFA and gallery representation is. Despite there 
being a difference between the two situations – related both to the self-consciousness of 
the proclaimed artist and to the level to which the artist and the artwork rearrange our 
dependable perceptions – whether it is art or craft, the act of creation always holds the 
potential to be transformative. This fact must not be denied or overlooked. 
Experience with art, particularly in creating it, is an unequivocal good, regardless 
of the ultimate value of the work. This is so because all creative action is a 
reconfiguration of reality that is necessary to access a broader imaginative capability. All 
art is a productive experience that engages the creative mind and spirit – at least for a 
moment. The problem is that much redundant art concludes the creative process with its 
end product, and the viewer is thus left uninspired. This is the experienc  with 
mainstream, or what can be called “plastic”, art. 
 We must conclude that the value of art in engendering more empowered, open-
minded individuals is in its sincerity. This focus on sincere or authentic creation, rather 
than on the aesthetic evaluation of the end product, means that all art, despite its 




reality and of established everyday perceptions, although far more slowly than truly 
rebellious artwork, and most often, to little political or communal benefit (sometimes 
even to negative effect in this sense, as mainstream art often re l cts ruling ideals and 
images, rather than genuine rearrangements of the world and its ideas). It is only human 
though for us to be physically and emotionally inspired by “aesthetics.” Consider the 
average corporate-commissioned, large outdoor sculpture; even if it is trite, mainstream 
art, when standing next to it (say, a large stainless steel structure of tree limbs), you can 
still feel transported, affected by its sheer size. It can still break the monotony, the known 
structure of the everyday. This is the first-order social good of public art – that any 
beautification or reconfiguration of public space endows that space with social value. In 
other words, even a conformist work of public art can create an emotional relationship 
between the individual viewer and the space in which it resides.7 This is the power of 
aesthetics – even in its regurgitated, unchallenging forms, it can inspire. 
One individual, or one philosophical work, could never claim to determine the 
boundaries between expected experience and creative experience for all other individuals 
in their relationships with art and with various artworks. It is enough simply to establish 
that there is a way to experience art that is inspirational and self-empowering, and a way 
that is expected and mass produced. Both are important to public and social life; all art in 
the public, even conformist art, creates a stronger sense of pride and interest in the public 
                                                
7  See some of the excellent works that discuss boththe theory and the practice of public 




which is vital to a sincere feeling of community,8,but it is rebellious or visionary art that 
encourages within people the expansion of their imaginative capabilities, their true 
independence (knowledge of self), and their sense of empathy. Ultimatey, the presence 
of rebellious art on our streets brings creative and emotional knowledge into the public 
arena and uses that knowledge as a tool to bring about a stronger natural desire for people 
to care about and participate in their communities and in their political destinies.9 
Some artworks and ideas rise above the rest in their rebellious and often anarchic 
rearrangements. Visionary artists, those who forever altered th  way we perceive 
ourselves, and our world, and continue to influence the way in which we perc ive even 
the most fundamental forms and concepts – from Da Vinci to Goya, Van Gogh to 
Picasso, Duchamp to Dali, choreographer and dancer Merce Cunningham to the avant-
garde composer John Cage – take great strides in educating the participants of their art, 
by actively working to opening minds to new possibilities. Notwithstanding that any 
creation of art is inherently a form of political action in its rearrangements, there are 
many different forms of art-making. Functional art (which some term “craft,” “plastic,” 
or mainstream art) is regarded here as conformist and redundant. And, of course, there is 
what is termed political art. Political art conjures at least two understandings – 
                                                
8  Henk E. S. Woldring, in his studies on social justice as a work of art, argues, “We have 
already seen that beauty is a kind of good. Something beautiful may be called good not only because it 
gives pleasure when known but also because it fulfills a human need; thus, we desire what will satisfy our 
need” (cited in Ramos, 2000, p. 289).   
9  See works that link civic engagement, community and rt: Corbitt and Nix-Early (2003). 
and the highly interesting data born of the 2002 Survey of Public Participation in the Arts:(National 
Endowment for the Arts, 2007) and the 2008 Survey of Public Participation in the Arts: (National 





propaganda art, which is directly and overtly political action; and political y indirect art, 
which has political ramifications in that it encourages participation in life through its 
rearrangements. It is this latter understanding of political art that is rebellious and 
transformative. Art can be "political," as opposed to rebelliously political, when it 
directly employs historical facts or political ideas to protest or shed light on political 
concerns. It can be as vague as art that protests a problem such as violence against 
women in society, to art that is used by political campaigns and civic groups to create an 
organized movement or to incite participation in a specific event. Poli ical art uses artistic 
experience, imagery, and language to voice a political idea or concern, in a less direct and 
less formal manner than traditional political appeals do.  
Quite differently, transformative artistic experience does not requi e that the 
artistic experience directly invoke specific or tangible political concerns. It may do so, 
but it can also create a "political turn" within alienated postmodern persons through  
simple transformations of space that enable the ability to envisio  alternative and 
rearrangements and through imagination-bending suggestions of alternative approaches 
to our public spaces and to our personal and political lives. All art, whether rebellious or 
merely conformist, is vital to a healthy imaginative life, and all public art is a benefit to 
our public culture. Visionary or transformative art throws a wider maginative net. It can 
serve as a prime catalyst for the individual political rebellion that ultimately culminates in 
a more active, thoughtful, and sincerely connected citizenry. 
While it is doubtless valuable to create politically motivated art-, which raises 




useful vehicle through which to address social and political ideas. Its seeming 
disconnection from non-aesthetic realms of life enables it to communicate radical ideas in 
a nonthreatening way. This type of direct appropriation of artistic creation is vital to 
political action and change and must not be overlooked (by citizens or by governments 
who are able to fund such projects). That said, this argument regarding the link between 
artistic creation and experience and political action is primarily of a different nature.  
Chapter Breakdown 
Chapter One begins with a discussion of democracy in America today, and draws 
heavily on Tocqueville’s (1835/2002) observations on American life in the 1830s and 
1840s. His ideas concerning the role of spirituality and civil associati ns in American 
public and private life are discussed in comparison with the characteristi s of these 
institutions and spheres today. Tocqueville argues both that the spirituality of religion and 
associations support each other (and that religion fosters association) in several ways, and 
that religion provides a necessary balance with attention to the immaterial where a focus 
on material pursuits tends to prevail. I then introduce the argument that art and artistic 
experience can replace the role of religion by providing an outlet from the "established 
reality" of everyday life (again, both public and private) and by enabling the self to 
connect with its immaterial needs and desires and thus access feelings of unity with 
nature and gain a stronger sense of community. Saying that with creative and spiritual 
knowledge one gains access to feelings of community, implies at least three interrelated 
ideas. First is the idea of community, which is the philosophical concept that 




is also the concept of community, which is contained in our local cultures – the physical 
environment of sights, sounds, images, and voices that we encounter each day. Finally 
there is the overarching concept of the universal human community, which e access 
through the feelings of empathy and connectivity that can be gained from our 
experiencing through art what is felt universally in our everyday moments. The best 
artists and artworks capture these universal forms and ideas in ever-new ways. 
Chapter Two picks up the discussion of both the nature and the role of art in 
society. This chapter explores Nietzsche’s (1872/1967) attempt to establish, if not a 
definition, at least an outline of the characteristics of transcendent art and creative 
experience. Nietzsche’s understanding of the Dionysian, or irrational, realm of human 
experience introduces the necessity of passionate release (the b ginning of art) to provide 
us moments of universal connectivity and interrelatedness. It is when t e instinctual 
Dionysian glimpse is processed, and made lasting, by Apollonian reflection, that art 
becomes visionary. Through organization of the alternative reality that Dionysian 
experience enables within a person, a consciousness change, or an expansion of the 
imagination, takes place. From this process emerges political praxis. 
Nietzsche’s conception of the union of Dionysius and Apollo as the overc ming 
of tragedy, or transcendent art, is traced from the early ideasexpressed in The Birth of 
Tragedy (1872/1967), through the more nuanced discussions of The Gay Science 
(1882/1974). I agree with the later argument that the dialectic of these two opposing 




art, between mainstream conformist art and courageous, sincere exp ssions of the 
spiritual and the existential, is explored.  
Chapter Three discusses Camus’ (1951/1991) understanding of art and its 
relationship to revolutionary ideas and to politics in general. He saw art as rebellion and, 
following Nietzsche’s similar claims, as an eternal fusion of two opposing realms – those 
of the rational and the irrational. Camus encouraged a new understanding of 
individualism that encompasses a unity of all selves. To support and highlig t some of 
Camus’ themes in a contemporary setting, this chapter explores how an experience with 
artwork, whether on the street or within the confines of a museum, creates an emotional 
and philosophical change within a person that is more important to a fulfilled life, and to 
a political life, than is often thought. Carol Duncan (1995) and Caroline Levine (2007) 
provide supportive arguments for the value and power of art in a community. Duncan 
observes the transformative potency of the rituals that are accessed when art is 
experienced in museums. Levine asserts that the presence of challenging avant-garde art 
within a democracy keeps the democracy committed to a freedom of ideas.  
Chapter Four examines the importance of dialectics in life and in visionary art, 
and thus also in politics. Drawing primarily on the ideas of Rimbaud and de Sade (1990), 
I show that the eternal tension, between what is irrational, passionate, natural, and what is 
rational, ordered, and a product of reflection, is the most necessary component of 
rebellious or visionary art. In the parallel relationship within art, there exist two 
interrelated aspects of art-making that demonstrate its inheretly political nature. First 




the Dionysian moment), when the artist makes art out of found objects, empty space, 
everyday life. In these rearrangements of in art-making, there is creation and destruction, 
elation as well as meditation. Then, whether consciously created or naturally apparent, 
there is art’s modification of reality to illuminate the universal, the existential; life as 
poetry. This ability of art to provide an image or a sound for the parts of the human 
condition that are difficult to see or describe, can be seen in works that either literally or 
abstractly evoke universal themes like love, death, pain, laughter, family, nd work and 
present them in provocative new ways. 
Visionary, or rebellious art, is fundamentally transgressive; it is a negation of the 
established reality. In reorganizing and newly envisioning the world, art provides, for the 
creator and the viewer, at the very least contemplation, and within this reflection lies 
great potential for new viewpoints and behaviors to form within the self that challenge 
accepted ideas and possibilities. It is often said that you can or must experience the 
particular in order to get in touch with what is universal. We live within a narrow field of 
vision but can imagine the contours of the extended image. Similarly, Dionysian dances 
with the particular allow us momentarily (and it can only be in moments) to transcend 
daily existence and feel, not think or organize or value or judge, but feel what is human. 
Dionysian glimpses provide universal understanding in the sense of cohesiveness and 
wholeness. As we expand our picture of the world and of life, the picture not only 
becomes more whole, but also begins to take on an entirely new form. The new image 
reminds us of both our ultimate and our mundane connectedness to all others, despite our 




alienating force of excessive individualism: “Eternally chained to only one single little 
fragment of the whole, Man himself grew to be only a fragment: … he never develops the 
harmony of being." (p. 40). 
We then come to Chapter Five’s argument that there has been an ever -increasing 
move to produce public and social art. This final chapter catalogues some challenging 
and visionary projects over the past two years, enacted primarily in New York City, that 
have artistically confronted the citizens of the city. My goal is to demonstrate the various 
strains of the current public and social art movement and show how its many different 
projects all aim to contribute to individual awareness, liberation, empowerment, and 
community participation. Finally, I assert the need for increased private and 
governmental funding for not only arts awareness and the educational and cultural 
programs that support it, but also for accessible and open-to-the-public sources of 
funding for a variety of public and social art projects. Such projects would help 
traditionally unsupported artists and the many persons whom the art would reach on the 
streets, especially those who might not otherwise confront challenging art. These types of 
experiences build and support a community-oriented, cosmopolitan mindset.  
It is vital that the American government (and the American private sector, too) 
fund the arts, and especially public art projects, with greater att ntion, generosity, and 
consistency than is now forthcoming. Visionary art must now become social and public 
in the broadest sense. It must work to awaken truly individual instinct and thought, unite 
communities, and challenge the false mainstream conception of the lone individual. The 




“happenings” of the 1960s, and graffiti and outsider art became frontline discussions 
even in the mainstream art world. The defining movement in art for the 21st  century has 
been to put it on the street. We must support and encourage this still evolving trend, 
which is vital to the revitalization and advancement of our public life and our democracy. 
Conclusions 
The aim of the explorations in this work is to make a contribution to two main 
areas of political philosophy and political science in general by looking at ideas of 
participation and community in a democracy, and by highlighting the need for 
revitalizing changes that seek true freedom through art. In this way, the work seeks to be 
relevant to theorists in the fields of democratic participation, to practitioners of 
democracy in all its forms, and to artists (particular artists who value public or social art) 
and those who fund and organize arts organizations. Further, it endeavors to add
ongoing discussions regarding the foundations of democracy and the problem of citizen 
participation (or lack of it), as well as to theories of the utility of nonviolent rebellion, and 
revolutions, to a healthy democracy in the 21st century. Beyond the relevance to the civil 
society literature, challenging and visionary art in the public sphere makes available the 
knowledge borne of creativity to all who cross its path, and thus promotes a theory of art 
as a tool of liberation from everyday reality for the individual. 
Art must focus on connecting members of the human community; it is the only 
realm able to move beyond physical reality and the limitations of history and the 
everyday. This has always been art’s power, even under circumstance  where art was not 




of life, a reorganization of the senses. Even before the presence of ov rtly impressionistic 
movements in art like cubism, surrealism, expressionism, conceptual art, even classical 
and realist painters and sculptors created images that reinvented and reinterpreted the 
divine as well as the everyday, so as o provoke universal emotions and experiences. Even 
within the realist style, visionary artists could represent transgressive ideas and emotions. 
Today in the United States, and around the world as well, outside the urban 
centers and pockets of communities that house concentrated art worlds, the social and 
interactive landscape of art remains largely hidden or nonexistent. For both sincerity 
(genuine interest and involvement) and complementary progress, democracy must 
ultimately rely on a true collective of individuals – each endowed with independent 
reflection on participation and community – not merely the conformist and complacent 
“popular opinion” of Tocqueville’s (1835/2002) fears. This is what Camus (1951/1991) 
meant when he argued not that attention the individual is less important than attention to 
the whole, but that the idea of the individual must be re-conceptualized to include a vital 
connectivity with, and reflection of, all other individuals in the definitio  of one human. 
Tocqueville (1835/2002) argued that conditions of equality inevitably yield control, and 
potentially dangerous oppression, by popular will – a new institution, a new form of 
tyranny, a new paradigm for understanding the structure of society – that for Tocqueville 
paralleled aristocracy’s hierarchical system of power and wealth. Instead of formal, de 
jure proscriptions for behavior in society, democracy in America cre ted and upheld rules 
through elements of de facto and dispersed power. Marcuse (1970a) argued that the 




Marxian class theory, it succeeds in incorporating all classes of individuals into its grasp 
of uniformity and sterility of desires. It is through this historical condition, these 
moments in the progression of capitalism as an economic system, that we must address 
democracy as a political system.  
As Marcuse, Foucault, and others have described, capitalism has grown from a 
system of laissez-faire supply and demand with a militant focus n profit to one that has 
transferred the assembly-line perspective to the realm of the psychological. When in a 
democracy individual needs – private needs –are consistently felt in tandem with the 
majority that has created them, liberation from "established reality" is imperative if both 
authentic individual freedom and the desire to participate in public life are to be accessed. 
So, what can be said of today’s democracy? What can be said for individual political 
involvement and empowerment when even the most private of desires are esentially 
controlled by the Establishment through popular culture? How can particition and the 
desire for change be inspired within each individual? How does art expand the 
imagination and thus heighten a desire for praxis and community? Theseare ome of the 





EVERYDAY REBELLION: USING TOCQUEVILLE TO ARGUE THE 
NEED FOR A REVITALIZATION OF AMERICAN S OCIETY AND 
DEMOCREACY THROUGH ART 
Each individual allows himself to be attached because he sees that it 
is not a man or a class but the people themselves that hold the end of 
the chain.…Choosing the representatives of this power from time to 
time … will not prevent them from losing little by little the faculty of 
thinking, feeling, and acting by themselves. 
—Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 
 
Many thinkers in the Western tradition – Marx, Nietzsche, Freud, Camus, 
Marcuse, Gramsci, Beauvoir, among others – have critiqued everyday life and the role 
both society and the state play in that reality. In various ways, they have asserted the need 
for an awakening of true liberty within each individual. As we seek answers to today’s 
concerns with democratic life in the United States, it makes sen e to consider the ideas of 
this tradition. An interesting addition to this tradition lies in the work of Alexis de 
Tocqueville, who was more than a sociologist famous for his comprehensive observations 
on American life. Rather, he was a political philosopher, the first to call attention to the 




democracy, in his Democracy in America (2002).10 Writing around the same time that 
Marx (1844/1978) was finishing the essays that became known as the 1844 Manuscripts, 
Tocqueville intended to study America’s justice system. He wasa young lawyer in 
service to the French court after the revolution but was so fascinated by America that he 
stayed longer than intended to examine and experience the many different layers of 
American democratic life.11 Some of the most salient and eloquent passages in 
Democracy in America concern the danger that individual thought, cultural and civic 
activity, and a genuine sense of community will collapse into the rule of a complacent 
and conformist popular will.  
There is a crisis in American democracy today, aspects of which are 
contemporary and others that are age-old, that must be addressed. Further, it is not 
enough simply to cite the problems that repeat, such as low partici tion in the political 
process. Today’s crisis of democracy is reflective of the passage of time; with age, our 
Republic’s power grows more and more dispersed, and becomes further internal zed 
within individuals. This increasingly invisible, yet insidious power in society, results in 
increasing feelings of a Marxian notion of alienation, of division among people, as 
popular opinion (the true power in American democracy) wheedles its way further into 
their very needs and desires, and the ‘myth of the individual’ – a key part of alienation – 
                                                
10  Many texts provide interpretations of Tocqueville’s Democracy in America. From 
examinations that place Tocqueville in the context of the history of political thought (Wolin, 2001) to hose 
which explore various applications of Tocqueville’s ideas to social and political concerns today (Masugi, 
1991). 
11  See some of the exceptional works on Tocqueville’s ife, and on the story behind his 
enormously popular and influential Democracy in America, such as George Wilson Pierson’s (1959) classic 
Tocqueville in America, Hugh Brogan’s (2007) Alexis de Tocqueville: A Life, and Joseph Epstein’s (2009) 




is maintained. Popular opinion, in the United States and almost everywhere els  in our 
globalized postmodern world, is heavily reliant on the capitalism and materialism that 
created the globalism to begin with; and both globalization and popular opinion benefit 
from organized alienation. Tocqueville’s fears about Americans' acting as a ‘timid herd’ 
from the force of equality joined with popular opinion in a democracy havebeen coupled 
with the current dominance in cultural life of a complex media structu e, a focus on 
connectivity by way of the Internet and a level of consumerism and globalization he  
never could have predicted, despite his prescience.  
In considering this current lackluster state of citizen involvement in public affairs, 
and the unique political culture of the United States that accommodates this, Tocqueville 
serves as a guide to understanding why and how Americans have a tendency to focus 
more on work than on communal and spiritual affairs, and the implications hat this 
characteristic has on public life and on the individual psyche. Tocqueville observed that 
religious and spiritual life was necessary in the everyday life of the American, in order 
for democrats to avoid falling prey to the tyranny of popular opinion that is in rinsic to all 
democratic systems. The need both to acknowledge and develop our spiritual lives is 
critical to my primary argument- that public art can revitalize and expand individual 
imagination and motivation- for several reasons. First, since people are comprised 
equally of the inclination for reason, as much as of instinct and emotion, it is crucial to 
nurture both aspects of human nature. Second, with the influence of Locke’s work on the 
development of the U.S. Constitution, as well as the work ethic of the Puritans, American 




science, while knowledge learned of creativity and spirituality seems to play second 
fiddle. Third, Tocqueville’s work shows us that these tendencies within American 
democracy both have serious consequences on the safety of true liberty, as popular 
opinion dominates, and that they can be confronted and controlled through experience 
with the otherworldliness and empathetic reminders of religion. And last, where 
Tocqueville employs religion in his theory, I insert artistic exp rience and public art in 
particular. 
His theory of the role of religion in American public life, and consequently, in 
American democracy, creates an interesting point of departure for the theory presented 
here. In DA, both Tocqueville’s art, and the best elements of his political theory, are a 
result of his ability to vividly describe almost every element of American life, both public 
and private, through the lens of an equality of conditions. It is his overlying belief that the 
fundamental experience of being regarded by society as an equal to your peers (at least 
far more equal than had been the case in feudal European society) creates a foundational 
political psychology that appears in every relationship, decision, and in the values of 
popular opinion. This psychological condition is both revolutionary for Tocqueville, as 
well as a source of dangerous widespread complacency, in that it accepts a certain 
inherent flux and change in life and in political conditions that allows for fresh input and 
fast turnover, but it also whitewashes over this potentially fresh independent thought with 
the suffocating thickness of the ruling beliefs of society. It is easy for Americans to fall 
prey to, or give in, to the already constructed ideas and values of the popular opinion in 




success, and the private sphere of life, to think about advancing change in the public 
sphere.  
Although there are many exceptions, this general lack of either empathy or 
independent will for and in the public is reflected in the ability of m st Americans to 
simply ‘let things happen’ that they largely feel they have little to no control over, rather 
than desire to be critical, and thus provide the fodder of true flux and change. Although 
the’ free rider problem’ is not unique to America, as it demonstrates some basic human 
tendencies, Tocqueville’s extended analysis of early American culture, still elucidates 
how the many unique attributes of American society- its newness, its ingrained survival, 
and commercial, spirit- come together to create an ideal environment for an excessive 
focus on work, and the pursuits of the individual. In attempting to understand why so 
many Americans fail to even vote, let alone be engaged, on their own accord, in either 
governmental or civil society -based actions, without tangible and often immediate 
material rewards, it is valuable to turn to Tocqueville’s observations to explain the 
qualities that are common to most who reside in America. Tocqueville himself implies 
his observations will stand the test of time, as they are the inevitable reflection, or 
byproduct, of democratic governance.  
In this chapter I employ several of Tocqueville’s primary observations on 
democracy and American life to demonstrate that individual creative reb llion (for him, 
as exemplified through religious experience) in the pursuit of liberty plays a necessary 
role in American political life. Tocqueville argued that the Puritan drive for work, and the 




creates the potential for an apathetic and conformist American people, without much 
perceived need for community, or an understanding of the human condition; and that this 
weakness could be improved through religion.  
Where he used religion as a balancing force against these drives, I argue that in 
our modern context we can, and ultimately must, transmute the role of religiousity into 
that of art. I aim to show that spirituality is a political con ept and that art can fill this 
role. Artistic experience is a more direct and more democratically accessible avenue to 
counter our individualistic and capitalistic proclivities. To improve the levels of civic 
behavior and heighten genuine feelings of inclusiveness and community within and 
among individuals in society, Tocqueville’s arguments about the importance of religion 
in democracy can be better understood in the language of art, and may be reformulated as 
the importance of art in a democracy. This replacement of the role of religion with art has 
important implications for individuals, for society, and for democracy.  
There is a key distinction between religious practice and behavior, nd religiosity, 
or what can be explained as the type or intensity of your belief, that is important to the 
ideas presented here. To abide by a religion’s rules and doctrines, is the condition of 
being religious, of following a religion in your everyday life. This is far different from 
what is understood as religiosity, or spirituality. The spiritual fee ings and connections of 
the spirit that may, or should, arise when engaging in religious practice, is what is 
important to the heart of this thesis. It is not about the religious behavior but rather the 
emphasis here is on the depth of spiritual feeling as a result of reflection brought on, or 




otherworldly values, and spiritual connectivity among creatures and people, is 
encouraged by art and creativity. When Tocqueville discusses the role of religion in 
America, his point that its indirect relationship to political life actually sustains its 
primary influence in that realm, and thus creates order in a society of equality of 
conditions, is important and holds a place in the history of American democracy, at the 
very least as seen through the eyes of a European. Still it is his other point about religion, 
the one that concerns not the rules of religion, but the knowledge of the spirit, the belief 
in the values of the spirit, and the seeking of the spirit within and among us all, that is 
relevant to what I argue here.  
Overview of Tocqueville's Primary Arguments in Democracy in America 
In looking at American democracy, Tocqueville was interested in the perpetual 
tension between the establishment of equality among individuals in socety, and the 
encouragement of liberty that naturally perpetuated difference. Within this dichotomous 
relationship, he highlighted the important role of religion, and both the practical nature of 
Americans and their tendency for frequent change, what he called “restiveness.” During 
the time of Tocqueville’s visit, Americans lived as pioneers, pushing forward the 
boundaries of the rapidly expanding physical and philosophical frontier of their land; 
theirs was an enterprising mindset that sustained survival and growth. It is natural that 
both the pragmatism and the mildness of American political culture refl cted the still 
developing needs of a rapidly growing country; in all aspects of life, practical thinking 





Tocqueville’s overarching arguments in Democracy in America rested on his 
belief that the chief defining characteristic of this new democracy was what he called an 
“equality of conditions.” It was this leveling of “conditions” – the equal distribution12 of 
political benefits among citizens, and mobility across social classes – that most reflected 
the vast changes that manifested in the transition from a hierarchic l feudal society to a 
nonhierarchical democratic one. This equality of conditions trickled down t  bring a new 
face to every aspect of social, political, and economic life in America.  
Tocqueville had few complete solutions to the problems he feared in democracy, 
although he did suggest that American democracy needed a “new political science” that 
would attempt to identify, prevent, and correct the potential dangers inherent to 
democracy, and that democracy should hold moderation as its dearest virtue. This 
moderation in life would be achieved primarily through both the role of religion and the 
role of secondary voluntary (family and friends being primary associations) social and 
civic associations, and by encouraging what he called ‘self-intrest properly understood’, 
which can be understood as a particular definition of self-love that asserts that loving 
oneself naturally includes a love of all others and thus an attention to the public good, in 
order to combat the dominance of material pursuits. Above all Tocqueville beli ved it 
was necessary to love democracy moderately. He saw public expression a  necessary to 
liberal democracy as protection against its internal contradicions. He concluded that the 
new American democracy is a delicate balance of equality, liberty, and religion. It is 
religion that both creates a permanent structure where an equality of conditions had made 
                                                




the structure or order of society fluid and regulates the mores of American life, and that 
which could persuade the American mind away from commerce and labor into the realm 
of the immaterial. As a reminder of all that is important to human life outside of physical 
and material needs, religion, by supporting a life perspective that centers on the human 
spirit rather than self-serving pursuits, not only can push people out of the isolation that 
capitalism naturally lends itself to   but also can encourage a higher level of independent 
thought. Once religion is able to discourage tendencies toward isolation and materialism, 
then people who have unwillingly accepted the rule of Tocqueville’s tyranny of the 
majority while in isolation now can see themselves as members of a true human 
community. As a result, they will be exposed to a deeper understanding of true 
individuality that embraces the desires of others and of the community. We must love 
democracy, but in moderation, that is, rationally and pragmatically as well, Tocqueville 
implied. 
In his book Reason and Horror (2001), Morton Schoolman makes an interesting 
argument in defense of American democracy. He believes that democracy makes 
individual inner exploration and awareness, and the consequent understanding of the 
plight of others, natural. This is indeed inherently possible in a democracy, but it brings 
up a perpetually two-sided characteristic of democratic culture. We must be careful and 
aware to promote such connectivity. Democracy also creates an environment that can 
make laziness, a free-rider mentality, and a driving desire for material gain, easy 
tendencies to fall back on. I disagree though with Schoolman that Tocqueville is negative 




warnings of the possible dangers that democratic life can yield.In seeking answers to how 
and why voluntarism aids democracy, Barbara Allen (2005)13 applies Tocqueville’s 
theories to contemporary politics and highlights Tocqueville as a political theorist. Allen 
echoes this view of Tocqueville as moderate: “[F]or him, no principle was an absolute 
good; even the best passions, including religious devotion, was dangerous when it 
became ardent and exclusive.” (p. xii). America, especially at the ime of Tocqueville’s 
visit, was a land of people who were too busy working and creating a country, to write 
poetry. It is not surprising that Tocqueville, a young aristocrat, would lament the death of 
romanticism and high art in this new world of commerce and Puritan values. Some 
Europeans would probably agree with that characterization of Americans today. Of 
course, Americans after the time of Tocqueville developed several major literary, 
philosophical, and artistic movements – from transcendentalism to Pragmatism to jazz 
and the abstract expressionists – that put America on the high culture map. Nonetheless, 
Americans today are still largely and generally commerce and material minded.  
Jon Elster14 (2009) examines Tocqueville as a social scientist rather than as a 
political theorist. Elster asserts that Tocqueville’s perspectiv  in Democracy in America 
was more effective as an explanatory exercise than as a normative one. Elster criticizes 
what he sees as Tocqueville’s inability to formulate a cohesive political theory regarding 
the effects of democracy in America. Elster cites Tocqueville’s call for a new political 
science, which is never clearly or comprehensively described, as a key indicator of 
                                                
13  Allen teaches courses on Tocqueville and relates his observations to civic involvement 
among the youth (middle and high school students) today. 
14  Elster primarily researches the history of social thought,and theories of rational choice 




Tocqueville’s lack of effectiveness as an “important political theorist”. Elster uses this 
point – that Tocqueville’s ambitions far outweighed the theoretical soundness of his 
completed product – to harness and provide foundation for his primary claim th t 
Tocqueville is an underappreciated, and effective social scientist and that his observations 
still have value in the 21stt century. Elster finds supporting evidence for his arguments in 
what he views as Tocqueville’s tendency to be vague, speculative, and ultimately uncl ar. 
He argues that this can especially be seen in his second volume f D mocracy in 
America. Elster systematically dissects many of Tocqueville’s most salient observations 
on Americans, and shows how Tocqueville sometimes contradicted himself. El ter also at 
another point accuses Tocqueville of exaggerating some of his observations. He argues 
that Tocqueville described the key concepts of both individualism and conformity, in at 
least two different ways, and on the issue of conformism in democracy, to oppositional 
meanings.15 At still other points, Elster’s language is almost mocking of Tcqueville’s 
research integrity, and he is notably concerned that Tocqueville’s th ories are not 
“testable” or transferable.  
The reader of Democracy in America is struck by the contrast 
between the concrete and down to earth nature of the first volume 
and the highly speculative, almost sophomoric character of many 
parts of the second. Most of us are liable from time to time speak 
                                                




before we think; Tocqueville often seems to have thought before he 
looked (Sainte-Beuve16) (Elster, 2009, p. 4) 
Here we see Tocqueville both affirming the norm of self-interest among the 
Americans and claiming that they were afraid of admitting to ac  out of self-interest. No 
doubt some of the individuals he met corresponded to the first profile and others to the 
second. In one context, the latter occurred to him; and when he came to discuss 
phenomena where he could make explanatory use of the former he had, as I suggested in 
the Introduction, forgotten his earlier argument (Elster, 2009, p. 26). 
Elster tells us that he aims to show us that Tocqueville’s work “does indeed 
contain[s] exportable mechanisms” (p. 9). While I do not believe this need be or should 
be the exercise at hand when one reads Tocqueville, it is in this way that Elster feels 
Tocqueville, or any social scientist, is valuable – where he can provide ways to observe 
and understand society, not where he actually observes and understands our society as it 
was nearly two hundred years ago. I strongly disagree that Tocqueville loses relevancy 
with regard to his actual observations and theoretical warnings, and can only be useful to 
social science if we can pull out of his work techniques and matrices that can be repeated 
in various contexts.  
The Case of the Mediocre American 
The first volume of Democracy in America is largely descriptive, depicting 
Tocqueville’s journey through America’s towns and cities. Here he identifies the 
                                                
16  Charles Augustin Sainte-Beuve, the French writer and critic who wrote between 1828 
and 1869, argued that an artist’s biography must be examined to achieve a full understanding of his work 




foundations of American democracy as equality and liberty, but not until the second 
volume does he analyze the effects of equality on the conditions, setiments, and 
relations of everyday life. Tocqueville begins with a discussion of the direct relationship 
he identifies between rising levels of equality and more empathetic r lations in a 
democracy. He attributes this relationship to several causes, among them the lack of a 
fixed class structure in America, the inevitability of change and movement, and the role 
of compassion in American democracy. He explores how the unavoidable relationship of 
master to servant changes from aristocratic conditions to conditions of equality. He then 
explores similar changes within families, in the institution of marriage, and in the 
equality of the sexes. Tocqueville successfully tackles how democracy and, more 
specifically, the middling effects of equality not only influence, but also directly alter the 
foundations upon which society rests. In the pages of the second volume, Tocqueville 
describes the dangers to liberty that a focus on equality of conditions naturally brings and 
tentatively discusses the need for rebellion from the potentially liberty-crushing 
tendencies of American democracy. 
Tocqueville seeks to provide evidence for his opening claim that greater 
conditions of equality produce increasingly compassionate mores: “As peoples become 
more like one another, they show themselves reciprocally more compassionate regarding 
their miseries, and the laws of nations becomes milder” (p. 539). He argues that the very 
constraints, in both the public and the private realms, that prevent mingling among 
classes, are also what tightly binds members of the same class to each other in aristocratic 




does class structure lack a strong tie to history and tradition, but also classes are 
indicative of an often temporary wealth. Even the well-to-do in America are not joined as 
closely to each other as the members of the former aristocratic lass. As a result of these 
close dialectic relations in feudalism, there was devotion between master and servant, but 
it was not the true compassion that comes from recognizing yourself in all others that 
arises under conditions of equality. Tocqueville observes, “In democratic enturies, men 
rarely devote themselves to one another; but they show a general compassion for all 
members of the human species ... they are not disinterested, but they are mild” (p. 538).  
He provides further additional evidence for his assertion that equality is the important 
variable in the transformation of mores by going beyond his experienc s under 
aristocracy and observing the inhumane treatment of slaves in an otherwise free and 
equal America. Tocqueville writes that “thus the same man who is full of humanity for 
those like him when they are at the same time his equals becomes insen itive to their 
sorrows as soon as equality ceases” (p. 538). 
Equality also creates a mutual need among individuals that is understood through 
an awareness of the many potential dangers and vulnerabilities that could befall any or all 
of us, with equal possibility. In other words, we are independent, but we are not alone, 
and we are equal in that way: “At the same time that equality of conditions makes men 
feel their independence, it shows them their weakness; … their interest as well as their 
sympathy makes it a law for them to lend each other mutual assist nce when in need” (p. 
545). Because of frequent daily interactions with a wide variety of people across 




easily offended in little things.” (p. 562). This ability to move between societal roles, 
combined with the inevitable opportunities for social mobility, increases compassion 
(though it yields competition as well) among men. This compassion i then woven into 
the fabric of social relationships.  
The observed tendency toward the middle alternately plagues and empowers the 
American landscape. But this propensity for the middle terrain in life is also, as 
Tocqueville says, an inclination toward a dangerous complacency and conformity in 
everyday life: 
They willingly turn themselves away from the ideal to direct 
themselves toward some visible and proximate goal…Equality does 
not destroy imagination in this way, but limits it and permits it o fly 
only while skimming the earth. None are less dreamers than citizens 
of a democracy, and one scarcely sees any of them who want to 
abandon themselves to the idle and solitary contemplation that 
ordinarily precedes and produces great agitations of the heart. It is 
true that they put much value on procuring for themselves the sort of 
profound, regular, and peaceful affection that makes up the charm 
and security of life; but they do not willingly run after the violent 
and capricious emotions that trouble and shorten it (p. 571).  
Perhaps most important is his contention that American democracy, and its 
accompanying tenet of equality, consistently, and in all realms of life, pushes the 




democracy and ultimately best for all, although still somewhat horrific to his aristocratic 
sensibilities. This "middling effect" naturally has both positive and negative results, 
although for Tocqueville, the loss of certain extreme and imaginative ideas by rare 
individuals is acceptable when one considers the benefit that is a nation of mild and 
pragmatic, if sometimes conformist, democrats. This section of Tocqueville’s work 
employs his critical arguments regarding the basis of American democracy and its 
accompanying mores to explain the unprecedented reinvention of socialrelationships 
based on equality. Unlike the fixed class relationships essential to hierarchical rule, 
democracy encourages organic, fluid connections, such as the ones we encount r in a 
variety of social and civic meetings, charities, and associati ns, that bind people to one 
another in a more genuine partnership that can be revised, and recreated at th  will of the 
individuals (and not the social or political order) involved. 
Tocqueville and How a Love of Commerce in Democracy Breeds Excessive 
Individualism 
Tocqueville believed that a quest for, and the attainment of, property crated an 
independence and drive that supported liberty, but that excessive self-interest and its 
consequence, greed, corrupted the benefits of a focus on commerce (Drolet, 2003). As we 
know from the Puritans, a hard-work ethic and a desire for material success yields 
pragmatism and order; but, without the benefits of a complementary religious life and an 
active voluntary civic life such as that of our earliest European settlers, a love of 





For Tocqueville, the American obsession with commerce created a love of liberty 
that was essential for the democratic state; but with democracy’s companying tenet of 
equality, the American people, encouraged to succeed above all, were prone to placing 
political concerns behind his more important material ones (Drolet, 2003). Tocqueville 
argues, “Commerce is naturally the enemy of all violent passion . It likes even tempers, 
is pleased by compromise, very carefully flees anger. … Commerce renders men 
independent of one another; it gives them a high idea of their individual worth; … it 
therefore disposes them to freedom but moves them away from revolutions” (p. 609). As 
a result, individuals in democracies are motivated by a greedy s lf-interest in material 
comforts that precludes a desire for political change or revolution and an inability to 
identify properly the needs of the public. This major weakness of the democratic system 
creates a need for a balancing force that can alleviate the pressure of material success, 
educate the people, and restrain greed and self-interest. Tocqueville observed that 
religion achieves this balance in material- and popular-dominated American life. Religion 
provides the necessary link to empathetic and community-minded emotions and 
perceptions that become clouded by the fog of the competitive mindset of daily 
commercial success.  
Michael Drolet’s work reveals new details about Tocqueville’s life17 and places 
Tocqueville’s work in context with the history of political thought. Drolet provides a 
similar analysis of the role of religion in American democracy. He argues that 
Tocqueville, following Montesquieu, believed that “religion cultivated betwe n 
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individuals’ sentiments of fellow feeling, sympathy, and benevolence. It also directed 
individuals’ attention to spiritual concerns, obligations and considerations, and these took 
them beyond their daily and material preoccupations” (p. 80).Invoking Tocqueville, 
Sheldon Wolin (2003) argues that like democratic man, “postdemocratic man wants to be 
led while feeling free" (p. 570). Wolin highlights what is perhaps the primary problem in 
American democracy: that citizens enjoy their equal access to liberty but lack a certain 
"spirit of liberty" that inspires them to take active part in sculpting and preserving that 
liberty.18  
I argue that this spirit of liberty in American democracy is linked intimately to the 
spirit of community that is reawakened both by religion, and by artistic experience. 
Feelings of community are born of truly independent contemplation apart from the 
popular will. When a true spirit of liberty is accessed, the feeling of universal mpathy, or 
a spirit of community, is awakened inside the person. Religion is a portal to our 
immaterial world, and these intuitions work as a ‘check’ on our pursuit of the material, 
both in their ability to create the feelings of intoxication and transcendence in which we 
find that we possess qualities that can’t be quantified or commodified. In the absence of 
the divisive competition of ownership, unity as a real possibility, is more readily 
perceptible. This was apparent in Tocqueville’s time, in part becaus  of the way religion 
was woven into the everyday moments of life, even political life, thus illuminating 
earthly concerns. It was in his day, the key reminder of spiritual life in a commerce-based 
                                                
18  Wolin (2003) further asserts, “[P]ostmodern despoti m consists of the collapse of 
politics into economics and the emergence of a new form, the economic polity. … At home, democracy is 




world; today it is artistic experience, and particularly public and social creative 
experience, that can invigorate, refresh, and connect together, all members of society 
through its universally meaningful rearrangements of values, and of life itself.
Tocqueville distinguishes between unrestrained self-interest, and thoughtful self-
interest guided by reason, what Drolet (2003) calls an “enlightened self-interest” (p. 182). 
It is clear that self-interest on its own will not naturally align with the interest of the 
public, but a reasoned self-interest demonstrates the importance of th  public good. We 
must balance our taste for material success with this new sort of selfless self-interest, or 
liberty will be at stake, argue both Tocqueville and Drolet. Likewis , the other major 
threat to liberty, excessive individualism, is tempered both by religious life and by an 
active involvement in political and social associations.19 In their examination of the social 
capital produced by civil society today, and the relationship of civil society to the 
mechanisms of the state, Edwards, Foley, and Diani (2001) suggest that civic 
organizations create empathy among individuals, and employ the words of Putnam to 
illustrate their point: “associations broaden the participants’ sense of elf, developing the 
‘I’ into the ‘We’.” (Putnam, 1995a, p. 67). They thus foster what Tocqueville termed 
“self-interest properly understood,” as well as a “wider sense of a community and social 
purpose” (p. 34). Both the spiritual aspect of religious belief and associational life remind 
people of the value of that which is outside their everyday concerns and their material 
pursuits. Spirituality aids in the discovery of the universal, the infinite, and the eternal. 
                                                
19  Mark Warren (2001) argues that Tocqueville overgeneralized the effects of associations 
on democracy resulting in a too simplistic state-society model, and that not all associations have the same 
effects on democratic life. Warren seeks to identify which associations are the most inclusive, and which 




Similarly, when we associate with others, we are granted peeks into a greater sense of 
community as many small interactions and communications form a more inte esting, and 
more interested, public realm. 
Imagination and the "Spirit of Liberty" 
Tocqueville’s central quandary in Democracy in America is how a democracy, 
characterized by equality can be truly compatible with liberty. Tocqueville speaks often 
in that volume of the "spirit of liberty," of the good that liberty possesses in and of itself. 
Rather than being a means, a tool to achieve certain goods, liberty can be an end all its 
own, a desire to create life actively, rather than to merely accept it: “[T[hey lack the taste 
itself for being free. Do not ask me to analyze this sublime taste, it is necessary to 
experience it.” (Tocqueville, 1856/1955, p.205). He argues that under democratic 
conditions men slowly give up their liberty to an administrative despoti m, both to 
preserve their material comfort and to ease the insecurities of the constant flux and 
uncertainty of democratic life.  
Allen (2005) looks specifically at the role of religion in American democracy and 
calls attention to the vital role of imagination in preserving liberty in a democracy. She 
echoes Tocqueville’s call for a wider imaginative capability among citizens so they may 
escape the tentacles of soft despotism. “Conformity originated in two ways – when 
“innovators” silenced themselves and when the empire … (intellectual authority) was so 
vast that unorthodox ideas lay beyond the imagination. In politics self-censorship reaped 
any number of negative consequences, but in society the lack of imagination—the 




upon the individual intelligence” – seemed to Tocqueville far more dangerous.” (p. 166). 
This relationship between feelings of insecurity and the desire to yield to a greater 
authority is a common theme in human history. Freud (1927/1961), too, pointed to how 
humans have historically accepted the ‘Truths’ of religion in order to fill the void with 
which the inevitable existential crisis confronts us with. In agreement with Tocqueville, 
Hilda Hein (1976) writes: “In producing a work of art, one engages in deliberate choice, 
assuming responsibility for one’s decisions and their outcome. By contrast, bureaucratic 
society diffuses authority to the point where autonomous action all but disappears, and 
paternalism buffers our conduct so that we become morally and intellectua ly atrophied” 
(p. 150). 
It is when intermediate bodies of local governance are eliminated or undervalued 
that individual liberty begins to slip into the soft despotism of centralized governmental 
control.20 In this historically new form of tyranny, the sovereign power of the state does 
not exert the traditional overt force of monarchs past. Rather it slowly and almost 
imperceptibly embraces the mind of the individual and quietly shapes it into conformity 
with the whole (Hein, 1976, p. 188). “Freedom alone is capable of lifting men’s minds 
above … the petty personal worries … in … everyday life, and of making them aware at 
every moment that they belong each and all to a vaster entity … their native land. It alone 
                                                
20  Paul Rahe (2009) likewise agrees with Tocqueville that the ‘drift’ toward soft despotism 
by way of a yield to administrative and popular authority is natural in a democratic society and must be 
constantly defended against. He sees this human desire for guidance as rooted  not only in the ideas of 
Tocqueville, but also those of Montesquieu and Rousseau. Further, he concludes that America today has 
indeed given up true liberty for administrative contr l and argues that Americans must embrace a new 
revolution that aims to reverse this yielding of freedom to a central government, albeit his argument is of a 




replaces at certain critical moments their natural love of material welfare by a loftier, 
more virile ideal” (Stone & Mennell, 1980, p. 378). 
Tocqueville and the dual role of religion 
Tocqueville may seem out of place among philosophers of rebellion and critique 
of everyday life, but his ideas about the dangers to liberty in a democracy speak to a 
fundamental train of thought within this tradition. Although he did not directly argue in 
Democracy in America that Americans need to rebel, he implied as much. One of his few 
solutions to the dangers inherent in democracy lies in both the institutional and the 
spiritual nature of religion. Although it is the spirituality that religion provides for the 
Americans that is his most salient point, he begins by explaining how vastly different a 
role religion as an institution plays in a democracy than it does in European aristocracy. It 
is its uniquely indirect authority in America that creates needed structure in a democratic 
world of flux, by stressing proscribed moral behaviors and punishment for delinquencies, 
according to Tocqueville.21  
The legal and institutional separation of church and state that is of en taken for 
granted in this country can be understood in a new light when one considers the unique 
relationship of democratic life to religion in the United States. Tocqueville argued that 
                                                
21  The conservative libertarian scholar Michael Ledeen (2001) examines Tocqueville’s 
assertion that the various elements of American democratic life are kept in balance, excessive individualism 
avoided, and liberty protected, by Americans’ strong religious beliefs and by their desire for a decentralized 
government that encourages local governance and an active role in voluntary associations. He argues that
American democracy has evolved significantly from the world described in Tocqueville’s observations 
close to two centuries ago. He asserts that today’s political life is distinctly and self-consciously separate 
from religious life and belief. This move away from religion in the public threatens the precarious balance 
of relationships that Tocqueville described. Ledeen also cites the importance of associational life but does 
not identify a decrease in voluntary public participat on (a claim often made in contemporary democratic 




religion creates balance by adding a necessary element of spirituality and community to 
an American everyday life of practical and commercial minded harwork. In America, 
there is a national tendency for the material and the earthly that breeds individual not 
collective progress. Accordingly, Tocqueville said that there is a dire need for the 
presence of the immaterial in American life. Specifically, religion acts as a shield against 
excessive individualism by providing access to that which is other worldly, and by 
allowing for connection with feelings of an eternal universal whole.  
Unlike Barbara Allen, (2005), who takes an activist approach to Tocqueville, 
Matthew Maguire (2006) is a historian whose work reflects his interes s. His text on 
Rousseau and Tocqueville focuses on the role of imagination in connecting veryday life 
to the infinite and eternal. Maguire argues,  
Tocqueville develops a dualistic and quasi-Pascalian anthropology 
in which transcendence, including freedom, is explicably defined in 
opposition to the material cosmos and the desire for secure comfort 
and earthly well-being that shapes the modern opinion. Yet this 
dualism in Tocqueville persistently resolves itself in favor of th se 
forces opposed to transcendence, against Tocqueville’s stated 
intentions (p. 13).  
For Tocqueville, religion provided balance and served as the stabilizing force 
(married with popular opinion) that prevented the constant flux of democratic life to 




one considers how vital a desire for community interaction, world view, and ultimately 
associations can be for a vibrant and ever-changing American democracy. 
In Democracy in America, Tocqueville put forth several foundational arguments 
regarding spirituality and religion in general and the unique role that religion plays in 
America. In the second half of his work, Tocqueville’s discussion of religion parallels his 
changing intentions from the first to the second main section of his text. In the first part, 
he established that, under the competing conditions of equality and liberty in a 
democracy, the role of religion is vital to order and well-being. Beginning in Part Two of 
Volume I, Tocqueville describes how vastly different a role religion plays in social and 
political life under conditions of aristocratic hierarchy and under conditions of 
democratic equality. The primarily commercial nature of this new d mocracy fueled in 
the American people a pragmatism that craved the balancing force of spirituality. 
Americans had come to embrace religion with open arms, despite it  many rules for the 
everyday.  
Tocqueville observed that religion in America plays a fundamentally indirect political 
role – ruling by the superego (popular opinion as ego ideal) rather than by laws and 
bureaucracies. “Christianity therefore reigns without obstacles, on the admission of all; 
the result … is that everything is certain and fixed in the moral world. … So the human 
spirit never perceives an unlimited field before itself; however bold it may be, from time 
to time it feels that it ought to halt before insurmountable barriers” (p. 279). He observes 
how, although state and church remain separated in American political life, religion 




He described religion in democracy as being opposed to aristocracy and as garnering 
more devotion and being more powerful in the lives of people when it is unconstrained 
by institutions and official positions of authority.  
Tocqueville observed how religion draws a tight circle around the boundaries of the 
American democrat’s imagination. It is imagination that enables new ideas, participatory 
desires, and, ultimately, revolutionary action and change.  
The imagination of Americans in its greatest leaps has therefor  
only a circumspect and uncertain step. …These habits of restraint 
are to be found in political society and singularly favor the 
tranquility of the people as well as the longevity of the 
institutions,”… At the same time that the law permits the American 
people to do everything, religion prevents them from conceiving 
everything and forbids them to dare everything (pp. 279–280).  
 
Tocqueville's Ultimate Fear: The Squelching of Individual Liberty and the 
Advent of Soft, or Administrative, Despotism 
Tocqueville wrote that “the same equality that facilitates despoti m tempers it; we 
have seen how, as men are more alike and more equal, public mores become more 




naturally contained, imagination bounded22, pleasures simple”(p. 662). Marini (1991) 
argues that “Tocqueville’s analysis is, in the fundamental respect, rimarily theoretical. It 
involves nothing less than the attempted reconciliation—on the level of political 
history—of the inherent tension which exists between the public and private; the general 
and particular. In the process he hoped to forestall the worst aspect of democratic life, the 
tendency to administrative despotism” (p. 270). 
Tocqueville explains how the excessive possessive individualism that develops 
out of the equality of conditions (and the equal access to opportunity for wealth) of 
American liberal democracy slowly eats away at the natural human emotions of 
compassion. Without the ties of empathy, a sole focus on material pursuits drives men 
apart: “Each of them, withdrawn and apart, is like a stranger to the destiny of all others: 
… he is beside them, but he does not see them; he touches them and does not feel them; 
he exists only in himself and for himself alone" (p. 663). It is when we focus on material 
gains that individualism is naturally logical, and it is when excessive individualism sets in 
that a person becomes susceptible to domination by the majority will.  
When Tocqueville defines the political authority of the majority will in American 
democracy, his description brings to mind Hobbes’ (1651/2009) also vividly visual 
explanation of the Leviathan as one man consisting of many other men. This imagery 
captures Tocqueville’s primary argument that in a democracy the most dangerous 
opportunity for tyranny is within the people themselves who seek freedom: 
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[T]he sovereign extends its arms over society as a whole; it covers 
its surface with a network of small, complicated, painstaking, 
uniform rules through which the most original minds and the most 
vigorous souls cannot clear a way to surpass the crowd; it does not 
break wills, but it softens them, bends them, and directs them;[…] 
reduces each nation to being nothing more than a herd of timid and 
industrious animals of which the government is the shepherd (p. 
663).  
Tocqueville’s language is noticeably strong in those passages, and strikingly 
visual; the reader can almost taste his disgust with American democratic complacency 
born of greed; we can feel his fear and his voice rising as his argument progresses.  
Our contemporaries are incessantly racked by two inimical passions: 
they feel the need to be led and the wish to remain free. Not being 
able to destroy either one of these contrary instincts, they strive to 
satisfy both at the same time. They imagine a unique power, 
tutelary, all powerful, but elected by citizens. … They console 
themselves … by thinking that they themselves have chosen their 
schoolmasters (p. 664).  
Tocqueville was largely devoted to understanding the effects of equality on the 
conditions, sentiments, and relations of everyday life. He employed many of his 
fundamental arguments regarding the basis of American democracy and its 




this new land based on equality. He wrote that, unlike the fixed class relationships 
essential to hierarchical rule, democracy encourages organic, fluid connections that bind 
people to one another in genuine partnerships that are revised and recreated by the will of 
the people, not the social or political order. In this same vein, in an environment of 
equality, religion becomes linked to people’s faith not by force and material promises 
but, rather, by individual acceptance of religious faith (and its mores) alongside the 
institutions of democracy.  
Tocqueville observed that religion in America functions as the evryday 
constraint on boundless individual liberty (even in the realm of the imagination) through 
its complement, the power of mass opinion. It exists apart from institutions, is “an 
invariable disposition of the human heart.” (p.409) and is seen as a necessary part of 
democratic life, embraced with self-conscious determination. “I do not k w if all 
Americans have faith in their religion…but I am sure that they believe it necessary to the 
maintenance of republican institutions. This opinion does not belong only to one class of 
citizens or to one party, but to the entire nation" (p. 280). Religion, by providing fixed 
answers, stabilized the newly free American society, but at the same time, by providing 
access to feelings of a universal whole, it also worked to protect against the excessive 
individualism that is a natural danger in democracy. 
Following his initial assertion in Volume I that in America religion rules de facto, or 
without the aid of laws and institutions, Tocqueville develops this argument in Volume II 
to explain how religion captures the hearts and minds of Americans:. “I  America 




entirely distinct from the political order, in such a way that ancient laws could easily be 
changed without shaking ancient beliefs” (p. 406). This quote demonstrates Tocqueville’s 
belief that, whereas the government could make laws, religion created and regulated 
morality and served as a check on politics, policies, and the law. In this way, religion 
banished the grave dangers of excessive liberty. In Tocqueville’s eye , an excess of 
freedom was breeding ground for perpetual change, revolution, and, ultimately, anarchy. 
Tocqueville had already seen that the prominent characteristic of American democratic 
life was the constant flux he observed in labor relations, family relations, and almost all 
aspects of life. If it is flux that defines relationships, and ultima ely society, then this 
movement must be played out on a foundation of order. Without such a foundation, 
Tocqueville worried that this new, already successful democracy would cease to function 
smoothly. While religion provided systemic order, it was its other powers – to provide 
access to immaterial questions and desires and to universal emotions – hat would keep 
democracy fresh and independent thought truly free. Religion provided spirituality and 
compassion for others in daily life that sustained a necessary bal nce among individuals 
in a nation built on the hard work of pragmatic, commerce-minded democrats. 
Tocqueville offered insight into the nature of revolutionary behavior by o serving 
that Americans, unlike the French, for example, never had a democratic revolution and 
thus never felt the paradigm shift (and sudden true freedom) of a crumbling belief 
structure: “There are no revolutions that do not disrupt ancient beliefs, w aken authority, 
and obscure common ideas. Therefore every revolution has the effect, more or less, of 




before the mind of each” (p. 406; emphasis added).This, perhaps more than any other of 
Tocqueville's observations, holds the key to understanding American life. Tocqueville 
asserts, that despite the freedom that equality yields, there is little true individual freedom 
of mind in America. Interestingly, he seems to despair of this lack of independent spirit 
almost as he points out the dangers of too much individual freedom: “Individual 
independence can be more or less great; it cannot be boundless. It is true that every man 
who receives an opinion on the word of another puts his mind in slavery; but it is a 
salutary servitude that permits him to make good use of his freedom.” (p. 408). In similar 
fashion, he spoke of the role of mass opinion as both a liberty-suffocating force, and as 
the vital glue that ensured the stability of the country.  
Tocqueville argued, “The same equality that makes him independent of ach of his 
fellow citizens in particular leaves him isolated and without defense against the action of 
the greatest number” (p.409). This is one of Tocqueville’s paramount fears. The public 
has a singular power among democratic peoples. This is what he wants to argue in 
Democracy in America.  
It does not persuade [one] of its beliefs, it imposes them and makes 
them penetrate souls by a sort of immense pressure of the minds of 
all on the intellect of each. In the United States, the majority takes 
charge of furnishing individuals with a host of ready-made opinions, 
and thus it relieves them of the obligation to form their own. 
American political laws are such that the majority reigns over 




over the intellect. For nothing is more familiar to man than to 
recognize wisdom in whoever oppresses him (p. 409).  
No individual or groups of individuals can, whether on the basis of class or wealth 
or even legitimate political power, ever claim to have any inherent authority over 
knowledge. Still, Tocqueville observes that under conditions of equality, the collective 
society, or popular opinion, does assert authority over societal knowledge and beliefs. His 
warning of what he termed a "tyranny of the majority" – that te power of popular will 
does not need to use force to oblige belief but, rather, that it “penetrate[s] souls” – is 
strikingly anticipatory of C. Wright Mills’ (1956) arguments that the power of authority 
in America is based not on force but on bureaucratic manipulation. In Democracy in 
America, Tocqueville wrote, “One can foresee that faith in common opinion will become 
a sort of religion whose prophet will be the majority” (p. 410). Equality b rths popular 
institutions based on the assumption of equal individuals and the complementary 
oppression of these individuals by the mass: “I see very clearly two tendencies in 
equality: one brings the mind of each man toward new thoughts, and the other would 
willingly induce it to give up thinking” (p. 410, emphasis added).This complacency 
extends into all aspects of life: “[In American democracy]… majority right had passed 
into ‘the smallest habits of life’” (Drolet, 2003, p. 87). 
Tocqueville asserts that “men cannot do without dogmatic beliefs” (p.417). In 
other words, man cannot live well with too much freedom of any sort. F  the sake of a 
stable democracy, observes Tocqueville, the masses must not be existentially curious. 




interrelated points. Tocqueville does not trust the unstable nature of democracy without 
religion to rein it in and provide the necessary “master.” That is, the master–slave 
relationship integral to aristocracy must reinvent itself in all political systems. The 
fixedity of religion is practical, useful, comforting; it saves peo l  from existential crisis, 
from the void of true individuality. Religion serves as a moral check on desires for excess 
and greed – society’s source for the superego. Democracy fundamentally allows for more 
freedom of choice, and, when in combination with the laissez-faire nature of capitalism, 
more individual material gain. In the new world, religion replaces la s structure as a 
limit on human desire and greed. It supports the democratic and commercial interests, 
especially those of the majority (which are ultimately the intrests both of government 
and of religion as well). The influence of religion, and its dissemination into the mass, 
works in tandem with majority opinion to prevent revolution.  
Tocqueville, himself a pious Christian who believed in the necessary authority of 
religious values, brought to light the distinctly new role that religion played (and arguably 
still plays) in American life. He wrote that, upon his arrival in the United States, it was 
the religious air of the country that first intrigued him. The Founders had created the 
separation of church and state to make certain that the extrem nature of religious beliefs 
would not hurt a government based on equality. In the process they ensured that religion 
would play a strong role in everyday life because of its very separation from government. 
As the editors write in their introduction to the 2002 translation of Democracy in 
America, one of the, if not the, defining characteristic of Americans, according to 




volumes of the work that “individualism” is a complex phenomenon; it is at once natural, 
a privilege, a threat, and an oppressor. Americans’ private isolationist tendencies become 
even more threatening when seen in conjunction with the flux that is also inherent to 
democratic society. 
Tocqueville revered the novel and indirect role of religion and religious mores in 
American democratic life. He observed that religion, despite its xplicit separation from 
the state in American government, must nonetheless adopt a new role that ngages 
popular opinion (and its supremacy in daily life]) so as to create st bility, both in 
government and in society, under the new conditions of equality. Tocqueville observed 
that, by the time of his visit, American religion had moved away from a focus on 
traditional theology (aristocracy and the next life) to an attention to morality (dictated by 
religion) in this life. Accordingly, the representatives and leaders of religious institutions 
had also perfected their careful separation from institutional public life while maintaining 
less explicit but ultimately more influential power over the inherently interrelated but still 
distinct realms of society and mass opinion. 
Tocqueville saw religion in America as a stabilizing and disciplining force. It is in 
this sense that is the first institution of American public life. It creates order and balance 
where there is great potential for excess. Democracy fundamentally allows for more 
liberty and thus more freedom of choice and seemingly boundless individual gain, so in 
the transition from hierarchy to equality, religion replaces cla s structure as the limit on 
human desire. The rules of religion, and the simplified ‘truths’ of mass opinion, work 




Tocqueville valued religion as the replacement of the rigid class structures that 
existed under aristocracy, but he equally found it valuable as an avenue to an expanded 
imaginative capability and to a sense of universal community among individuals. 
Although he was by all accounts a democrat and praised the importance of freedom, he 
was also fearful of the limitless boundaries of true freedom – that is, freedom that is 
unconstrained by religion. Tocqueville observed that freedom in American l fe was 
largely expressed through the drive for commercial enterprise, pursuits that separate 
people from their collective instinct. 
The problem of excessive individuality concerned Tocqueville greatly, nd he 
rests the brunt of his solution on the power of religion. He made a strong case for 
spirituality as an elevation of consciousness. He greatly valued the ability of religion to 
elevate individual desires and curiosities beyond material concerns to the realm of the 
immaterial. In American democracy, religion as spirituality prevents an excess of 
individual sentiment, because the foundation of all religion is transcendent universality; 
religion as an indirect public institution provides society with a prescribed morality and a 
uniformity of behavior that favors order where democratic conditions fail to provide 
permanent structure. Both of these benefits create community where it   threatens to 
dissolve. As the freedom to consume, acquire, and achieve, and, with it, material success, 
are highlighted under democratic conditions, religion, both as individual spiritual 
experience and as public institutional presence, creates a more active desire to pursue the 
development of the human spirit and the human community. It is this spiritual ole of 




spirituality must be reconceived not as the product of religious partici tion, but as the 
benefits of artistic encounters, and in particular public artistic experience, in American 
democracy today. In the creation of a public minded and participatory citizenry, this 
spiritual knowledge is as vital today, if not more, because of the high levels of 
consumerism and commodification, as it was in Tocqueville’s America. 
Replacing Religion with Art in Today's Democracy 
Following, Tocqueville’s assertion that a uniquely indirect role of religion was 
needed to create balance in a democratic society based on an equality of conditions, I 
argue that art, particularly public and social art, is needed, perhaps more than ever, in 
America today. Artistic creation and re-imagination highlights, reflects, and distorts our 
most universal emotions and desires and in its varied public forms is accessible to all, 
free of charge. Although spirituality, like creativity, is freely and individually accessible, 
a religious structure inherently excludes and limits; whereas an artistic structure, that is, 
art displayed in museums and galleries, though it can be exclusive (at least for its very 
physical enclosure of the art),  is released from its bounds once pla d in our streets, our 
parks, and our buildings. With genuine spiritual inclusivity serving as our guide, 
creativity must be nurtured among Americans today, and among all democrats. The 
spirituality of artistic experience, and the knowledge it produces, must be encouraged 
through the creation and support of public art projects. Increased occurrences of public 
art challenge the generally higher valuing of conformist aesthetics by the public, and 
more importantly, simply places thought-provoking and rebellious art in our everyday 




nature of this knowledge rests primarily on transcendent and universal ideas and 
emotions, that alert us to an expanded realm of possibility for everyday life and a greater 
empathy with others. Public art's occurring in the open and free space  of our daily lives 
yields an easier and closer connection between how we perform our routine habits and 
how we express and understand our higher spiritual desires. 
Just as Tocqueville revered a religion without hierarchical bounds and elitist rules, 
this work encourages the freedom of public art as an alternative to our increasingly 
commodified and digitized lives. Artistic experience needs to be fre d of its elitist 
constraints within institutional walls and its elitist myths, which discourage the average 
person from taking part in artistic life. Public art is located in public spaces rather than in 
such delegated spaces as museums, galleries, symphony halls, and libr ries, It is un-
elitist; is often unregulated or less regulated than artworks housed in conventional spaces 
and is thus accessible to more people more frequently; and is experienced within the 
moments of their everyday concerns, rather than in those moments they hav  specially 
designated to “visit” art where it is likely they already have an expected experience in 
mind.  
It is clear that by advocating mixing democracy with religion, Tocqueville did not 
mean the hierarchical religion of the ancien regime, but, rather, a new, distinctly 
American understanding of religion as exemplified in the Puritan belief that religious life 
is intertwined with political life.  Tocqueville did not believe that a specific religion 
ought to be mandatory, like Rousseau’s (1750/1993) civil religion, but rather that 




like the nature of democracy itself, and the political, economic, and social relationships it 
creates. This quality of the religion he admired in America is lso present in artistic 
experience, which, spiritual as it may be, almost always appears to be more innocuous in 
society than the forces of religion or government, despite its possible active engagement 
in these other realms. 
Tocqueville simultaneously revered and feared the forces of democracy. Like 
historian George Bancroft and other early American thinkers, Tocqueville, the French 
aristocrat, believed that in the course of history, democracy was both inevitable and 
natural. He greatly admired American democracy and the American people, but he also 
worried that this still new system could be dangerously corrupted by its inherent 
weaknesses. As natural as was the development of American democracy itself, it was also 
natural to this particular political system that certain cultura  t aits develop within 
individuals and communities along with the democratic practices. An excessive love of 
material well-being, the excessive spiritual isolationism that Tocqueville called 
“individualism,” and its complementary “general apathy,” all ultimately contribute to a 
tyranny of the majority (tyranny of public opinion) and, beyond this, a situation of soft or 
mild (also called democratic or administrative) despotism. This wa  his greatest fear – a 
situation in which control is exerted not by overt force but through more insidious 
avenues to the mind. He warned that the strength of American public opinion could 





Tocqueville argued that, because American democrats tended to focus on the 
pursuit of individual material gain they were also prone to becoming complacent and 
conformist, traits he asserted were most prevalent in, and most dangerous to, the 
continued freedom of American democracy. When we fall prey to the pursuit of 
excessive materialism we are led naturally to excessive individualism, which then leads 
to apathy – we are comfortable enough staying home with our mateial possessions23 to 
distract us from considering public involvement and new  possibilities for our lives. If we 
believe that material accomplishment and wealth is the Holy Grail, then what incentive is 
there to seek community and political involvement? While this mindset may have served 
frontier living, it also leaves us vulnerable to the invisible, yet encompassing, grip of soft 
despotism. Tocqueville affirmed the need to nurture the emotional realmof life that could 
awaken the senses of “middling” Americans that had been muted and relinquished to the 
sway of popular opinion, by excessive attention to the quest for the mat rial, and the 
pragmatic, and the rational. 
Many philosophers, particularly of the 20th century (e.g., Baudrillard & Glaser, 1994; 
Hardt & Negri, 2000; Marcellus, 1969; see also Lefbvre & Moore, 1991), have lam nted 
the difficulty of inspiring revolutionary ideas in people living complacently in the 
comfort of advanced capitalist republican representative democracy. "But men who live 
in an ease equally distant from opulence and misery put an immense value on their goods. 
… the number of these … small proprietors is constantly increased by equality of 
conditions. Thus in democratic societies the majority of citizens do not see clearly what 
                                                




they could gain by a revolution, and they feel at each instant and in a thousand ways what 
they could lose from one” (Tocqueville, 1835/2002, p. 608). This far-sighted observation 
identifies the problem of complacency among citizens of a capitalist democracy. 
Connection with the immaterial opens our minds to that which is universal and breaks 
down the boundaries between us as individuals. In this way, the immaterial can bring a 
revolution of the mind.  
The ability to imagine revolutionary ideas is key to maintaining vitality and progress. 
Revolutionary ideas may not lead to revolution, but they can help foster in people the 
desire to take on a more active role in affecting change in their communities. There is 
little reason for Americans, then and now, to pursue a truly community-minded everyday 
life. Nor is there always clear incentive to work through, alongside, or even without the 
institutions of the state to change their government or their conditi s of life. To counter 
this complacency, Tocqueville’s argument is revived here. 
We must add spirituality and recognition of the immaterial to our material desires. A 
desire for the immaterial and for existential answers is as natural as the capitalist pursuit 
in conditions of liberty and equality, but it is how one addresses and shapes this desire 
that matters. Religion seizes on the human desire for boundlessness and oneness, but 
public art, and especially rebellious, visionary art that challenges the majority will, could 
fulfill this role in a more accessible way. Like religion in Tocqueville’s vision of 
America, today it is art that can free the imagination to envision change and to access the 
universal feelings that foster empathy for each other and an involvement in communal 




reconfigurations of reality expand the boundaries of our imaginations and encourage in us 
desires alternative to what is present in the majority’s will. These new desires, by their 
very existence, challenge the constructs and limits of everyday life. When these new 
desires are accessed through artistic experience, the consequent reb llion reawakens 
political will within individuals in a liberal democracy. 
Tocqueville keenly recognized man’s natural existential yearnings. Despite these 
observations, as well as the many notes he made on the threat of “soft despotism” by the 
all-powerful body of mass opinion, he maintained his theory of balance and advocated 
the protection of the status quo upholding the stability of democratic conditions. In a 
powerful passage (p. 662-665), Tocqueville described popular opinion in America as an 
organism that looms over the everyday in both public and private life. Popular will, 
though intimately linked with religion, greatly surpasses in influence both old-world 
religious institutions and the rigid moral expectations of an aristocratic hierarchy. This 
influence permeates even the very desires and expectations of individuals. In other w rds, 
under the power of the popular will, individuals become replicas of each other, varying 
only in gradations. His words here are strong, wary, and almost revolutionary in spirit. 
One is moved by his warnings against this new monster of the collctive. In the 
concluding section of his text, Tocqueville delves deeper into understanding the body of 
popular opinion that he sees permeating American life and harshly indicts the lack of 
independent thought in America: “Above these an immense tutelary power is elevated, 
which alone takes charge of assuring their enjoyments and watching over their fate…[I]t 




the will in a smaller space. Can it not take away from them entirely the trouble of 
thinking and the pain of living?” (p. 663). 
Some Observations on Foucault and Tocqueville 
Tocqueville’s conception of the way the beliefs of popular opinion infiltrate even 
the very wants and needs of individual Americans, anticipates Michel Foucault’s (1991) 
arguments a century and a half later, on the diffusion of governmental power. There are 
in Tocqueville’s claim that “[i]t seems that if despotism came to be established in the 
democratic nations of our day, it would have had other characteristics: it would be more 
extensive and milder, and it would degrade men without tormenting them” (p. 662) 
strains of what Foucault was to argue in the 20th century about the silent dangers of 
dispersed power. Tocqueville “described how the majority had ‘degraded’ itself, its 
enlightened self-interest reduced to a coarse, untutored passion.” (1835/2002) Further, he 
warned of the “the omnipotence of the majority”, and Drolet (2003) points ut, was novel 
in arguing that the majority will in a democracy represented a new kind of political 
authority. Tocqueville “characteris[ed] it [the majority will] as a custom, a social 
phenomenon, an internal element of democracy. [This] enabled him to move beyond 
more traditional accounts of majority rule which focused exclusively on majority political 
power or authority” (p. 87). 
Despite his striking admonishments of the weaknesses of democracy, Tocqueville 
concludes that to preserve the system, we may not want to question mass opinion. Rather 
than "rock the boat," he accepts that Americans concede to the authority of the majority, 




how religion under conditions of equality co-opts public opinion, and vice versa, bec use 
true individual freedom is a threat to both regulatory enterprises: “public opinion is never, 
therefore, their enemy: rather it supports and protects them, and their beliefs reign both 
by the forces that are proper to them and by those of the majority that they borrow. … 
religion succeeds in struggling to its advantage against the spirit of individual 
independence that is the most dangerous of all to it” (p. 424).  
Tocqueville seems to recognize the potential revolutionary power of the influence 
of the immaterial and worries that Americans may suffer from a detrimental 
complacency, but he falls short of encouraging actual change. Above all, he is an 
advocate of balance and order and recognizes the many positive ways religion creates 
structure in the “loose” and ever-changing everyday American experience. It is religion 
that maintains stability by preventing excessive materialism, individualism, and apathy 
among Americans, but it also contains the potential to disrupt this same tability and 
balance by seeing beyond individualism to revolutionary ideas of community and human 
unity that could potentially change the foundations of democracy. 
Today we still need the influence of the spiritual to “wake us up” individually and 
ultimately, collectively. Artistic experience can replace religion as a way to access the 
spiritual in everyday democratic life. Religion aims to connect to oneness with the greater 
universe, but artistic experience can access that same existential desire by challenging 
and rearranging what we take for granted so that we can more easily recognize new 
possibilities in everyday life. Before people feel the need to join civil associations, there 




with one another. With the capitalism has come the now widely accepted claim by Robert 
Putnam (1993, 1995) and others24 that the 20th (and certainly the 21st) centuries have 
brought on the demise of civic associations and other indicators of political and social 
community. This demise coincides with the technological advances of modern industrial 
capitalism and the rise of the middle class. These forces work together to falsely separate 
society into a collection of seemingly free-standing and competitive individuals. This 
"myth of the individual" is supported by both democracy and capitalism – democracy, 
because of its reliance on an equality of conditions, and capitalism, because of its 
insistence on (and need for) rational behavior, its inherent selfishnes  and survival of the 
fittest foundations, and its focus on the importance of material gain.  
One of Tocqueville’s most notable observations in Democracy in America is of 
the overarching middling quality of American life. Equality and liberty are in perpetual 
tension; equality levels the playing field whereas liberty allows difference. This is 
Tocqueville’s overarching theoretical concern. The liberty that democracy guarantees 
provides fertile ground for capitalism, which then puts the emphasis on the individual and 
on material satisfactions. Despite the domination of the individual and of material things 
in American everyday life, Tocqueville still astutely observed the survival of that almost 
indescribable universal feeling of curiosity about the spiritual world, about a realm 
beyond the everyday that is alive in all of us.  
Some Observations on Freud and Tocqueville 
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Tocqueville’s observations, especially those concerning the idea of dispersed 
power in the form of soft despotism, anticipated the ideas of many of the leading thinkers 
of the 20th century, from Marcuse to Foucault. Some other connections between 
Tocqueville’s work and the ideas of contemporary thinkers are less direct. Sigmund 
Freud had little to say about democracy but elucidate the way individuals – ultimately the 
building blocks of society – understand their own spiritual and rational beliefs and 
desires.  
Freud famously argued that we choose religion as adults to replace our fathers. 
Freud (1927/1961) described religion and our need to believe – in God, in anything –  as 
a fantasy, as our need to find otherworldly protection and stability (through the 
paternalism of religion and its institutions) in a world of fear, loneliness, and chaos. “The 
origin of the religious attitude can be traced back in clear outlines as far as the feeling of 
infantile helplessness.” (p. 19).  
In my "Future of an Illusion" I was concerned much less with the 
deepest sources of the religious feeling than with what the common 
man understands by his religion – with the system of doctrines and 
promises which on the one hand explains to him the riddles of this 
world with enviable completeness, and, on the other, assures him 
that a careful Providence will watch over his life and will 
compensate him in a future existence for any frustrations he suff rs 




But his critics reminded him that this feeling of boundless eternity (“a feeling of 
an indissoluble bond, of being one with the external world as a whole” [p. 12]) comes 
before the reasons for the existence of religion that psychoanalysis can provide. Freud’s 
critic argues that this “oceanic” feeling is the real source of "religious sentiment", and 
that this feeling is simply that, and not an article of faith25: one can “rightly call oneself 
religious on the ground of this oceanic feeling alone, even if one rejects every belief and 
every illusion” (p. 11?). Influence by Nietzsche’s concepts of the overman and the will to 
power, Freud saw great value in the role of powerful people who reject illusory truths in 
favor of true freedom of thought – literally an avant-garde that can transform and lead 
mass society. Although it is clear that not everyone can achieve or comprehend 
independent freedom of thought to the same extent, it is this sort of reawakening and 
rejection of simple truths that can yield more interested and empowered individuals, who 
then come together to form a more actively participatory society. 
Decades before Freud’s influence over the 20th-century mind, Tocqueville had 
recognized man’s natural need for the immaterial, although he connected this need for the 
immaterial with the needs of a democratic political system based on equality. Even with a 
very different perspective, Freud (1930/1961) nonetheless agreed with Tocqueville that 
“[r]eligion has clearly performed great services for human civilizat on. It has contributed 
much towards the taming of the social instincts. [But not enough.]” (p  47?). In an 
aristocracy, where all men and women are not subject to the same opportunities (equality 
                                                
25  But Freud (1930/1961) defends himself by saying that his main intention when writing 
"Future of an Illusion" was to understand how the ev ryman understands religion, not to uncover the 




gives rise to the individual drive to acquire, which then gives rise to the rule of the 
material), Tocqueville believed that a strict class structure maintained order in society. 
Tocqueville asserted that religion in a democracy achieves two divergent goals. Religion 
is both a way to structure the constant flow of democratic life and an access route into the 
emotional realm of life that is often brushed aside in commerce-focused America. 
Tocqueville believed that Americans needed to nurture society, not only 
individual satisfactions, and to be reminded of this through the spiritual experiences that 
religion encourages, in order to create balance within the materially focused American 
democrat. He correctly identified the natural human desire for some understanding of, or 
simply a connection to, the realm where our immaterial aspirations and confusions can be 
attended to. In one of Democracy in America’s particularly insightful moments of 
psychological analysis, Tocqueville identified the relevance of existential feelings to 
individuals and to society: “Alone among all the beings, man shows a natural disgust for 
existence and an immense desire to exist: he scorns life and fers nothingness. These 
different instincts constantly drive his soul toward contemplation of an ther world, and it 
is religion that guides it there” (p. 284). Tocqueville used the same bas argument as 
Freud did –that man is naturally and inevitably aware and fearful of his own existence – 
but they took it to different places. The spiritual and religious structu e that Tocqueville 
not only admires but deems necessary in a democracy is the same religiousness that 
Freud argued sedates man, and prevents him from living an actively political life. They 
both understand and draw attention to the important role that spiritual life nd religion 




conclusions. Still, both thinkers seem to imply our interdependence as humans, and the 
need to recognize this in order to move democracy, or civilization, forward. 
Freud (1927/1961) described well man’s need and desire for religion but 
attributed only political and social values to this universal yearning for religion. Despite 
his belief that reason cannot supersede the primacy of our passions, he failed (and admits 
to this failure himself and cites his lack of connection to this “oceanic” feeling personally 
and his adherence to science) to give this common, and in many ways defining, emotion 
its own space, to allow it to stand on its own as a primal need. Both Freud and 
Tocqueville ultimately cite as the reason religion exists – man’s inevitable crisis of 
existence – has to be considered in relation not only to religion, but to all areas of life 
where the spiritual and sensual realms can be accessed. This is the point, in both 
Tocqueville and Freud’s very different arguments, that not only a place, but an important 
place, for art in society becomes apparent.  
Conclusions 
The desire for what is immaterial looms much larger than does religion – it is a 
defining cornerstone of human existence, and it is because of this primal longing that 
religion holds the primary role in society. In this same vein, before people create and join 
civil associations, they must encounter a different shade of the sam feeling that propels 
them to come together. This feeling can be created, supported, and fulfilled by art. Art, 
then, fosters a desire for connection with the human community. This conne tion creates 





I argue that the immaterial – whether it is religion or art – can also foster a new 
understanding of self and humanity that enables the creation of a cmmunity-minded 
revolutionary consciousness. Tocqueville was no communitarian, but he valued 
recognition of the human community for its power to create balance in the everyday life 
of American democrats. Our experience with art creates new needs that propel us   to 
desire and be able to imagine, realities beyond the given conditions. Art, particularly 
public and social art, primarily because of its accessible nature, promotes a more 
imaginative, and in this sense revolutionary, consciousness, that strengthens democratic 
life by empowering individuals with the desire to enact change.  
Visionary art in the public arena encourages a spiritual jolt within passerby that 
for a moment, often in the middle of a busy day, pushes away within individuals the daily 
concerns and yields them to the power of feeling the universal pains and joys that art so 
easily and naturally evokes. True liberation from the majority requires an expansion of 
the imagination beyond the system’s prescribed limits, and visionary art brings out in 
people the desire for, and the ability to perceive of, new and expanded possibilities for 
everyday rebellion.  Such deeper knowledge of ourselves, our imaginative cpabilities, 
and the creative rebellion this supports, could incite total social revolution, but, more 
importantly (and more commonly), it begins the project of awakening the individual 
consciousness to the liberation of independent thought and morality, and to the crucial 
empathy for others which this independent thought naturally leads to. In the 1960s, 
Herbert Marcuse (1969/1970) introduced his theory of revolution through art and created 




(1844/1978) argument that we need to replace capitalism with communism) that will 
bring recognition of the human community about, but, rather a fostering of the eternal 
dialectic of art and reason as exemplified through visionary art. The universal and 
transhistorical experience of art can engage the participatory nd revolutionary (in the 
sense of being able to imagine and desire change and alternatives) consciousness within 
individuals, and finally, within society.  
Art cultivates the spirit – one's inner life – and with this attention to the 
knowledge that is within, one finds the importance of connection to the world outside of 
them. This great benefit of a creative life is the sense of community (empathy) and other-
worldliness (that there are vital needs and desires beyond the everyday of practical 
concerns). Once the myth of the individual has been dispelled, people can be free, 
without having entirely to disavow material desires, to embrace their int rrelatedness 
(without fear that they will fail in society) with each other and with nature. Individuals 
will be able to approach their relationship to society in a new way, ith as much, if not 
more, of the participatory determination they use in their individual p rsuits of material 
wealth. While we perceive ourselves to be alone, our rational interests d termine for us 
that we do not want things to change if they are good enough for our daily lives, but, once 
we come together, imagination will cast its net wider, as the entire landscape of human 
endeavor will have been broadened. This opening of the imagination allows for and 
encourages more active and consistent participation in public life by supporting change 






THE COUPLING OF THE DIONYSIAN AND THE APOLLINIAN: THE 
EVOLUTION OF NEITZSCHE'S DEFINITION OF TRANSCNDENT ART 
 
An amoral artist-god who wants to experience, whether he is 
building or destroying, in the good and in the bad, his own joy and 
glory – one who, creating worlds, frees himself from the distress of 
fullness and overfullness and from the affliction of the 
contradictions compressed in his soul. 
– Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy 
 
The modern stage, at least in its predominant bourgeois realism, 
reflects the limited and barren spiritual landscape of modernity. The 
hopes for transcending this situation lie in a rebirth of tragedy 
through a reconnection with the spirit of music and with myth. For 
modernity, however, the gods have aesthetic principles, art having 
in a sense replaced religion. 
– M.A.F. Witt, Nietzsche and the Rebirth of the Tragic 
 
 
As a young philologist in the late 19th century, Friedrich Nietzsche situated the 
ancient Greek god of sensuality, Dionysius, symbol of all that is instinctual and chaotic 




fulfilled life. Rather than deny its vital importance to an understanding of Greek tragedy 
and Greek culture in general, Nietzsche elevated the Dionysian (and its expression in 
tragedy and the Dionysian festivals of excess) to a realm of experience that existed on an 
even plane, as half of a whole system, with that of Apollinian order and reason (and, in 
his time, with the grand narratives of the Enlightenment). The generally accepted 19th- 
century attitude and scholarship on ancient Greek culture (and likewise on modern life) 
had fundamentally misunderstood the ancients’ legacy by sublimating, so to speak, 
evidence of raw passions in Greek art into an appearance of pure A ollonian reason, 
harmony, virtue, and order.26 It is precisely in the unity of the two opposing drives that 
Nietzsche discovered the foundations of what he deemed the highest art form – tragedy, 
or true transcendent art. Nietzsche argued for a revival of, and new appreciation for, the 
tragic in society to serve as the vehicle by which to transcend everyday life and the 
falsely absolute values of Christian morality through a positive and willful authentication 
of life. This discovery of tragic knowledge would result in the rebirth of the individual 
and the reawakening of culture. But, unlike Nietzsche’s contemporary Arthur 
Schopenhauer (1818/1969), who first acknowledged the importance of pain and 
pessimism to human existence, Nietzsche reformulated tragedy (an  the doctrine of 
eternal recurrence) to become a positive and life affirming, rather than a nihilistic and 
debilitating, vision for the future in a godless world.  
This chapter examines the Dionysian drive, as well as its foil and complement, the 
Apollinian consciousness, and their dialectical dance of artistic creation. In dialectics one 
                                                
26  This dominant view was heavily reliant on Johann Wi ckelmann's (1764/ 2009) The 




sees life as a perpetual resolution of contradictions within concepts that are composed as 
dichotomous relationships that alternately come together and twist apart in an eternal 
dance. This dialectic provides an understanding of existence that assists in consciousness 
change. It is vital that encounters with Dionysian fears and passions, also akin to the 
notion of the taboo, or the "unclean," or (to use Julia Kristeva's, 1984, term) the "abject," 
be incorporated into the rhythms of everyday life and that these work in opposition to the 
routinized structure of contemporary mass image mediated consciousness, or the 
reiterations and simplifications of "plastic aesthetics." Following Nietzsche’s 
(1872/1967) argument that the Greeks, to cope with the decline of their civilization, 
needed true Dionysian tragedy, I argue that contemporary 21st-century life in America, 
with its myriad luxuries and mass-negotiated experiences, has been in a decline of true 
Dionysian experience. As has been man’s inclination at least since the Enlightenment and 
the invention of capitalism, adherence to reason and individualism has edged out the 
value of sensual and spiritual knowledge in all areas of life. Today, individual 
experiences, potentially possessed of true freedom, are often repressed, by the force of 
popular will and become part of the plague of the conformity of mass experiences. The 
universal character of many emotions and experiences has been exploited, as the 
middling quality of popular opinion dulls the extremes of experience and forms a tepid 
and simplified “social” concept of the experience that is consumed by individuals in 
democratic society, who then, somewhat misleadingly, believe they are the authentic 




When we draw a connection between creativity and feelings of empowerment and 
empathy for others, the link takes several steps. When we tend to ourspirit, we press 
pause on pragmatism and on everyday urgencies, and allow ourselves to focus on the 
embrace of the melodic words of poetry, of music. These feelings often bring deep calm, 
sometimes long stored-away sorrow. These emotions, felt through the sens s, access both 
joy and pain; creativity (like it is the intention of religion) enables the individual to feel 
not only for their particular situation, but for the universal joys and pains of the human 
experience. The more frequently that we can access such emotions, the more we are 
exercising a healthy attention to our inner worlds, and to our truly free passions, which 
then illuminate knowledge that is gained from the spiritual experience of rebellious art. 
For Nietzsche, art could properly focus both on the valuable knowledge of the sens s and 
instincts, as well as on the intertwined relationship of this knowledge to our rationality. 
Both Nietzsche and Camus have a style of writing that feels mlodic, or rhythmic, 
aiding you to feel the sensuousness of the unfiltered passions they want to revive in 
individuals, and in society.  For Nietzsche, true art, and true philosophy, encourages the 
individual viewer to interpret it, and to consider its meaning, in their own personal way. 
In his own work, he presented his philosophy in spurts of thought, or aphorisms, not as a 
systematic and unified theory. A unified theory would falsely imply coherence in 
philosophy that could not be if it accurately reflected on the complexities and divisions 
within life, and the Self.  
Nietzsche believed, in line with anti-Enlightenment writers like de Sade and 




forward-thinking philosophy, and of a new understanding of morality that is borne of 
experience, not the church, or science for that matter. He did not intend to say that the 
mind was not important to the Self, but that the mind could not create what it does 
without the experiences of the senses- that the mind is borne of, and intertwined, with the 
body. This is in contrast to viewing the body- and sensory experience- as a separate, and 
less important, entity, from the mind, and from rational experience. Ni tzsche’s 
overarching point in his philosophy is that man must face his animal instincts, and in the 
face of a meaningless world, forge his own moral path using art as his only guide. 
Nietzsche saw in art the same oppositional tension as he found in theSelf. Artistic 
experience reflected the union of this un-resolving tension, and thus was the only source 
of authentic freedom and meaning for the individual. Although he was clearly influenced 
by the Romantic tradition, he did not believe that art should function as escapism from 
life, but rather that one could live meaningfully through art, and actually re-create life 
from the creative perspective.  
I propose the need for the encouragement and development of true Dionysian 
release – of true tragedy – among individuals on a mass level and the creation of 
visionary (tragic) art, in defiance of a contemporary society that is ever-more highly 
routinized and image-ized. Art, by definition, is an expression of an alternative reality. 
This is the vital distinction between art and aesthetics. I argue that “art” is Socratic by 
nature; it implies a constant questioning and resolution of contradiction. Aesthetics, or 
mainstream art, is entertainment, or the beautiful (see Cahn & Meskin, 2008; Cazeaux, 




in response to a society that thrives and expands largely on the promulgation of 
appearance-based experience that seeks to dilute lived reality. At least since the middle of 
the last century (Marcuse, 1969), seemingly visionary or taboo experi nc s are regularly 
stripped of their tragedy, their transgressive power, and thus teir authenticity and 
connections to the truest moments of existence; in this way, important human emotions 
and experiences are reduced to a shallow and contrived universality.  
Notwithstanding that consciousness change is necessary to revitaliz  nd 
reawaken, first, individuals’ true freedom of thought and, eventually democracy, it can 
begin with small transformations – with the desire to confront true life rather than take 
the easy road and accept mere images of life. Only after people reopen access to the 
knowledge of Dionysian spirituality can they be powerful against the disciplining 
tentacles of our image-ized culture. The energies of the "‘will to power" provide 
opportunity for those who are strong enough to accept Dionysian power. With the 
harnessing of sensual and spiritual power, of suffering and of compassion, we can begin 
to see the truths of human connectivity and universal human experience. Then we can 
revitalize the latent community-minded American spirit and pave the way for a stronger 
and more participatory, democracy. 
With the passage of time, the Apollinian sublimation of Dionysian experiences 
has expanded and become perfected. By sublimation, following Freud (1930/1961), is 
meant the redirecting of potentially destructive raw passions. These chaotic instincts are 
transformed into more positive, constructive actions and also repressed into the recesses 




Dionysian, especially its most taboo facets, and transforms true passions into simulated 
passions into Apollinian illusions and images. These simulations servethe dual purpose 
of 1) strengthening the desire for constantly increasing choices and depth of xperience in 
the consumerism of our capitalist society and 2) further alienating us from our personal 
Dionysian moments (of love, sex, aggression, pain) by creating the app arance of our 
having felt Dionysian transcendence, which may simply have been a purchased image 
(and it is always an image of an experience. The result is a sort of false conscious ess). 
We need to be aware of our increasing ability, made possible by the vast number 
of choices aimed at us, not to ‘face life (reality)’ as individuals,, as we must also be aware 
of  the ramifications of possessing and using such ability (Barber, 2008). A new 
understanding of our shared experiences, such as of happiness and of individuality, m st 
be created. This new understanding can create a life of happiness if we understand 
happiness to mean the comfort of stability (for Nietzsche (1872/1967), a lack of change 
meant a lack of life), but not if we understand happiness to mean thriving in the 
phenomenal experience of everyday life, complete with its discomforts, cruelties, and 
pain. Accordingly, we need to confront the issue of change of consciousness in everyday 
life, particularly through the use of art and festivals to create life that is in harmony with 
both the Dionysian and Apollinian elements. Artistic creation, and likewise 
consciousness change, are self-overcoming. As political theorist Jul a Kristeva (1984a) 
explains, through creativity, we can confront the valuable human experienc s that may be 
taboo in collective life or that may be filtered through popular opinion in a way that they 




utters and by the same token purifies” (p. 17). True confrontation with horror, or the 
abject, results in a purification of existence that replaces Platonic essentialist truths with a 
freedom to create the cadence of the everyday.   
Nietzsche (1872/1967) believed that the true art of tragedy could serve as th  tool 
by which to create meaning in life where the fallacy of universal values has been 
positively confronted. Martha Nussbaum (1991/2002) explains Nietzsche’s underlyi g 
belief that we must face the meaninglessness of life with positive and willful 
determination, a determination to create. The other key part of this idea that the inevitable 
and inherent meaninglessness of the order of the universe, engenders the need to pursue 
meaning elsewhere – meaning that is truly independently created and experienced, not 
merely accepted as a hand-me-down truth. On this issue of meaning creation in a 
meaninglessness world, Julian Young (1992) elucidates Nietzsche's beli f that the only 
true meaning that can be experienced in life is the connectio  with, and dependence on, 
all others, in the face of a lack of universal, and God-given, ideals.  
Matthew Rampley (2000) echoes the claim that Nietzsche’s ideas about art are 
inseparable from his confrontation with the tragedy of nihilism: “[H]e accords to art the 
potential for functioning as the counter–movement to general nihilism" (p. 215). "[Art], 
for Nietzsche, is constituted less by artworks and more by the stat of artistic creativity" 
(p. 219). Rampley points to Nietzsche’s belief that we must reform our aesthetic practices 
in our ever-evolving culture because we are constantly called on to vercome ourselves 
so that, “aesthetic reform opens the way to cultural revolution.” (p. 215). He further 




like Schiller and Novalis, did not believe merely that aesthetic rform should take place 
because of the lack of transcendent values in popular cultural aesthetic , but with an 
existential bent, he believed that aesthetic renewal could serve as an antidote to a 
meaningless world. 27 
Nussbaum (1991/2002), in her explorations of Schopenhauer’s influence on 
Nietzsche, argues that Nietzsche always denied “[that] we can [could] understand the role 
that works of art play in human lives, or even adequately explain our particul r 
judgments of beauty and ugliness, without connecting these to human practical needs—
and needs that are directed toward living and affirming life, rather than toward 
resignation and denial.” (Nussbaum, 1991/2002, p. 55). Further, she argues that in art 
“we find life justified: that is, having abandoned all attempts to find extra –human 
justification for existence, we can find the only justification we ev r shall find in our very 
own selves, and our own creative activity” (Nussbaum, 1991/2002, p. 59). She focuses on 
Nietzsche’s argument that in the face of existential crisis and uncertainty, the 
empowerment of creation builds freedom and will. 
Young’s (1992) influential study on Nietzsche’s philosophy of art28 considers 
Nietzsche’s beliefs about art as occurring in several stage  but argues that the last 
parallels the first, thus creating a circle of thought. Young argues that art, for Nietzsche 
(and this is true for Camus’ philosophy as well), saves us from our own existential 
anxieties. Young writes, “The psychological basis of altruism i sympathy – feeling the 
                                                
27  Rampley, M. (2000). Nietzsche, Aesthetics and Modernity. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. p.216. 




same kind of concern for the well-being of another that one normally has for one’s own – 
and the basis of that is the altruist’s … inarticulate, 'intuitive' realization that the 
principium individuationis is an illusion” (p. 9). Further explaining this point, he echoes 
both Camus and Nietzsche: “[The] realization that I am the only being that exists but that 
every other individual is this 'I' too” (p. 9). Young (1992) is most interested in 
Nietzsche’s assertion of the myth of the individual, or the fallacy that our selves are 
independently created and defined. Nietzsche, like Camus, believed that true freedom and 
independence comes at least partly from the recognition of fundamentl similarities and 
interdependencies.  
The Birth of Tragedy 
Through a genealogical exploration of the history of the Greek tragic form, 
Nietzsche’s first book, The Birth of Tragedy (1872/1967), critiqued how repressed and 
misguided 19th-century German society had become. In his early, dense prose style, he 
introduced life as formed by a dialectic, with the comfort of reason, science and culture 
(society) on one side, represented by Apollo, the god of restraint and h rmony, and, on 
the other, Nature, with its unrestrained passions and instincts, represented by Dionysius. 
These two life forces complement yet actively restrict each other.  
Nietzsche believed that existence is not about eternal and universal truths, but 
rather is the constant struggle of many competing "‘will[s] to power’" and a 
“continuously manifested representation of the primal unity” (p. 45). Nietzsche proposed 
that the early tragic Greek chorus functioned as the expression of that which is universal 




Nietzsche argued that the Dionysian side of human life has been largely denied and 
apprehended, whereas the already-filtered Apollinian side of life is encouraged in society. 
Accordingly, the love of reason and conscious knowledge – from Socrates and Plato to 
Descartes and Kant – has dominated society and the cultural evolution of humankind.  
Enlightenment's faith in reason as Truth and Science and scientifi progress as salvation 
has, like a veil, hid from our everyday view “excess reveal[ing] itself as truth" (p. 46). 
Thus Nietzsche presented Socrates as both the problem and the answer. Socrates’ 
influence destroyed the union of Dionysius and Apollo in early Greek tragedy with his 
love of reason and the conscious mind. Nietzsche asked, “Is the resolve to be so scientific 
… perhaps a kind of fear of, an escape from, pessimism? A subtle last resort against 
truth?” (p. 18). Despite Socrates’ fear of pessimism and the unknown of art, Nietzsche 
admired the strength and courage of Socrates (a man ahead of his time) and was 
interested in the “artistic Socrates” as a model for life. This combination of a rigorous, 
transcendent critique and free artistic passion is what Nietzsche seems to have conceived 
of as the path for a true visionary, for the philosopher of life, for the artist of progress. In 
his “Attempt at a Self-Criticism,” which precedes the text of The Birth of Tragedy, 
Nietzsche mentions that his own artistic Socratic expression “had a knack for seeking out 
fellow-rhapsodizers and for luring them on to new secret paths and dancing places.” 
The Dionysian drive has many functions, according to Nietzsche. Perhaps most 
importantly, it allows for a healthy and vibrant social life by providing an outlet for 
repressed and restrained urges that, if held inside, could damage the heal  of the self or 




urges are not simply unrestrained emotions and passions, they are desires for the abject, 
the “boundless and cruel longing to exceed all norms” (p. 10), the antirational yearning 
for spiritual life, for deep release, for dance, for song. On Dionysia  occasions, we allow 
ourselves to disregard conventional boundaries and limits by experiencing atural 
animalistic urges for violence, pain, pleasure, and creation (and its counterpart 
destruction). In the process, Nietzsche argues, we experience trascendent feelings of 
freedom and mystical understandings of human unity and wholeness, and oneness with 
Nature. In the 1998 film Pleasantville, the citizens of a fictional 1950s television 
suburban town live in a Puritanical, black-and-white world of reflected images, restraint, 
perpetual happiness defined by stability and relative to nothing else, and an almost 
complete lack of change – anti-life living, for Nietzsche. It is only when knowledge of 
sensual pleasures begins to spread in the community that people are reborn in color, with 
all its accompanying ecstasy and pain.  
Kristeva (1984a) defines the Dionysian, or a similar, concept as "‘abject"’– not 
only what it feels like but according to its transgressive rolin consciousness: “It is thus 
not lack of cleanliness or health that causes abjection but what disturbs identity, system, 
order. What does not respect borders, positions, rules. The in-between, th  ambiguous, 
the composite (p. 4). Kristeva, inspired not only by Freud and Lacan, but by Georges 
Bataille too, seeks to increase interest in, and understanding of, our universal and 
unifying connections with the abject, the bodily, the instinctual, what s e terms the 
semiotic. She argues that the abject can be found in the universal hum n feeling of 




and revolting. In abjection, there is lapse in meaning, leaving only feeling. Kristeva 
associates the abject with the maternal; she says that when we part from our mother in 
birth we experience the initial abjection of the maternal that creates our self-identity and 
brings us into the symbolic (not semiotic) realm of life. The semiotic and the symbolic 
are two poles of the dialectic of life, which Kristeva argues must balance each other.  
I argue that these poles can be seen as parallel to the Dionysian and Apollonian 
relationship. The semiotic is prelingual, corporal, whereas the symbolic is referential, is 
of knowledge and reason (Kristeva, 1984a). Poetic language, which I would call 
visionary – the unification of the Dionysian and Apollonian – for Kristeva (1984b) 
mediates and confronts the universal contradictions in life. The best art, for Kristeva, 
explores that which is natural, taboo – the abject.29  
The abject is experienced when we are confronted with the body in death, in birth, 
in illness and decay, in excrement, extreme pain, and loss of control. The abject is 
regularly pushed from public sight and into private repression and concealment. We fear 
and quarantine our diseases and our garbage, our blood and our bodily waste. Yet the
abject, Kristeva explains, provokes a semiotic response, a valuable addition to the 
symbolic- in our everyday lives. 
                                                
29  In 1993, the Whitney Museum of American Art in New York City exhibited a show 
titled Abject Art: Repulsion and Desire in American Art. Included in this genre, of creativity is extreme 
performance art that employs various forms of the abj ct, such as a deceased body or rituals of cruelty or 
suffering, as well as the use of bodily fluids, such as blood, feces, urine. Some of the notable artists whose 
works were exhibited in this show are Louise Bourgeois, Carolee Schneemann, Cindy Sherman, Kiki 
Smith, Robert Gober, and Paul McCarthy, among others. Some artists have employed abject materials and 
ideas to provoke and transcend the comforts of our eve yday lives; others are conscious of the simple shock 
value and even humor that may be contained in the abject. Although theoretically the abject is significant, 
and while some artworks are able to capture the transcendent moments of abjection, many others seem too-
easy, "plastic’" imitations of truly subversive expriences, and often their effect is silly and trite, rather than 





The Union of Apollo and Dionysus 
The Apollinian consciousness needs the Dionysian energy. “Apollo …shows us 
how necessary is the entire world of suffering, that by means of it the individual may be 
impelled to realize the redeeming vision.” (1872/1967) The primal unity relies on the 
assistance of illusion; art seeks to understand and interpret. We need chaos to impel us to 
create, and out of pain comes the desire for beauty through the ordered nature of illusion. 
We are saved, as from the abject; it sculpts comprehension and veils us from a confusing 
and painful reality:  
Apollo, the god of all plastic energies … ruler over the beautiful 
illusion of the inner world of fantasy. The higher truth, the 
perfection of these states in contrast to the incompletely intelligible 
everyday world, this deep consciousness of nature, healing and 
helping. … But we must also include in our image of Apollo that 
delicate boundary, which the dream must not overstep lest it have a 
pathological effect (in which case mere appearance would deceive 
us as if it were crude reality). We must keep in mind that measur d 
restraint, that freedom from the wilder emotions (Nietzsche, 
1872/1967,p. 35; emphasis added). 
The Apollinian consciousness, in seeking order and regulation through restraint, 
promotes an atomistic understanding of life through the “delimiting of the boundaries of 




and emotions, also reveals a mystical unity or oneness among humans and Nature. This 
unified vision is very different from the artificial harmony of society; rather, it seeks a 
spiritual unity that is less about peace than it is about authentic living.  
Throughout his life and his writings, Nietzsche argued that the reigning Christian 
system of morality had created and rationalized a false dichotomy between good and evil 
that simplified and thus misunderstood life. It was in The Birth of Tragedy that Nietzsche 
first called for life (and likewise art) that is ‘beyond good and evil’. It is dangerous to 
follow the teachings of Socrates that if art is to be beautiful it must be of the 
consciousness (intelligible, "good"). Instead, we must not deny how instinct and the 
unconscious can (and should) fuel the creation of art (and the creation of life), wrote 
Nietzsche.  
True art is an expression of our universal and instinctual responses, our inner 
worlds, of the unsafe, or of the taboo. It is for release, for catharsis, and, ultimately, for 
education, both for the artists and those viewing and experiencing the art. A true 
visionary artist expands the limits of our experiences, while simultaneously 
demonstrating our common bonds: “This Dionysian artist … exalts Life when he honours 
her with his love; and in exalting her, exalts humanity as well. For the mediocre, simply 
because they cannot transfigure life in that way, benefit extremely from looking on the 
world through the Dionysian artist’s personality. It is his genius that, by putting ugly 
reality into an art-form, makes life desirable” (Ludovici, 1971, p. 51). This artist is a 
sage, a teacher, a healer: “[There] is a special kind of consciousness or perception which 




state, created with the intention of prompting and aiding the recreation of a similar state 
in the mind of the spectator” (Young, 1992, p. 10).  
Use of the symbolism of laughter, and its development as a concept, is abundant 
in the work of Nietzsche and other thinkers such as Kristeva, have followed course. 
Laughter, with its spontaneity and guttural powers, is the perfect representative of the 
Dionysian release- of the self, pouring out in unstoppable waves: “Céline – who speaks 
from within  … So his laughter bursts out … the gushing forth of the unconscious, the 
repressed, suppressed pleasure, be it sex or death” (Nietzsche, 1872/1967, pp. 205–206). 
Nietzsche’s main project was to elevate the importance of the unconscious: “You ought 
to learn the art of this-worldly comfort first; you ought to learn to laugh. . Laughter I have 
pronounced holy: you higher men, learn – to laugh!” (pp. 26–27). But not all of what 
mass society terms or believes is ‘art’ is either true Dionysian expression or true tragedy 
(visionary art). Nietzsche clarified this through his distinction between tragedy – true 
transcendent art – and the plastic arts. Art that is plastic (Apollinian) is concerned only 
with images and appearances (dreams, appearances of appearances) rather than with lived 
experience.  
The aesthetically sensitive man stands in the same relation to the 
reality of dreams as the philosopher does to the reality of existence 
… these images afford him an interpretation of life, and by 
reflecting on these processes he trains himself for life. It is not only 
the agreeable … images … the serious, the troubled, the sad … the 




him … he lives and suffers with these scenes- and yet not without 
that fleeting sensation of illusion (p. 34). 
Artistic creation (true tragedy) comes both from recognition of the importance of 
the Dionysian realm, and from the healthy tension of the two life forces.  
Nietzsche argued that intuition can access a deeper knowledge than philosophy 
can offer because instinct and passion operate beyond words and conceptual 
organizations and can articulate the universal core of human love and anguish. In later 
works, after The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche extended his argument against both the 
omniscience of rationality and a strict Christian morality. Nietzsche viewed traditional 
morality as hostile to life.30 At times in his writing, he is almost physically disgusted by 
Christian morality’s function in society as a shield from the pain nd suffering of 
everyday reality. He feared that a morality that relies on promises of a better, truer, other 
life is “the beginning of the end … because life is something essentially amora” (p. 23). 
First in Beyond Good and Evil (1886/1989) and then in The Genealogy of Morals 
(1897/2009), Nietzsche denied a system of absolute morality31 and encouraged his 
readers to be self-reliant and live according to self-creation, without the constraints of the 
morality of the masses. Quoting from his Thus Spake Zarathustra (1891/1968), he wrote: 
                                                
30  Notably, Stauffer and Bergo (2009), in their recent work on the links between Nietzsche 
and Levinas, argue that despite the seeming opposing nature of the ethical thought of the two thinkers, there 
are important overlaps between them: “Both [thinkers] radically reevaluate the traditional ground of ethics 
and morality, and, further, both are united in their appreciation of the risk that nihilism poses to ehics and 
to life in general”(p. 1). 
 Similarly, von Vacano (2007), examining the similarities between the political theories of 
Machiavelli and Nietzsche, argues that for both thinkers “truth is to be approached from an artistic 
perspective” (p. 111). 




“[A] philosophy that dares to move, to demote, morality into the realm of appearance … 
as delusion, error, interpretation, contrivance, art" (pp.22–23). Similar to Camus’ 
(1951/1991) notion of a "rebellion of moderation," which must be created in response to 
the nihilism bred by the absurdity of the human condition, a desire for life was 
Nietzsche’s vision of a meaningful way to live in a meaningless world. 
Before a man can create in true (the ultimate) freedom, “[h]e must first be an 
annihilator and break values (Nietzsche, 1891/1968, p. 228).Nietzsche’s later writings 
were often focused on the artistic creative o rman versus the slave morality of the herd, 
or the masses. This hierarchical conception’s inherent elitism should not distract from 
Nietzsche’s correct understanding either of the importance of the visionary (in and for 
society) or of the problem of consciousness change for the philosopher r a tist 
(philosophical artist) – you can never reach everyone. Similar to Nietzsche's willful 
overman, Kristeva’s (1984a) notion of the "deject"  
never stops demarcating his universe whose fluid confines – for they 
are constituted of a non-object, the abject … impel him to start 
afresh. A tireless builder, the deject is in short a str y. He is on a 
journey … the end of which keeps receding. … And the more he 
strays, the more he is saved. For it is out of such straying on 
excluded ground that he draws his jouissance (p. 8). 
Kristeva argues that the abject, not unlike the animal instinct of Nietzsche’s 
Dionysian, cannot be understood rationally, through the mind. Rather, it must be felt, 




as such. One does not know it [the abject], one does not desire it, one joys in it [on en 
jouit]. Violently and painfully. A passion” (p. 9). 
Nietzsche's Evolving Definition of the Dionysian Realm of the Self 
In a footnote to Nietzsche's (1882/1974) Gay Science, Walter Kaufmann warns 
readers that any reader of Nietzsche’s work must be aware of his progressi n as a thinker, 
particularly concerning his understanding of the Dionysian realm. Kaufmann writes that 
Nietzsche’s early works employed a very different understanding of Dionysius from 
those in his later works (after Zarathustra) (p. 331n). He argues that in his early writings, 
namely, The Birth of Tragedy (1872//1967), Nietzsche viewed the Dionysian as being in 
a dialectic with the Apollinian forces in society; later, he situated the Dionysian in 
opposition to both the Romantic, and the Christian approach to life. Kaufmann asserts 
that the Dionysian impulse of the later books was entirely unified with the Apollinian 
drive, while Nietzsche’s initial ideas about the neglected Dionysian realm of the body and 
instinct, in BOT, asserted its relationship to, though also its distinction, from its opposing 
drive. In Nietzsche’s later works, this view changed as he began to view and define true 
Dionysian expression, and true artistic expression (the “artistic Socrates”) as a 
convergence of the Dionysian and Apollinian realms whereby Dionysia  urges are 
informed by thoughtful creativity. It is also clear from his writings that Nietzsche disliked 
both the energetic Romantic fondness for drink and reckless abandon, and the slave 
morals and ascetic nature of the Christians. To pit the exalted Dionysius again t these two 
extremes tells us that the heart of Nietzsche’s theory lay in the middle-ground or cross-




Aristotelian mean method where the message for morality, and for progress, is that we 
can locate a healthy balance in our lives between our two most dominant natural 
instincts- to understand, and to feel with abandon- by tempering Dionysian disorder and 
rearrangements, with Apollinian order. 
                Artistic Socrates 
                        ↕ 
      Early works:  Dionysius    vs.    Apollo 
 
      Later works:  Dionysius           Christians ( ot enough Dionysian) 
                (Artistic Socrates)    vs.       & 
                                     Romantics (too much Dionysian)  
Figure 1 
When you experience the Dionysian, you lose your subjectivity and gain a 
glimpse of universal oneness. The Apollinian realm, by its nature, encourages individual 
subjectivity; the subject–object relationship exists only in language, or in society (in the 
Apollinian sphere). In The Birth of Tragedy (1872/1967), where Nietzsche clearly 
contrasts Dionysius with Apollo, he does not especially admire the exc sses of the 
Dionysian realm on its own, as alone guidance for life. Rather, he declares a union of the 
two parallel realms of life in his description of the “artistic Socrates” (p. 92). This artist-
philosopher, rigorous yet emotional, was a true visionary, able to use Dionysian moments 
in a critical (through rationality) fashion in society, that is, for action. Nietzsche aimed to 
examine “the problem of science itself … presented in the context of art – for the 
problem of science cannot be recognized in the context of science – a book [The Birth of 




look at science in the perspective of the artist, but at art in that [perspective] of life” (p. 
18). Kaufmann discusses the later characterization of Dionysius a "superabundant" 
(filled with life) as opposed to the guilt or “resentment” (anti-life) of the Christian (p. 
331n). The Dionysius of the later work seems to be a reflective version of Nietzsche’s 
earlier idea of the God. The initial conception of Dionysius was simpler, characterized as 
the ruler over a realm of complete disorder and natural chaos, while his ater images of 
the same God depicted the ruler over a liberating artistic drive that uses the transcendent 
qualities of "truly facing life" through creativity and lived experiences, to pursue critique 
and change within the individual, and also society. In this sense, Nietzsch ’s vision of a 
union of tragedy and the “artistic Socrates” carries through to his later ideas, where the 
notion of the Dionysian represents such a union.32  
Nietzsche was disdainful of the Romantics in general and of the Romantic 
propensity to believe devoutly in the expression of wild and primal releas , often in the 
easily accessible form of intoxication, as a road to truth. In the Birth of Tragedy, he called 
such romantic art “a first-rate poison for the nerves, doubly dangerous among a people 
who love drink and who honor lack of clarity as a virtue, for it has the double quality of a 
narcotic that both intoxicates and spreads a fog” (p. 25). Although I would argue that 
many of the Romantics, the poet Arthur Rimbaud in particular, despite their wild 
behavior and seemingly "aimless" journeys, were aware, if only subconsciously, of the 
need for the interjection of the reasoned Apollinian viewpoint into their artistic ventures 
                                                
32  Witt (2007) argues that in Nietzsche’s final works the importance of the Apollonian 
drive is reduced, in comparison with its valuation n his first work, although he affirms that “Nietzsche 
never abandoned his anti-Aristotelian stance, which privileges suffering over action and the aesthetic over 




that exalted the irrational. Dionysian feelings exist so that people can throw off the cloak 
of reason for a moment and feel the world without the rules and symbols of society. Yes, 
the young Rimbaud lived a life of dangerous and self-destructive exc ss. But Rimbaud’s 
notion of the visionary poet as a driving force of history was a concept that relied on the 
need to reflect on the chaotic and transcendent moments of Dionysian experience, in 
order to truly fulfill its claims; and Rimbaud, on several occasions, alluded (1869-
1891/1975) to this dialectic- that reason must be overcome to experience th  truly free 
and creative, but that reason can also process and create genuine knowldge from 
instinctual and artistic experiences.  
Despite such objections, Nietzsche (1872/1967, 1882/1974, 1886/1989, 
1897/2009) rightly observed that it is in the mixing of the Apollinian and Dionysian 
drives that we find political theory and a source for political action.33 In other words, it is 
only when we dispense with the notion that anti-societal expressions of individual 
passions can change or move society forward] – , a claim that was supported by 19th-
century thinkers from the Marquis de Sade (1795/1990) to Rimbaud (1869-1891/1975)–  
that we can begin to make real use of art as a force counter to poli ics and especially 
mainstream culture. It is noteworthy that Nietzsche, one of the men most associated with 
bacchanalian revelry, the idea of immorality, and a desire to live above or beyond the 
norm, was cautious in recommending that one live through true art.  Although clearly that 
                                                
33  This connection between art and political health is distinct from the view described by 
Jeanne M. Heffernan (2000) in her examination of art as a political good, where she highlights Maritain’s 
ideas regarding the relationship between art and politics.   Quoting Maritain (Art and Scholasticism, 1924), 
Heffernan asserts that, “Art plays a critical role in the life of virtue: art teaches man the pleasure of the 




he was excited by his discovery of the importance of Dionysian experiences to political 
and social life, he also made clear that misuse of a discovery (or ediscovery) of a vibrant 
inner world could be fruitless as well as dangerous. Although Nietzsche (1872/1974) 
pointed out the destructive and painful struggle of human existence, he urged his readers 
to affirm life and face these aspects of life bravely, to fight nihilistic urges with an 
enthusiastic will to power.  
It is important to remember that the Greek god Dionysius did not simply live with 
reckless abandon. She taught of truths that came from our passions, our bodies, from 
what is individual to each of us. Henri Lefebvre (1991), the French humanist/Marxist 
philosopher and sociologist, coined his version of this approach to life as the "art of 
living." Like Nietzsche’s concepts of the overman and the eternal return, the art of living, 
presupposes that a person sees his own life – the development and intensifica ion of his 
life – not as a means to an end but as an end in itself. It sugge ts that everyday life 
become a work of art and ‘the joy that man gives to himself.” Further, he alludes to the 
threat of Apollinian sublimation to the Dionysian project, as well as to the power of 
visionary art to enable unity among people and nature: “[T]his will not be reducible to a 
few cheap formulas…[they are] a shallow wisdom which will never bring 
satisfaction…the [true] art of living implies the end of alienation” (p. 199). 
Lefebvre wrote of the importance of the Dionysian festival to healt y ancient 
rural peasant communities: “In celebrating, each member of the community went beyond 
himself, so to speak, and in one fell swoop drew all that was energetic, pl asurable, and 




from everyday life only in the explosion of forces which had been slowly accumulated in 
and via everyday life” (p. 202). The rituals left men and women liberated: “[T]he 
festivities would end in scuffles and orgies" (p. 202) and completely xhausted: “No 
aspect of himself [the peasant], of his energy, his instinct, was left unused” (p. 207). He 
argues, and his approach is part of the argument I am making in this paper, that, with the 
development of industrialization and modernization in general, the true Dionysian nature 
of these festivals has faded, leaving little more than superstitiou  repetitions of the 
traditional experiences, with people taking part in rituals only for the belief that it can aid 
the profits on their crops, Lefebvre argues, not for how it can provide needed true release, 
and in this way, liberation. 
In other words, Apollinian image and appearance have replaced the true 
connection with joy and suffering that historically maintained thehealth of the 
community. “Rituals and symbols … have tended to dispossess human actions of their 
living substance in favor of ‘meanings’” (p. 209). It is indeed true that ultimately, all 
images, or reflections – described rather than felt – of intense human emotions and 
experiences pale in comparison with the indescribable pleasures and intensities of  actual 
experiences. The ever-increasing mass manufacture of release leads to a sterilization and 
routinizing (in the Weberian sense) of potentially true Dionysian experience.34 This 
dilution of experience, and of rebellion and nonconformity, is a common occurren e in a 
21st-century world that thrives on transforming what is alternative and anti-societal into 
                                                
34  Caroline Levine (2007) writes of the turn in the 1960s, “Turning rebellion into a devious 





its opposite – an order-affirming (and ultimately capitalist) acivity (Barber, 2008; Frank, 
1998; Hinderliter, Kaizen, Maimon, Mansoor, & McCormick, 2009). Art is interested in 
progress and history. For it to function as a deciding force in society, rebellious creation 
must straddle intuition and reason by blending transcendence and critique. 
The Apollinian realm demonstrates our propensity for reason, and in the reflection 
and order of reason, it also becomes the world of appearances. It is our natural desire to 
shape the chaos, confusion, and sensuousness of Dionysian experiences into something 
palatable. Since the 1960s, the hippie culture has, for the large part, grown up and tuned 
back in to society, or in the rarer cases, fled society completely and gone underground. In 
the following decades, though, with the smell of hippie culture still lingering, a new term 
developed for hippies who loved the intoxication and escapism of bohemian life, but not 
the true political rebellion– who enjoyed the free love, but not the ruly free mind. This 
new “hippie-lite” became synonymous with people who had the appearanc of hippies 
but who had adopted the look mostly to enjoy the reckless abandon of drug 
experimentation without awareness of the political and social consciousness of the true 
revolutionary ‘hippie’ (VH1 Rock, 2006). This type of “watered-down” identity naturally 
sprouts where there is initially a strong lived experience. Powerful xperiences are 
exciting and mysterious. No matter how one might describe, draw, or sing about such an 
experience, it can never be satisfyingly understood without your actally living in those 
moments. We can remember, and even try to describe, the sublime, but try as we may, 




doing so would be an attempt to relive Dionysian emotions in terms of Apollinian reason, 
which is not possible.  
Marcuse (Kellner, 2007) argued that in the difference between true visionary or 
critical art and mainstream aesthetics that attempt to imitate true art the key is the 
experience of a true Dionysian moment. Even those mainstream artworks that appear 
avant-garde fail to recapture the creative force of the original a d are thus merely an 
empty vessel of what was once transformative art. “What originally started out as an 
authentic cry and song of the oppressed black community has since been transformed and 
commercialized into ‘white’ rock, which by means of contrived ‘performances’, serves as 
a orgiastic group therapy which removes all the frustrations and inhibit ons of the 
audiences, but only temporarily and without any socio-political foundation” (p. 229). 
Similarly, New York Times art critic Ken Johnson (2010) argues that the 
institutional art world has become overwhelmed by what he calls "contemporary 
academicism."  This genre of art-making employs various elements of important and 
revolutionary ideas within the Western art canon. It moves them fro their original 
contexts to new environments and creative confrontations. As Johnson points out, his 
appropriation of avant-garde artistic tropes may be seen as revolutionary in its own right, 
and in some ways it is. But, he argues, the “wild new beauty and free om” that 
accompanies visionary creation is compromised by the routine enactment of its particular 
driving creative idea,; eventually, I maintain, ever more quickly the visionary and 





It is because many of these Dionysian moments cannot be easily understood that 
there is both a natural human impulse to provide that experience in an accessible form 
and a complementary capitalist desire to market and package this same experience. What 
we lose is our ability to live in the moment, to live to the fullest by feeling as much as 
possible. “In the end, our only difference is our unwillingness to have a face-to-face 
confrontation with the abject. Who would want to be a prophet? … prefer to fo esee or 
seduce; to plan ahead, promise a recovery, or esthetize; to provide social security or make 
art not too far removed from the level of the media” (Kristeva, 1984b, p. 209). When 
these two impulses meet, there is a successful market for whatever kind of alternative 
Dionysian experience one can imagine. But this marketed experienc, lifestyle or, more 
simply, party or artistic idea, fails to replicate the experience accur tely.  
Kristeva explains the problem of re-creating the passions of the abject: “Would he 
then be capable of X-raying horror without making capital out of his power? Of 
displaying the abject without confusing himself for it? Probably not” (pp. 209–210). The 
experience that marketed the appearance or reflection – or, as Kisteva would put it, the 
X-ray – of the true Dionysian experience. The result is a mere image, an end result 
obtained without the process of creation, without the Nietzschian primal unity. It is in this 
vein that Nietzsche (1872/1967) called Wagner a “Romantic.” Nietzsche (1882/1974), 
like Rousseau (1750/1993), who argued against mainstream arts, derided Wagner and 
other artists who pander to the “common man” for being overly theatrical and dramatic, 




Open any city newspaper in the major cities in America and you will find a 
variety of radical avant-garde visual art exhibits, cutting-ede dance and music 
performances, ecstasy-fueled raves, and ritualized contemporary urban festivals of 
debauchery. There is evidence of such Dionysian life, existing both underground and in 
venues that are open to the general public, that takes place all over the world, but this is 
primarily found in urban areas (especially in the bigger and more diverse cities) and on 
university campuses, which in many ways resemble the diversity and often 
complementary liberal nature of urban life. It is largely in these experimental 
communities and areas, that unique, and anti-establishment artistic experiences expand 
our imaginative and empathetic limits and encourage community-consciousness, rather 
than the individualism that is encouraged by the increasing routinization nd image-
ization of everyday life under current global capitalism (Lash & Lury, 2007; Ritzer, 2007, 
2010). 
Nietzsche called on us to cast aside the temptation of mass society’s postmodern 
nihilism in favor of a constantly self-criticizing and self-reflecting individualized system 
of morality. This "will to power" in the face of existential crisis is a fundamental 
reinterpretation of the Enlightenment itself – to think for oneself and to act for oneself as 
much as is possible, true autonomy. Most systems of morality assume that there is an 
objective source of moral knowledge, be it a Christian god or the aristocratic morality of 
the ancient Greeks. These systems base on these gods their justifications for these rules 
and their ideas about how the rules ought to be obeyed. Nietzsche (1882/1974), for whom 




not to engage in any totalizing discourse, to confront life passionately, nd to follow our 
own paths by way of artistic creation. 
Conclusions 
In our time, a less hierarchical possibility for ethics is a pluralism of many 
coexisting individualized personal ethics. Nietzsche (1886/1989) suggested an alternative 
to a fixed or universal moral basis for practical life in the form of true moral 
individualism. In contemporary philosophy, Agnes Heller (1989, 1999) (among other
postmodern thinkers) advocates an “ethics of personality,” that her colleague Mihaly 
Vajda (1999) has summed up as a free ethics that contradicts the way that traditional 
moral philosophy tries to prescribe how people should behave: “'Be yourself! Follow 
your own destiny!'”Many thinkers talk about the end of “grand narrative(s)” and big 
"Truth" sounding board(s) for moral life. Instead they admire Nietzsche’s call for 
constant self-critique and creation. Instead of becoming an "-‘ist" or trying to develop a 
new "ism," Nietzsche (1891/1968) asks us to think "personally," to find our own way: 
“One repays a teacher badly if one always remains a student. … Now I bid you lose me 
and find yourselves; and only when you have all denied me will I return to you” (p. 190). 
In response to Schopenhauer’s philosophy, Nietzsche (1872/1967) wrote, “Is p ssimism 
necessarily a sign of decline, decay, degeneration, weary and weak instincts? Is there a 
pessimism of strength? An intellectual predilection for the hard, gruesome, evil, 
problematic aspect of existence, prompted by well-being, by overfl wing health, by the 
fullness of existence?” (p. 17). “How should we then … explain the origin of the … 




overgreat fullness?” (p. 21). Nietzsche (1882/1974) pointed out that the Greeks had 
grown more outwardly optimistic at the very point that their civilization began to 
dissolve: 
 
a society in which corruption spreads is accused of 
exhaustion…while the comforts of life are now desired just as 
ardently as warlike and athletic honors were formerly … the ancient 
national energy and national passion … have now been transmuted 
into countless private passions and have merely become less 
visible…Thus it is precisely in times of “exhaustion” that tragedy 
runs through houses and streets, that great love and great hatred are 
born, and that the flame of knowledge flares up into the sky….for 
they carry the seeds of the future…corruption is merely a nasty word 
for the autumn of a people (pp.96–98).  
We find ourselves in a similar situation today. Our culture, in a dialectic with the 
free markets of capitalism, has reached a point where money can purchase almost 
anything. What’s better than buying a material object? Some would say that buying a 
service, or an experience, or, better, a taboo experience is even mor  exciting. From the 
Reagan years of the 1980s, and Nancy Reagan’s “Just say No” antidrug campaign, to the 
antismoking crusades of Elizabeth Dole and others, the last 30 years have seen a 
“cleaning up” of society. Suddenly it is the 21st century in America and cigarette 




restaurants, even bars, and many schoolchildren can no longer snack on soda or other 
sugary foods in their cafeterias. Most would not disagree with these governmental and 
societal measures that provide safer and cleaner environments for us. Nonetheless, 
besides the obvious advances in health care, what do these sanctions say about our 
culture? Our fear of the "abject" and our societal need to order it and package it 
appealingly (make it image-ized) makes it more difficult for people to confront the true 
Dionysian realm, but that we fear the abject, and the body in general, also makes it all the 
more important to confront our fears, and our own abjection. 
Dionysian experience is vital to the visionary need and capability to see beyond 
and ahead. It is not possible to teach until you learn, and Dionysian experience engenders 
the ability for one to be a spiritual teacher, to facilitate progress outside of science. It is 
important to create, encourage, and experience art that is both intoxicating and thought-
provoking, and in this way demonstrates the sensuous and rebellious Dionysian spirit and 
instinct and opens it to the world. True art presents the particular experience of the artist 
fearlessly, knowing the particular is also the universal, so as to conjure a similar 
experience within all who then confront the art. The emotion that embraces every listener 
of transcendent music, or viewer of an evocative performance or of a painting that seems 
alive, or reader of vibrant and pungent poetry, guides them to that too often ignored or 
sublimated terrain of our inner worlds, the realm of the Dionysia. It is difficult to 
describe well in words how it can feel to be suddenly filled with joy through music, or 
reawakened by art, or simply calmed by a beautiful, transcendent image of Nature. These 




are that which remind us- in our instinct, our gut, our heart- both tha indescribable, non-
rational feelings can change us, and that there is a ‘spirit of life’- a feeling of being bodily 
and sensuously alive- that all people feel at some point or other, and th t connects us to 
each other. Nietzsche (1882/1974) heralded the dawn of postmodernity with his 
perspectivist ideas and denial of essentialist reified truths. Hi  recognition of the 
importance of Dionysian destruction and creation to a healthy, balanced life 
acknowledged both the importance of art in society beyond aesthetics and the need for a 
confrontation with our individual inner passions through visionary art. Only then can we 
live an authentically free life.  
Art, for Nietzsche, is intrinsically related to morality and to political life. Art is 
born of transgression and taboo – the crossing or elimination of boundaries. Fre dom and 
unity are revealed in the destruction of fences, in the forging of a personal moral path. 
This freedom is essentially the existentialist “opening up” that Nietzsche (1886/1989) 
addressed by espousing positive self-overcoming. He knew that the path of such courage 
in the face of the looming threat of nothingness is a struggle to follow. But if it is 
difficult, then the visionary artist needs to be brave; he or she can cre te life, and make 
history. Aesthetic rebellion through a unity of the Dionysian and Apollonian drives is for 
Nietzsche the only response to the knowledge that our societal foundations of absolute 
values are human-created and ultimately false and, at the same time, the route through 
which to pursue political change and the encouragement of alternativ  views on universal 





CAMUS AND THE TRANSFORMATIVE NATURE OF ART: ART AND 
PUBLIC ART AS INVIGORATING ENCOUNTERS 
 
Art realizes … the reconciliation of the unique with the universal of which Hegel dreamed. 
—Albert Camus, The Rebel 
 
The end, the aim, is to make thought - the power of man, the participation in and 
the consciousness of that power - intervene in life in its humblest detail … more 
remote than the means, the aim is to change life, lucidly to recreate everyday life 
— Henri Lefebvre , Critique of Everyday Life  
 
Art, it has been said, is a reflection of its time. The discipline of art history tells us 
that the study of the history of art should include an examination of its historical 
environment. This assertion, coupled with the claim that public art museums and the 
rituals experienced within them provide rich fodder for understanding society and its 
many relations and interactions, shows us that art is, indeed, inseparabl  from the public 
sphere. If we turn this idea around, we can see not only that much art is created in 
response to society, but also that society is shaped by the values and knowledge born of 
creative endeavors. Art revives us as individuals and invigorates the spirit through its 
ability to expand imaginative boundaries and reveal universal human ties. A healthy 
society – democracy itself – ultimately relies on the participatory inspiration and 




dominating values of popular opinion, can be accessed and developed through rebellious 
and visionary artistic experience. Our postmodern world is not only globalized, but 
technologically sophisticated. While this state makes communication, trade, and travel 
more efficient, it also burdens people with almost constant stimulation, the need to rush, 
and the encouragement to work harder. This is particularly the case in the United States, 
where democracy has, from its beginnings, been intimately tied to a spirited and 
pragmatic work ethic and a capitalist ethos, rather than to poetry and community life, 
despite the influence of the Puritans (Young, 1966).  
Artistic experiences, particularly social and public visionary creative encounters, 
are vital sources of life, of quiet moments, of chaotic rearrangements, of confrontations 
with taboos, of affirmations of innate unity and interconnectivity. These opportunities to 
create our own "realities" in the creative realm, however temporarily, make possible true 
liberation.  For Albert Camus (1951/1991) and his philosophy of creative rebellion, this 
need to rebel against popular opinion and society is highlighted by the multitude of 
status- quo injustices. 
I submit that more frequent and in-depth experiences with art, firs enable a 
healthy liberation from alienation, isolation, and mainstream beliefs; and, second, 
following Camus, they will reveal the basis of true justice- the c ains of human unity. 
This chapter examines Camus’ concept of creative rebellion. His argument, especially as 
seen alongside contemporary arguments regarding the transformative properties of art on 
individuals and on communities, makes clear that, although art cannot be the final answer 




them to be critical. From Camus’ (1951/1991) argument about rebellion through of art, it 
logically follows that wider access to public art encourages such rebellion. Rome over the 
centuries is a prime example of a city that paid close attention to aesthetics and especially 
to art in the public sphere, with the result that shared public pride was heightened.  The 
beauty, and the disorder, of art can create within people the genuine feeling of inclusion 
and interest in public life. 
Camus is perhaps best known for his literary explorations of the absurdity of the 
human condition in novels like The Stranger (1942/1988) and The Plague (1948/1975), 
and plays like Caligula (1944/1962). His directly philosophical and political essays, 
beginning with a vivid description of absurdity in The Myth of Sisyphus (1942/1983), and 
a call to individual creative rebellion in The Rebel (1951/1991), explored this human 
desire to seek meaning in our existence. For Camus, when we confront a world devoid of 
such meaning, it is best to enjoy life subjectively, rather than objectively according to the 
commandments of a false god, and to understand that life is meaningless and hence the 
quest to give it meaning is absurd. When people are no longer willing to accept the values 
of society, they are likely to rebel. Camus (1951/1991) described the yearning to rebel, its 
necessity, its rewards, its potentially dangerous consequences, and the truly individual 
nature of freedom, both in society and within the human condition.35 Camus, writing at 
the midpoint of the last century, amid copious horrors created by power-hung y tyrants 
and oppressive modern governments, seems to have been almost desperately searching 
for an answer, or a better yet solution, that would limit and prevent th  forces of human 
                                                




destruction and (re)teach governments and individuals the benefits of moderati n. 
Seeking to explain why rebellion is a natural human proclivity, Camus described the 
ever-present tension between reason and imagination, and asserts that in he act of 
individual aesthetic rebellion we can achieve a crucial moderation between the two 
realms. Instinctual Dionysian and rational Apollonian forces ultimately limit each other 
and work together to enable the rebellion of visionary creation.  
I propose, that in order to combat the lack of energy, the lack of feelings of full 
inclusion on the part of the citizenry, and, ultimately, their lack of participation in today’s 
democracy in the United States – and to enable more and more individuals to gain access 
to alternative conceptions of everyday reality through creative reconceptualization, and 
likewise, to become closer to a sense of universal unity and true community – we should 
explore the encouragement of more frequent, and broader-based, artistic experiences in 
our outdoor public spaces. If we consider Camus’ (1951/1991) ideas about the power of 
rebellion through art alongside other arguments contending that artistic experience can be 
a transformative ritual, and that there is a liberty-preserving role for art in democracy, we 
can summarize these connections in the four parts I describe next. A desire to question 
our existence, and to access uninhibited passions, is natural to the human condition, but 
this drive is also naturally stifled by the dominance of reason, and the materialism and 
conformity of popular opinion, and thus needs to be especially encouraged. This rebellion 
is best accessed through artistic experience and best developed through public art. A 




can culminate in an overall (re)awakening of American democracy through the 
invigoration of public culture with feelings of empathy and community. 
Camus, Duncan, and Levine on the Power of Art   
Duncan and Levine each provide a foundation for a key part of the process 
described above. Levine shows us, in the American context, how much art can challenge 
and question a democracy and its culture, and argues that the liberty that Tocqueville 
worried was at stake in democratic life, could be preserved throug  the existence of 
visionary artworks. Working on a different angle of this question of the power of art, 
Duncan looks at how we feel in the presence of art, and the myriad ritu ls that play out 
within us, and among the art and its other viewers. Her works shows t at museums are a 
place of spiritual experience, not simply education or entertainment. With this assertion 
that experiencing art is otherworldly, the main argument in this work that public art is the 
prime vehicle for democratically encouraging inner reflection in people, gains traction, as 
public art encourages ritualistic experiences not just in a museum, b t on the way to 
work, or to school, as well. 
If we look at Camus’ assertion that there is freedom and empathetic jus ice 
contained within rebellious artistic experience, alongside these contemporary ideas 
presented by Duncan and Levine, we can see both how Duncan employs Camu when 
arguing that art is ritual, and how Levine similarly does so in her belief that the existence 
of what Camus would call rebellious art, maintains freedom and indepe nt thought in 
American society. When we consider Camus’ belief that the individual could experience 




be truly independent, and the experience likewise ‘authentic’, is the key to the rebellion 
that yields liberation. Camus means liberation from both the unjust realities of life, and 
the suffocating embrace of a popular opinion that too often allowed for tyranny.  
Art alters and reinterprets time, place, the body, emotions. All art, indeed, life, 
itself ultimately comes down to choice and interpretation. To create something new from 
the material of the everyday is both to acknowledge the characteristi s that define our 
social lives and to attempt to change them, at least temporarily. Camus (1951/1991) 
described this relationship between art and everyday life: 
To create beauty, he [the Rebel] must simultaneously reject reality 
and exalt certain(of its aspects.) Art disputes reality, but does not 
hide from it (p. 258). ... It [Art] is born of a mutilation, and of a 
voluntary mutilation, performed on reality (p. 265). ... “Through style, 
the creative effort reconstructs the world, and always with the same 
slight distortion that is the mark of both art and protest (p. 271)   
The framing that creation relies on does not allow you to deny rality completely, 
nor can you ever claim a truly objective understanding of it. Camus believed that 
formalism (abstraction) is an attempt at rejecting reality entirely but that it can never 
succeed in this goal because, as long as you are capturing real life, there is always a 
boundary to which you can abstract it. Realism can attempt to affirm only reality. 
“Realism cannot dispense with a minimum of interpretation and arbitrriness. Even the 
very best photographs do not represent reality; they result from an act of selection and 




purely rational exists; although these extremes can be momentarily accessed, they always 
meet between these extremes within a dialectical relationship. 
It is also necessary to reconcile the inherent individualism of artistic creation, the 
inevitably unpublic aspect of creativity, with its role as mediator between the particular 
and the universal and between the self and the community. Artistic endeavors begin 
within the individual mind and spirit, in that even the most publicly created works have 
their roots in the ideas of individuals. Visionary art evokes an ability to comprehend the 
self to be like all others, to perceive the self as universally constructed, but creation is 
ultimately a solitary affair. In other words, it is important to examine how an individual 
artistic experience translates into a more active participaon in life, and thus in society. 
Making and experiencing art can draw you further inside yourself, and it should begin 
this way. Experience with art should create reflection f rst and ,with the new possibilities 
that the knowledge of art yields, enable you to explore needs beyond the material and the 
individual and, ultimately, lead to a desire to connect with the collectivity of selves 
within each of us. 
Further, I am not implying that experience with art will necessarily make you a 
“better” or more generous or more tolerant person. Because all art is transformative, in 
that it transforms an object, or an emotion, or a space, it expands the imaginative 
capability and is thus valuable in the development of a more interested and active 
citizenry. In destroying the expected to make way for new approaches, artistic experience 





By nature of its symbiotic relationship to the public sphere, and its reliance on 
human interaction, public and social art is in a constant dialogue with society beyond that 
which is possible either for art that is housed in museums or for solely object-based art. 
Camus (1951/1991) argued that visionary or rebellious artworks inspire a transformative 
experience for both creator and viewer that enable access to true liberation and justice. To 
place his ideas in a contemporary American setting, and to explore the effects of 
transformative art that is created and displayed in the public arena, we briefly turn to the 
work of Caroline Levine and Carol Duncan before returning to Camus’ ideas.  
Several researchers have produced studies indicating a link between public art and 
ideas of community, a recognition that art is a transformative force in political science 
and art history literature, not only in philosophy, and an understanding that examining the 
relationship between art and politics is an interdisciplinary effort (Corbit & Nix-Early, 
2003; Edelman, 1996). These studies demonstrate the contemporary appreciation of the 
ability of art, particularly public art, to serve a political ro e. Some have looked at the 
spiritual results of interaction with art and others, examining art’s vital relationship to 
democratic conditions, have advocated provocative and challenging art aswell as the 
avant-garde. Duncan (1995) tells us that museums create a stage for important spiritual 
rituals between artworks and their visitors, and among the visitors themselves as they 
experience the artworks. Levine (2007) defends the role of the avant-garde, or the 
visionary, as a check on democracy’s pledge to freedom. These two very diff rent 
approaches to the study of the relationship between art and political life b end well to 




experience with art can be transformative. These arguments, taken together, they form the 
foundations of the point I am making here. Duncan illustrates why and how looking at art 
in museums, and artistic experience in general, can be transformative and spiritually 
invigorating and how artistic ritual affects our relationships and interactions with those 
around us. Levine also speaks of the power of art, but she aims to show how it can 
support the needs of freedom in a democracy. In a discussion of the dynamic role of art in
our social and political lives, and by demonstrating the need to view our political 
problems through an interdisciplinary lens, it is my hope to bring art out of a restricted 
aesthetic space.  
In this work, I suggest that the role of visionary art (and art in general), especially 
when placed or created in the public sphere, counters Tocqueville’s (1835/2002) claim 
that religion in a democracy provides an easily accessible path to expand the political 
awareness of individuals by working as a balancing force against the individualistic 
capitalistic tendencies of American culture. My argument is an inverse of sorts of 
Levine’s (2007). Rather than viewing the existence of avant-garde art as a check on 
cultural freedom, and proof that a democracy is as free as it claims to be, I see interaction 
with art, especially visionary art, as, following Camus, inspiring a rebellion within 
individuals that creates a more active and interested citizenry by creating moments that 
value the immaterial and the universal, as opposed to the material nd individual needs of 
everyday democratic life.36 Exposure to public art creates in people an expansion of the 
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imagination, particularly in the capacity to conceive of new and revolutionary 
possibilities in general, and in achieving a closer connection to truths accessed through 
intuition not intellect, especially the recognition of the unity of all selves, and ourselves 
in others, as an alternative to the reigning liberal worship of materialism in A erica.   
How Art Can Nurture Individual Transformation and Challenges to Society 
In her study on the history of avant-garde art in the United States, Levine (2007) 
aims to explore the cross-influences and relationships of aesthetic  and political life. She 
explains her motivation:  
We are used to telling ourselves that the arts need the protection of a flourishing 
democracy in order to survive. But in fact, the opposite is at least qually true: 
democracies require art – challenging art – to ensure that they are acting as free societies. 
Democratic citizens have gotten into the habit of believing that theirs are the freest 
societies in the world. But political theorists since Alexis de Tocqueville have warned 
that democratic governments can actually work against freedom. Intent on imposing the 
will of the majority, democracies are inclined to repress and silence nonconformist 
voices. And since majorities can – and do – decide to squelch unpopular expression, 
democratic societies always run the risk of becoming distinctly un-free societies. So: how 
can democracies guarantee freedom (p. x). 
Levine believes that we need to challenge mainstream norms in the tradition of 
the artistic avant-garde. “Since the beginnings of the avant-garde in the late nineteenth 
                                                                                                                                                 
beginning of art to the end – the truth which links the modern novel and the medieval epic, the facts nd 





century artists have claimed that they are helping to liberate society through their 
resistance to majority rule.” (p. x). Rather, they most often stir up unconventional norms 
through shock value, pushing the majority to become aware that their will is not absolute. 
Although the avant-garde period is supposedly over, Levine argues, its philo ophical 
challenge to mass culture and beliefs will never die: “[T]he id a that art represents a 
struggle for freedom … remain[s] surprisingly robust and influential. In fact, whenever 
art works are contested in the public sphere, artists and arts advocates leap to invoke the 
revolutionary, heroic, marginalized figure of the avant-garde artist and set that 
oppositional figure against the idea of the ‘people’” (p. x).  For hundreds of years, arts 
controversies have rested on the struggle between democratic majorities and deliberately 
provoked outsiders. Levine terms this the “logic of the avant-garde” (p. 3).  
Over the centuries,37 it has become accepted knowledge that artists serve an 
important role in observing, questioning, and critiquing society. “The critical autonomy 
and rebellion associated with the avant-garde have come to serve as a kind of default 
definition of the social role of art. … Art that intentionally shocks and unsettles majority 
preferences seems to set itself…against the will of the people. (p. 11). In contrast to the 
philosophical point of view, Levine’s social historical work demonstrates how important 
a function art can serve in society, and specifically, in American democracy. She shows 
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the word, meaning the front line or vanguard. By the 1870s and 1880s the label began attaching itself to 
artists who were a deliberate group of outsiders – “celebrating the margins, advocating an overturning of 
conventional aesthetics. More specifically, they were reacting against conservative art sponsored by 
national academies. … Within this context they praised art that was embattled, filled the term with its 
original military connotation: “artists saw themselves not only as innovators, but as warriors against the 
status quo, doing battle with the present in the name of the future, provoking radical change through rupture 




how, throughout the last century in particular, the creation of visionary and controversial 
art not only forced political and social change (particularly with regard to censorship laws 
in America) but challenged the limits of prescribed democratic individual freedoms. The 
ability of rebellious art to question and to create constantly shifting alternatives for 
human political life becomes even more useful when joined with the idea that individual 
artistic experience is transformative for both creator and viewer. Together these two ideas 
mean that art can first question society, and then invite viewers into a sensory or spiritual 
moment that is vital to developing more publicly participatory and community-minded 
citizens. 
Duncan (1995) believes that the experiences of art can be both transcendent and 
transformative for the spectators. She places her argument in the context of the museum, 
though her underlying assumptions about the “ritual” power of art are valuable in many 
other contexts. . Her high regard for the ability of art to affect and change people echoes 
the ideas of both Camus and Nietzsche. Duncan contends that museums ar  not merely 
well-designed structures in which to store art;38; rather, they are places for “ritual” or 
some form of transformative or spiritual activity and thus not unlike the experience of 
traditional places of worship. The key to, or heart of, her argument is that viewing and 
interacting with art (and the architecture that it is housed in) is a transformative individual 
experience. Instead of viewing a museum as many different objects brought together to 
be looked at separately, she sees the “totality of the museum as a st ge setting” where all 
                                                
38  Duncan argues that since art museums first began to be funded and built in the late 18th 
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the visitors (and it is to be presumed, the art they are viewing) participate in one 
ritualistic “performance (pp. 1–2). 
Duncan references the sociological studies by Pierre Bourdieu in the 1960s where 
he, in collaboration with Alain Darbel, interviewed hundreds of people and, using that 
data, concluded that “art museums give some a feeling of ownership and belo ging while 
they make others feel inferior and excluded" (p. 4). She uses their study as support for her 
premise that art museums function as a places for ritual.39 She argues that if this was not 
true, then visitors would not, as they do so often after spending time in an arts institution, 
feel emotions related both to their esteem and worth, as well as feel changed after 
interaction with others (those participating in the ritual with them). If the experience of 
experiencing art in a museum was simply about observing and learning- usi  reason- 
then people would only gain access to information about the aesthetic and educational 
appeal of the objects of art on view; they would not leave so often fe ling noticeably 
happier, or sadder, or simply more in touch with themselves and others. 
I agree wholeheartedly with Bourdieu and Darbel’s thesis. In fact, my 
fundamental arguments in this study could not stand on solid foundation were it not for 
the problems of exclusion inextricable from all institutions, including those of art. 
Despite this belief, as with Duncan’s self-conscious aim, I do not focus explicitly on the 
valid concerns with institutionally presented and maintained artwork, or with institutions 
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disagree with the sociologists, but she does examine the ritual experience of the museum more fully and




(as a sociological or political category) in general, though I begin with an understanding 
that institutions by nature of having to make the choice to enter them, exclude people, 
while public outdoor spaces are more inclusionary. 
Of course, art museums are public places open to all, but this is only a reality to a 
point. If we begin with Duncan's main thesis – that art museums are pl ces of ritual and 
participation, not simply of observation – then a natural next step is to claim a 
fundamental place for public and social art (that is, art taken out of the institutional 
context) in the building of community feeling, a desire to participate in social and public 
(and therefore political) life and in democracy. “Its [Duncan’s book’s] larger argument is 
not simply that art museums are ritual structures, but rather that, as ritual structures, 
museums are rich and interesting objects of social and political history.” (p. 6). Our 
culture identifies religious buildings, such as churches, temples, and mosques, as 
different from secular buildings like museums and courthouses. This “rel gious–secular 
dichotomy,” Duncan says, structures “much of the [our] modern public world,” (p.6) but 
it should not be seen as natural or intuitive. Rather, she explains, this dic otomy itself has 
historical and man-made roots in Western life. The classification began with the 
Enlightenment movement’s attempt to use the new discoveries of science to weaken the 
power of the Church  over society and public thought. By the late 18th century, this goal 
had become a reality and since then it is secular–rational, verifiable truth that reigns as 
“objective” truth in our culture; religious truths are only for those who choose to take 




Art museums, Duncan continues, are “secular,” both because they are org nized 
by “scientific and humanistic disciplines” and because they are s id to be caretakers of 
our cultural memory. She, however, claims that ritual, despite its usual association with 
religion, is actually at the heart of the art museum experience (p. 8). 
Liminality, a term associated with ritual, can also be applied to ar  museums. It 
was used in the anthropological writings of Victor Turner to indicate  mode of 
consciousness outside of or “betwixt-and-between" the normal, day-to-day cultural and 
social states and processes of getting and spending. His category of liminal experience 
had strong affinities to modern Western notions of the aesthetic experience – that mode 
of receptivity thought to be most appropriate before works of art. Turner recognized 
aspects of liminality in such modern activities as attending the theatre, seeing a film, or 
visiting an art exhibition. Like folk rituals that temporarily suspend the constraining rules 
of normal social behavior (in that sense, they “turn the world upside down”), so these 
cultural situations, Turner argued, could open a space in which individuals can tep back 
from the practical concerns in social relations of everyday life and look at themselves and 
their world- or at least some aspect of it- with different thoughts and feelings (p. 11). 
Duncan cites Swedish writer Goran Schildt who has noted that museums are 
settings in which we seek a state of “detached, timeless and exlted” contemplation that 
“grants us a kind of release from life’s struggle … and captivity n our own ego” (p.14).  
Referring to 19th-century attitudes to art, Schildt, notes Duncan, observes “a religious 
element, a substitute for religion” (p.14). He succinctly identifies and describes the birth 




The eighteenth century’s designation of art and aesthetic experience 
as major topics for critical and philosophical inquiry is itself part of 
a broad and general tendency to furnish the secular with new value. 
In this sense, the invention of aesthetics can be understood as a 
transference of spiritual values from the sacred realm into secular 
time and space. Put in other terms, aestheticians gave philosophical 
formulations to the condition of liminality, recognizing it as a stte 
of withdrawal from the day-to-day world, a passage into a time or 
space in which the normal business of life is suspended. In 
philosophy, liminality became specified as the aesthetic experienc , 
a moment of moral and rational disengagement that leads to or 
produces some kind of revelation or transformation (p. 14). 
Duncan asserts that art museums are sites of transformative ritual that enable 
people to achieve liminal experience – to move beyond the psychic constraints of 
mundane existence, step out of time, and attain new, larger perspectives” (pp. 11–12). If 
we transfer the context of this argument about the transformative pow r of art from the 
museum or gallery to the truly public realm of our outdoor spaces, it can be argued that 
art that creates social interaction and appears on our streets is transformative. Therefore, 
when it appears in our everyday lives and in our everyday places, often with the element 
of surprise, it encourages new ways of feeling and thinking about that with which we are 




democratic, and more physically encompassing way to access and har ess the unifying 
and liberating power of artistic experience.  
For Camus (1951/1991) the ultimate meaninglessness of existence, coupled with 
the horrors of human injustice, meant that people needed to experience creative 
individual rebellion truly free from all societal constraints, not the traditional, 
institutionalized revolution he saw in his lifetime. He argued that genuine change, and 
true freedom, must be felt within each person if it is to create new needs that reflect 
universal unity and community. He knew that artistic and creative exp rience held a 
unique ability to reinvent the world according to individual desire and opinion and that 
this rebellious reinvention could expand imagination, which was vital to an active 
political life. Art created or displayed in public as well as creativity conceived and 
experienced socially seem a natural extension of Camus’ beliefs regarding the function of 
art in society. 
Camus and the Desire for Order 
Camus’ theories, following both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, all began with the 
tenet that the fundamental human desire is to understand and order one’s own existence 
and place in the universe. He believed that our inability to comprehend our own existence 
and purpose, produces in us and in society a deeply rooted frustration that leads to a 
variety of paternalistic style myths, beliefs, and organizations. These ideas act as both a 
protective shield from the lack of absolute meaning in this world and as a source of clear 
and fixed answers to the mysteries of existence and to the goals and decisions of our 




impose certain limits between which he can be king . Religion or crime, every human 
endeavor in fact, finally obeys this unreasonable desire and claims to give life a form it 
does not have” (p. 262).  
In the quest for meaning, it is inevitable that people looked, firstto religion and, 
later, to science as providers of “objective” knowledge and truth. It was evident to Camus 
that neither the oppressive rules of religion nor the misleading reliance on rationality that 
science espouses, can bring us to the most important "truth,", accessed through intuition,- 
and that, because we are defined in relation to one another, each of us contain all others 
within ourselves. Camus feared regimes, such as Communism, that attempted to deny the 
spiritual aspect of life in favor of reason and a material-center d life. Denial of spiritual 
and sensory life, can lead only to desperate and tyrannical leadership. This denial would 
also separate us from each other,  and cause a generalized lack of interest in public life 
and eventual abrogation of the importance of public space, essentially taking the social 
concept out of “socialism.” 
Camus argued that rebellion, “in order to remain authentic, must never abandon 
any of the terms of the contradiction that sustains it” (p. 285). “Refusal and acceptance, 
the unique and the universal, the individual and history balance each other in a condition 
of acute tension" (p. 273). To illustrate the similarly unending opposition within 
rebellion, he used the example of the tension between equality and liberty that exists 
within any democracy: “Absolute freedom mocks at justice. Absolute justice denies 
freedom – To be fruitful, the two ideas must find their limits in each other” (p. 291). As a 




should be limited and balanced with a reasoned moderation. Otherwise this r bellion can 
threaten to run to its limits and devolve into exhaustion or, worse, tyrannical power: 
“[According] to Camus, if the absurd is not to degenerate into moral nihilism it must 
rehabilitate itself in the light of revolt and that if revolt is not to deteriorate into a regime 
of tyranny and oppression, it must remain conscious of its origins in the absurd premise” 
(Foley, 2008, p. 4). 
Robert C. Solomon40 (2006) makes the point that Camus effectively used the 
character of Meursault in The Stranger, not only as an expression of individual struggle 
in a meaningless world, but, more importantly, to show how much humans rely on their 
ability to reflect, dissect, and evaluate their thoughts and decisions and how, throughout 
the novel, his antihero declined to consider the value of his feelings. Solomon speaks to 
this second point when he shows how for Camus, experience and reflection, formed a 
universal dualism, a dialectic: 
 So The Stranger, I want to suggest, is a book of phenomenology, 
but it is in particular a book about the problematic relationship 
between the phenomenology of experience, and the phenomenology 
of reflection. Meursault, one might say, lives his experience, albeit 
shockingly limited, without reflection. This, I want to suggest, is 
what makes him so “strange” to us (p. 12). 
Solomon challenges the scholarly debates on the “honesty” of Meursault about his 
feelings. He asserts that Camus’ Meursault was neither lying in his indifference to the 
                                                




truth (Conor Cruise O’Brien, 1970)), nor was he simply being painfully “truthful” 
(Camus’, (1942/1983), own commentary on The Stranger) to his emotions. Solomon 
takes on the very way we understand the idea of feeling, or emotion. Solmon argues that 
“The emotions…sustain the “fundamental projects” of our lives…” (p. 113). He believes 
that our ability to judge a situation is essential to our forming emotion related to it. That 
is, he believes that we access what we know as feelings only during the process of, or 
once we have considered the value of, an experience. Solomon argues that Meursault 
failed to exhibit actual feelings (at least in the first half of the book) because feelings 
need to be processed and assessed, and Meursault lived only in experiences. 
Consequently, he could not have been anything so deep as “truthful” “because he never 
reaches that (meta-) level of consciousness where truth and falsity can be articulated. 
Moreover, he does not even have the feelings, much less feelings about his feelings, to 
which he is supposed to be so true” (p. 15). 
Solomon also points out that this duality in Camus’ philosophy is parallel to 
Sartre’s (1937/1960) earlier ideas about reflective versus prereflective experiences. 
Sartre's argument was similar to Heraclitus’ claim that one can never cross the same river 
twice. It also resonates with to Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle, which states that we 
can never get as close as we would like when observing atoms because the closer we 
look, the more we change what we are attempting to understand. The precise examination 
of some phenomena is thus impossible and self-defeating. In the field of quantum 




atom, you simultaneously lose the ability to gauge another key characteristic. This can be 
viewed as a metaphor for life. 
Sartre believed that once we leave the purely pre-reflective stat and we infuse 
our experiences with the reflection of history and science and morality, we have forever 
altered the original experience, and possibly diminished the power of knowledge. This 
idea is important to Camus’ project because he believed that life plays out in dualities and 
that experience and reflection create each other; they should also limit each other so as to 
sustain rebellion. Individual aesthetic rebellion was, for Camus, the sole response to the 
meaninglessness of our external worlds and to the tyranny and injustice that plague 
modernity. Rebellion demonstrates our connection to, and reflection in, the struggles and 
celebrations of all others and thus works towards a universal and humanist understanding 
of justice. It also opens access to vital intuitive, not reason-based, knowledge.  
Camus and the Eternal Tension between Reason and Desire 
The Enlightenment began with what social theorist Max Weber (1930/2002) 
termed, “the disenchantment of the world,” which stressed that society be grounded in 
science and technology. This rationalization of society signaled for Weber a loss in 
spiritual life. The overwhelming scientific and technological advances in modern life and 
the acquisitive individualism of capitalism combined to create an increasingly pragmatic 
and rational modern Western man. Following Weber, sociologist C. Wright Mills 





Our major orientations – liberalism and socialism – have virtually 
collapsed as adequate explanations of the world and of ourselves. 
These two ideologies came out of the Enlightenment, and they have 
had in common many assumptions and values. In both, increased 
rationality is held to be the prime condition of increased freedom. 
The liberating notion of progress by reason, the faith in science as an 
unmixed good, the demand for popular education and the faith in its 
political meaning for democracy – all these ideas of the 
Enlightenment have rested upon the happy assumption of the 
inherent relation of reason and freedom (p. 166). 
Romanticism became the first “re-enchantment program” to challenge the main 
tenets of the Enlightenment. The Romantic Movement challenged the primacy in society 
(and in our collective knowledge base) of reason, science, technology, and industry by 
defending the vital importance of sensuality, instinct, spirituality, and poetry. In fact, in 
the view of the Austrian experimental and conceptual artist and theorist Peter Weibel 
(2005), intellectual movements thereafter have repeatedly attempted to overcome this 
“crisis of disenchantment.” He explains that “the dispute between enlightenment and 
absolutism, between sensualism and spirituality, between rationality and religion is 
evidently not over: It continues, albeit under different presuppositions and conditions” (p. 
1020). He is pointing here to the same recurring primal dialectic in he human condition 




thought, our desire to live in poetry and our inclination for order and pragmatism, our 
capacity for empathy and our inevitable tendency toward selfishness.  
These tensions are all part and parcel of the same larger division between the self 
that plays out on the personal level but is equally present on the political and economic 
levels as well. In a liberal democracy, and in its natural spouse, capitalism, this 
fundamental human conflict is encouraged – by the system, whose aim isto be rational 
and pragmatic. Olivier Todd (1997) emphasizes Camus’ trust in aesthetic knowledge and 
in the phenomenology of experience, even early in his life, as can be seen in his quote 
from Camus (1933/1968): “I put Dreams and Action ahead of logic, becaus  I see logic 
as pure intelligence, empty and to be despised (Todd, 1997, p. 21). For example, when 
Camus (1933/1968) compared the Europeans, and specifically the French, to the 
Algerians who inspired and invigorated him,  he accused the French of being “civilized,” 
or too reliant on reason, and implied they could learn from the creativity and sensuality of 
his favorite African nation: “The opposite of a civilized people is a creative one” (p. 89).  
Similarly, Camus exalted the moderation by which by which the Gr eks had 
lived: “Equity, for them [The Greeks], supposed a limit, while our whole continent is 
convulsed by the quest for a justice we see as absolute” (p. 149). In the same essay 
Camus pit the Greek sense of limits, and acceptance of ultimate gnorance, against the 
egoist and power-hungry Roman conquerors. He indicted the souls of these Roman 
leaders as vulgar and compared them with his fellow Europeans: “Our reason has swept 
everything away. Alone at last, we build our empire on a desert. .]We turn our back on 




recurring themes, that of the vital difference between revolution and rebellion. It is the 
moderation itself, exemplified by a connection to the universal human condition that 
creates the freedom of visionary creation: “Both the historical mind and the artist seek to 
remake the world. But the artist, through an obligation of his very nature, recognizes 
limits the historical mind ignores. This is why the latter aims at tyranny while the passion 
of the artist is liberty. All of those who struggle today for liberty are in the final analysis 
fighting for beauty” (p. 152). 
Camus’ (1951/1991) analysis of rebellion as exemplified in the artistic vision 
begins with a discussion of man’s natural and inevitable desire for order in a world 
without absolute meaning. This crisis of existentialism, the very problem of attempting to 
understand the value or significance of our own existence, has plagued man since the 
beginning of time and is inherent to our species. That this problem ev n exists, and that it 
is at the foundations of the philosophical endeavor, is evidence of man’s natural desire to 
understand his place in the greater world and his need to seek his own freedom. It is in 
rebellion from the justice that is accepted in everyday society, said Camus, that we 
attempt to forge a path to a more true freedom. This is a healthy human drive that propels 
civilization forward. It is this rebellion that should be encouraged, but it is required that it 
also be internally limited by the only measure of justice that Camus espoused – empathy 
stemming from the recognition of the common ties among all of us. The rebel should 
seek freedom without taking away the freedom of others; without allowing one rebel’s 
quest for freedom to devolve into tyranny. This necessary rebellion is a breath of fresh air 




political force and the desire for total revolution. “The novel is rebellious because it 
refuses reality. It is not an evasion; it is an obstinate effort to refuse the world as it is, and 
through its recreation, to find man’s destiny therein” (Hanna, 1958, p. 140). 
This reasoning can be taken a step further. Camus was wary of the power of 
rebellion. Without moderation, rebellion can become revolution, and it is revolution – 
when one ruling power is actually replaced by another – that he fear d, for it reins n the 
freedom of rebellion and shapes it to the liking of the new regime. I maintain that it is 
useful to move away from the tragedies of totalitarian revolution in the 20th century, to a 
focus on individual moral and spiritual rebellion and revolt. Public and social art, as 
Camus suggested 50 years ago, is a natural companion to rebellion. By allowing it to 
prosper freely and consistently in the public lives of Americans, we can hope to release 
more and more individuals into the exhilaration of their own personal rebellion while 
limiting the ability of any one rebel to control the future of any other. This is not a call to 
limit revolution – for such limiting there is always a place in history. It is, rather, an 
encouragement for personal revolution to take precedence over societal revolution. 
John Foley (2008) contends that Camus was not an existentialist and thus is very 
much misunderstood. Foley writes that Camus, in line with existentialists like 
Kierkegaard, believed that there is lack of meaning in the world. But he did not believe 
that one had to ascribe meaning despite this truth, nor that life isworthless. Rather, this 
acknowledgment of meaninglessness provided a revolutionary new perspective on our 
lives. Foley says that Camus’ solution for the problem of nihilism lay in a revolt of limits, 




Camus, if the absurd is not to degenerate into moral nihilism it must rehabilitate itself in 
the light of revolt and that if revolt is not to deteriorate into a regime of tyranny and 
oppression, it must remain conscious of its origins in the absurd premise” (p. 4). 
Although Camus may not be best characterized as an existentialist, he was concerned 
deeply with lifting the veil from existential fallacies and seeking within individual 
liberated creative experience, a source of empathy and true power and justice. 
It was important to Camus that there are no moral absolutes. Rather, he believed 
that the only necessary moral foundation for a just society is the recognition of a common 
bond among all people, a bond based on such universal experiences as empathy and 
suffering. “The rebel pursues unity not through religion or morality per se, but through 
the assertion of human solidarity based on a common human condition. This princ ple of 
human solidarity constitutes the basis of the unity41 desired by the rebel, a unity Camus 
sees articulated in syndicalism and in certain forms of social democracy, such as the 
Scandinavian model” (p. 76). Camus believed that the rebellion needed to overcome 
alienation and engage unity must be one of internal moderation: “The idea of a 
“philosophy of limits” neatly evokes both the limit beyond which the rebel insists the 
master not pass, and the sense that the values on behalf of which the rebel rebels are not 
absolute values” (p. 79). Further elaborating on this point, Foley writes, “Crucially, 
according to Camus, legitimate rebellion seeks neither absolute justice nor absolute 
freedom, but seeks to institute a regime of relative values, wherein relative justice and 
relative freedom can be enjoyed” (p. 85). For Camus, absolutism in any sense was a 
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fallacy to avoid. Absolutism invites teleology rather than open evolution and tyranny 
rather than public forum.  
Re-imagining Individualism as Unity and Community 
Camus (1951/1991) wrote that rebellion reveals our true nature, which is an
understanding of our commonalities and the ultimate spiritual unity within the human 
condition: “Every act of creation by its mere existence, denies th  world of master and 
slave” (p. 224). The act of creation thus allows for the emergence of Marx’s (1844/1978) 
concept of species being, or the idea that within each individual exists the totality of the 
human species, that within each of us is the whole. This idea, not unlike Rousseau’s 
(1762/1993) reverence of societal unity asserts that our interconnectedness as human 
beings should carry more weight in political society than does the predominant 
preference for the plight of the individual citizen. Both Marx and Rousseau saw 
capitalism – for Rousseau, the original introduction of property into society – as a 
corruptive and competitive force that feeds on a focus on individual life. A fundamentally 
social understanding of life, and of progress, threatens the individual stic foundations of 
the liberal capitalist system and encourages a humanistic alternative to an everyday 
existence guided primarily by science and technology.  
In a quest to challenge and counteract the over-rationalized and tyrannical forces 
in modern 20th-century life, Camus asserted the power of art and aesthetic rebellion to 
bring about change within the individual spirit. Such an inner change, which 
acknowledges a universal unity among living beings, could prevent the ultimate self-




stressed a universal spiritual connection among man could be accessed and pursued 
through the creative experiences of art. He explained, “Rebellious art also ends by 
revealing the “We are” (p. 275). Later, Camus revealed the truly revolutionary 
component of his theory: "[T]he 'We are'”42 paradoxically defines a new form of 
individualism” (p. 297). Camus argued that “[w]hen he [the Rebel] comes to the 
conclusion that a command has infringed on something in him which does not belong to 
him alone, but which is common ground where all men – even the man who insults and 
oppresses him – have a natural community” (p. 16). He elaborated on the primary 
difference between the fruitless search for meaning in human existence and the 
development of individual rebellion through artistic experience. “In absurdist experience, 
suffering is individual. But from the moment a movement of rebellion begins, suffering is 
seen as a collective experience” (p. 22). Hanna (1958),43 and  Sagi (2002)44 both agree 
that Camus’ notion of rebellion suggests a universal unity among living thi s that 
supersedes material concerns: "[In] all revolt there is a metaphysical demand for unity 
which, going unsatisfied by the conditions of the world, attempts to build a universe 
which will satisfy this demand” (Hanna, 1958, p. 138). This new understanding of 
individual needs, and the fulfillment of those needs through relation with others, means 
that “[f]or the rebel, harmony is harmony with the other” (Sagi, 2002, p. 107). The goal 
in the revitalization of everyday life is not to deny the value of individualism, especially 
                                                
42  “Works from The Rebel era represent a subversion of Cartesian solipsism, placing “we” 
before “I” and culminating in the development of the concept of solidarity” ( Sagi, 2002, p. 1). 
43  Hanna identified key overlaps among the ideas of Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, and Camus. 
He suggested that they all worked in opposition to the modern world of reason and technology. 




as exemplified in the political doctrines of individual rights and liberties, but, rather, to 
re-envision the concept so that it rests on the doctrine that within each of us is the 
collective; by attending to our own rational, even selfish, needs, we are implicitly 
attending to the needs of all others, to the needs of the collective.45 
All philosophical inquiry, at least in the Western tradition, inevitably returns to 
the quest for truth. People never tire of searching for ‘truth’ in the complexities of life. 
Rather than seeking absolute truths through reason and science, people can locate truth by 
putting faith in the unconscious – in what is hidden, secondary, denied, unknown – to 
reveal important new truths. The keenly politically motivated social conceptual German 
artist Joseph Beuys (Harlan, Ed., 2004) touched on this idea when he argued for social 
revolutionary change through a development of the faculty of creativity and imagination: 
“By this I mean that such a formula would no longer necessarily be the result of thinking, 
as in classical philosophy, but would reflect the need for something at is attainable only 
through intuition, imagination, and such higher forms of thought” (p. 14). 
Similarly, the American transcendentalists (Emerson, 1893/1921; Thoreau, 
1849/2001), as well as Marx (1844/1978), and Rousseau (1762/1993), have all discussed 
a more communal understanding of the traditional liberal notion of individualism. The 
Transcendentalist movement in this country encouraged a retreat into solitude, to leave, at 
least temporarily, the stifling embrace of popular opinion and better access the ultimate 
                                                
45  Dave Beech (2004), one of the three members of the critical and public and socially 
minded art collective Freee based in England, notes similarly, “Collaborative independence … is a form of 
independence that does not delude itself that autonomy (self-determination) is equivalent to isolation (the 
myth of the self-created self). The ‘self’ of self-determination is understood, within collaborative 




unity of the human community. Emerson’s (1893/1921) concepts of the Over-Soul and 
the One Universal Mind evidence his belief that, if a person can withdraw from society 
(and from reason) far enough to be able to experience his own perception of ruling 
concepts and values, he will feel a stronger sense of unity and understa ing with his 
fellow man, as well as with nature. Following Tocqueville, Emerson understood the need 
to shake Americans out of their complacent conformity, and he knew that an accessible 
and truly free way to “opt out” was through art, poetry, and literature. Camus 
(1951/1991), in a very different context, similarly believed that creating and experiencing 
artistic rebellion, “transcends the individual, [and] … allows the whole being to come 
into play” (p. 17). In other words, they both argued that people seeking new and truly free 
possibilities in life should explore beyond the rational procedures, goals, and dreams, of 
modern life and find the spiritual knowledge that nurtures human connection. 
They maintained, as I do, that engagement with art enables the growth of vital 
knowledge through the senses and emotions. Sensory and sensuous experiences, wh th r 
in art or spirituality, are a link between ourselves and the world. The tension in political 
thought between Lockean liberalism and Jeffersonian republicanism is paralleled by the 
tension between capitalism and socialism (or social democracy) and between apathetic 
individualism and community and civic-mindedness. This balancing of drives exists in 
our political, economic, and social lives and separates us into opposing camps. Now more 
than ever, the support and creation of public (placed in the outdoors) and socially-
interactive artwork is needed to encourage inner individual revival. Art has always held 




ways. This power could be harnessed for the spiritual health of individuals, and for the 
benefit of a vibrant and participatory society. Art should be increasingly available to 
everyone by becoming part of our public spaces and our public lives.  
Knowledge Gained from Poetry, Myth, and Emotion 
Much can be learned from instinct, imagination, and fantasy. Artistic experience 
can connect us to these feelings, help us to access genuinely free individuality, and enable 
us to understanding more completely our connections with and vulnerabilities to others. 
Bruno Bettelheim (1977) believed that the surreal and the mythical old an important 
place in the intellectual and emotional development of children. He saw th t children 
could, through the symbolism and abstraction of myths and fairy tales, ccess, and try to 
understand, painful ideas and experiences in a healthy way. Citing Greek philosophy, he 
wrote:  
Plato – who may have understood better what forms of mind of man 
than do some of our contemporaries who want their children 
composed only to “real” people and everyday events- knew what 
intellectual experiences make for true humanity. He suggested that 
the future citizens of his ideal republic begin their literary education 
with the telling of myths, rather than with mere facts or so-called 
rational teachings. Even Aristotle, master of pure reason, said: “The 
friend of wisdom is also a friend of myth" (p. 35). 
Freud (1930/1961) too reminded us that rational thought and behavior is rational 




contained within the subconscious self. In this sense, art can be viewed n ither simply as 
oppositional to reason (as the realm of the irrational), nor only as the aesthetic or the 
beautiful. Rather, art can be understood as reason, as an alternative source of knowledge, 
as a more "genuine"’ (implying congruence along a common human bond) f rm of 
rationality. Touching on a similar idea, Beuys (Harlan, Ed., 2004) explains some of his 
philosophical motivations in creating art, and specifically, his varied “social 
sculpture(s)”:  
For several years, I have been working with a formulation of “the 
aesthetic” that goes back to its origins as the opposite of 
“unaesthetic” or numbness. From this perspective, aesthetic comes 
to mean “enlivened being.” This not only turns the contemporary 
usage of “aesthetic,” as something rather … superficial, on its head,
but links such “enlivened being” to … the ability to respond! So this 
overcoming of numbness and enlivening of being can engage one, 
make one internally active, mobilize people’s imagination (p. x). 
In accord with Novalis (1798/1997) and Schiller (1792-94/2004), Beuys believed 
that artistic experience contains the potential to create necessary and revolutionary 
change in society and political life. He developed his idea of 'social sculpture' throughout 
his long career, both by creating revolutionary performance and installation-style 
participatory artworks and through his active and popular lecture schedule, which 
continued even after his dismissal from a sculpture professorial post at the university in 




an artist. He created sculptures that redefined the physical boundaries of classical 
sculpture through performance, installation, and participatory requirements. He 
symbolically used natural materials in his artwork (for example, honey to him 
represented the bees’ natural sense of community, and gold, which indicated strength and 
connectivity with nature) to display the Earth’s many organically communal 
phenomenon, as well as the quite natural, for Beuys, need for a sense of universal 
community among people (Ray & Nisbet, 2001; Mesch & Michely, 2007). Many of his 
most famous works, such as the Honey Pump, required human interaction to make them 
“work.” Beuys (Harlan, Ed., 2004) believed that 20th-century society was in need of 
reform and revival, and that the growth of individual rebellion through art and creativity 
could positively affect the perspective and spirit of individuals: “It is something that 
Beuys, as well as others, like Bertolt Brecht, emphasized in different ways. Both 
developed a range of strategies that seek to mobilize us internally, to disrupt: to ‘scratch 
on the imagination,’ as Beuys often put it, enabling us to become internally active and 




Public art as political aid: The example of Rome 
Camus (1942/1988, 1942/ 1983, 1951/1991), argued that in our postmodern era, 




reason and justice have consistently failed in the social and political sphere, the creative 
realm is the only truly free avenue to the evolving needs and desires that create a more 
genuine and more humane world. It is only natural that the transcendent and 
transformative powers of art need to be encouraged. Public and socialart is the 
contemporary answer to the revitalization of the materially satisfied Americans who 
regularly accept mass opinions rather than authentically seeking the experiences for 
themselves. Public art not only creates change within the viewer, it also supports a public 
pride in the beauty and the rearrangements, of the community landscape. 
Rome is an exemplar of the power of public art to create and nurture alte nate 
possibilities for everyday life, and especially new feelings of community within 
individual consciousness.  The Romans embody the philosophy of public art. In most 
daily activities within the city, even today, attention to beauty and detail is a part of 
everyday, public life.46 The shared public art that largely defines Roman culture cuts 
through social and economic divides, and can be seen everywhere in the city and beyond. 
That Romans even today readily affix their identities as citizens on a shared pride of the 
art and architecture that adorns the city cannot be simply a the legacy of an egalitarian 
government structure (the democratic republic, did, after all, give way to a dictatorial 
Empire with the ascent of Julius Caesar). The Roman Empire's public displays of art – 
many utilitarian, some grandiose, for commoners and for the leadership – gave all 
                                                
46  Much of the great art in Rome is housed not in world-renowned museums like the 
Vatican, but in the many churches scattered around the city. From the Bernini sculptures and Caravaggios 
in the great Santa Maria del Popolo, to the Velasquez paintings that adorn the front nave of even the 
humble chapel near the Piazza da Spagna, transcendent artworks can be found not within crowded and 





Romans a sense of unity and pride, and these markers of the community, and of the city’s 
past glory, is still very much a part of everyday life in Rome today.  
Perhaps the greatest single contribution of the Roman Empire to the history of 
Western art is their vast imperial theft and the resulting use of the “found” art to build 
conglomeration art from their pirated collections. As victors abroad, the Romans acquired 
from the foreign peoples some of the most beautiful and influential objects representing 
their cultures and histories. At home the conquerors displayed those works publically. 
These were exhibited to create among the public the perception of a strong and exp nding 
empire –- a new, composite culture and history. In addition, epigraphic writ ng was able 
to reach a different sector of society than did traditional literature by adorning the most 
quotidian and communal of objects.47 Epigraphs differed from “the norm” in that 
different materials were used create them (both to write with and, especially, to write on 
inasmuch as these inscriptions were written on everyday objects). Epigraphs functioned 
in this way as a form of public communication and truly public art. 
In contrast, the Communist and Fascist regimes of the 20th century all encouraged 
a barren aesthetic that devalued not only public spaces, but also public life. The 
architecture designed and built under these regimes displays an aesthetic that was 
considered by many to be ugly (all sharp lines and boxes, little curvature and grace), as 
well as uncomfortable, and uninviting. It is a great paradox of Communis  that its (at 
least initial philosophical) intentions of community – of socialism – were quickly lost   
                                                
47  Epigraphy is the study of epigraphs or inscriptions, in order to study the culture in which 




through lack of political freedoms, as well as through the complete discouragement of 
public life and spirituality (of the human community). Today, 20 years after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, the countries of the former USSR still suffer greatly from the lack of inviting 
public spaces. Parks, squares, and streets were severely neglected and allowed to become 
run down. Rather than nurture socialism, these regimes managed to uphold one of the 
prime tenets of capitalist ideology – individualism. Under Communism, people mostly 
stayed at home, and the notions of public art and a pride in public culture (certainly closer 
both to what Marx (1844/1978) had in mind, and Rousseau's (1762/1993) desire for a 
“civil religion”) remained largely unexplored. Those who resisted the prescriptions and 
proscriptions, especially the organizers of the 1989 Velvet Revolutions in Central and 
Eastern Europe, that began with the destruction of the Berlin Wall and ended with 
liberation from decades-long occupation by the Soviet Union, had to do so by actively 
rebelling quietly and without control of the public sphere, rather than in the public ways 
of the Ancient Romans. 
Citizens of the Roman Empire followed different religions, but all 
participated in the public culture of Rome (Coulston, J. & Dodge, 2000); Hibbert, 
1988; Hintzen-Bohlen, 2008; Langenscheidt, 1998; Stambaugh, 1988).  The love for 
public life and its traditions was encouraged by those in power as a community-based 
religion and an essential part of state life. Even the most utilitarian of objects in Roman 
life – for example, the weights that hung on the ends of the scales at the market, were 
designed in the images of women, men, and various divinities, rather than in functional 




can be seen in even the smallest public moments of everyday life (Stewart, 1993). These 
were not the scales of the emperors. They were the machines used in th  daily lives of the 
common people to measure out grain and other household items at the many markets. 
One wonders, how did the high value placed on everyday objects affect society, and 
especially on daily life within that society? The Romans were certainly strong and unified 
(first as conquerors and assimilators of the pre-Roman Etruscan tribe, then as the Empire, 
and, of course, as the eventual world center of Christendom). It is not a stretch to 
hypothesize that their desire for consumption of, and great respect for, the aesthetically 
beautiful (sometimes the ugly or grotesque, but even then beautiful was both a unifying 
element born of pride (in the artworks) and pleasure (of being surrounded by them in 
daily maneuvers) and a motivating force to succeed as an empire and coalesce as a 
community.  
In looking to the culture and public experiences of the Romans, I am not stressing 
here their celebration of, and devoutness, to the state. This idea that the use of art in the 
everyday and public lives of citizens encouraged an interest in, and a love of the public, is 
a valuable corollary argument to the main one made here that artistic experience enables 
revolt from the rationality of everyday life, and awakens a true ind pendence of thought 
within the individual. Art by its nature re-creates and enhances life, so even mainstream, 
or redundant artworks that are present in our public spaces can bring happiness (and 
anger too). Public art projects can, and have historically, as can be seen even just from 
the existence of so many sculptures in public squares that honor fallen mi itary heroes 




the ruling culture. Still today, the majority of public artworks that critique and question 
the Establishment are guerilla efforts, by lone individuals, or smaller organizations and 
galleries, rather than well-financed projects. Art that is housed and experienced in our 
public spaces has great opportunity before it- it can (mostly) freely access the public at 
large, in the midst of their daily lives, and put before them, or involve them, in 
challenging activities and dialogues.  
So while all art in the public truly serves the good of a more vibrant public life, 
and the good of making more beautiful or more interesting our public spaces, that alone is 
often not enough to create a true connection to our inner raw emotions. This is illu trated 
well with the case of the Romans- public art was largely a monume t to the state and to 
civic life, and it also served to create beauty, and in that beauty create an essential pride 
in the community, but most of the examples of Roman public art do not draw attention to 
inner struggles, joys, taboos. Although some do, that is the work of another project 
entirely. Largely, Roman public art was a corollary of state life, and still today, it is a 
reminder of the great accomplishments, and the great artists, of Rome. 
When I speak of visionary art, in the vein of Nietzsche, Camus, and Marcuse, I 
am speaking of artworks that search for emotions and knowledge beyond current and 
mainstream ideas and values, both within art history, and more importantly, in society 
and government. These creative ideas are the result of the independent xploration of 
thought that art provides through its ability to turn the mind inward, and to release some 
of our inhibitions and societal structures in order to feel and think free of the necessary 




art an important part of the celebration of the state, though the example of Rome 
demonstrates how strongly the presence of art in the public can change t e way it feels to 
live within that city, and within that culture and community. Art that is created and 
displayed in the public sphere produces feelings of pride, inclusion, and the feeling of 
being a part of something greater than oneself. This is valuable in and of itself.  
Conclusions 
Like Sade, or Rimbaud, or Thoreau and Whitman in the American scene, Camus 
(1951/1991) argued that true individual freedom could be awakened and encouraged 
through creative experience. He believed that rebellion begins with urge fo  justice and 
human dignity. Camus, fearing the violent and power-hungry excesses of the 20th 
century, maintained that the way to combat these injustices was willful individual revolt 
through creative feeling and expression but, he warned, successful revoltion can become 
tyrannical, therefore defeating the original purpose of the rebellion. Accordingly, his 
concern is not necessarily about replacing an entire government system, but rather that 
the rebels seek both true freedom and a perspective that balances the n eds of justice with 
the needs of compassion.  
All healthy societies need the wisdom of instinct, of nature, and of true freedom.  
Involvement with art creates the desire and the ability to rebel. Camus explains the link 
between experiencing true individual freedom through art, and the consequet 
empowerment, and healthy self-awareness that develops in the individual. Once this link 
is established, it becomes clear that people who have become more "free" who have 




They then are inspired to participate in the collective beliefs of society, the same values 
of the popular will that they once swallowed whole. Camus believed that we are 
perpetually faced with the absurd search for meaning in our own existence. This quest 
inevitably fails, for there can be no "objective meaning" that we someh w have to 
discover. So it is absurd to continue to search in vain rather than approach our existence 
from the perspective of concrete experiences.  
Some who are rationally and materially focused often disapprove of others' 
affection for philosophy, and for poetry. Instead, they encourage action, because, they 
claim, philosophy is the antithesis of action. Marx (Thesis XI, Theses on Feuerbach, 
1845/1978) said that the philosophers have only interpreted the world, and now itwas 
time to change it. But it is too simple for us to believe that we act when we leave the 
realm of thought. Camus (1951/1991) said (making his own interpretation) that life 
moves too fast and encompasses too much for it to ever be captured by any single act of 
creation. Reality exists only in description, thus demonstrating that even the most 
exciting advances in science cannot capture the constantly changing character of human 
emotional and spiritual existence.  
Camus reminds us that all creation is a choice, a cropping of the full picture. This 
is particularly true in action, whose sheer physicality constrains it to borders and limits 
set by space and time. It is when we read and write – to escape, to learn, to process – that 
we can attempt (if only as an illusion) to transcend the often rigid borders of action in 




Camus determined the division between revolution and rebellion to be that 
between a mere shift in institutional structure and values and the almost anarchic (though 
still with inherent limits of the dialectic between instinct and order) individual freedom. 
This is the difference between merely redesigning and replanting assigned truth(s) and 
absolute values in a new home or system, and the growth of true freedom through 
individual creative thought and action. 
The rebel is not someone who always says no; he or she is someone 
who always can say no, and who knows this. And a rebellious 
politics is a politics that is alive to this possibility, that remains 
tolerant and open to dissent and insurgency, offering manifold 
opportunities for the revision and reconstitution of social life48. Yet 
at the same time a rebellious politics is self-limiting; rebellious 
political agency acknowledges its own partiality and provisionality 
and proceeds with caution, anticipating the opinions, objections, and 
even opposition of those others with whom the world is shared. It is 
this ethos of openness, this refusal to privilege existing conventions, 
rather than any particular institutional arrangement or electoral 
procedure, that makes rebellious politics supremely democratic 
(Isaac, 1992, pp. 141–142). 
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Revolution performs a lobotomy on a ruling system and fashions a transplant of 
its insides from the very material of the system to be replac d (the new, however new is 
defined in terms of its comparison to the old); this is a case of institutions succeeding 
institutions. Rebellion, very differently, has to do with the creation of new horizons for 
the mind – the formulation of a new individualism based in the spiritual collective. In 
accessing and re-bringing to life particularly deeply-felt emotions for the world to 
experience, artists seek to express the unity of the whole or the universal. This is why a 
good book or an affecting sculpture or painting “extracts … the tentative trembling 
symbols of human unity” (Camus, 1951/1991, p. 267). In doing so, it moves us, creates 
empathetic emotion and transcendent reasoning (if this is reallysoning at all but yet is 
something beyond instinct). In the perpetual crisis of our existence, i our unrelenting 
(even unselfconscious) desire for order and meaning where there is none, the recognition 
of similarity – of our features and desires in another,  in all others –  in these glimpses of 
unity, we find at least momentary refuge from the confusion and meaninglessness of 
everyday and philosophical life. In a world without meaning, human unity (and unity 
with Nature and the inanimate too) provides great meaning. Not that spiritual unity can 
fully give us the order we crave (so perhaps this whole notion of meaning is suspect); but 
it creates conditions whereby we can look at our reflection in a mirror and see the whole 
world staring back at us. 
It is silly, and beside the point, to attempt to separate thought and action, or to 
prove one’s value over the other. Although each of these two realms of life has its own 




two halves of a whole. Without visionary or rebellious thought, there cannot be visionary 
action. Action is what keeps us alive, makes us animal, allowing us to glimpse the purely 
emotive. It is as vital as breathing. Still, a life of pure action (particularly a life that aims 
to change and transform through action –a “political” life in the tru st sense) leaves us 
tired and worn, unable to sense, anticipate, and alter the future. Rimbaud’s (1869-
1891/1975) “visionary” artist (Nietzsche, (1872/1967) too, says this) balances the 
irrationality of Dionysian with Apollonian reason. We must process our instinct to give it 
strength and longevity. It was in writing about his experiences that Rimbaud became a 
visionary. To lose oneself entirely in thought and in the ordered reflections of the written 
word is as undesirable as living a dissolute, drunken existence. And perhaps here I 
contradict myself, or draw a circle with my words, but it is also true that there is action in 
thought, action in the act of writing, even in reading another’s writing. The distinction 
between the two need not be drawn too deeply; it should be a dance, not a battleground. 





 VISIONARY ARTISTIC REBELLION: 
RIMBAUD, de SADE, AND THE PROGRESSION FROM CHAOTIC 
CREATION TO CONSCIOUS POLITICAL ACTION 
 
His body! the dreamed-of liberation, the collapse of grace joined with new violence! 
All that he sees! all the ancient kneelings and the penalties canceled as he passes by. 
– Arthur Rimbaud, "The Genie" 
Ever since Socrates and Plato (2000, G. R. F. Ferrari, Ed. & T. Griffith, Trans.)  
first proclaimed their fear of the ability of visionary art to expand the imagination and 
declared the threat it posed to order, politics and, accordingly, to Plato’s ideal republic, 
Western philosophical thought has struggled with the balance between h se two realms 
of life.49 In the modern era, Rousseau (1750/1993) and others have echoed Plato’s view 
that art can be destructive to politics. The Romantic tradition formed in reaction to the 
domination in modern culture of a viewpoint that favored order as the ultimate goal. The 
dominant belief was that this goal could be reached only through the reason and science 
that the Enlightenment movement and the French Revolution had brought to the forefront 
of modern intellectual and moral life. Romantic thinkers like Rimbaud n  de Sade 
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presented a clear need for individuals to confront their irrational selves. They argued that 
our instinctual emotions and desires are a source of important knowledge, both about 
ourselves and about society. They both recognized that many experiences can never be 
explained or understood through reason. Only by denying the language of reas n can we 
be truly free. Without the constraints of the order and limited vocabulary of reason, 
experiences can be felt with our individual senses rather than with our societal-based 
learned rationality.  
Art, I have been arguing, continues, and should actively be supported in this, to 
move out of its assigned spaces of museums, galleries, symphony halls, and theaters, in 
order to inject its knowledge into the public spaces of our everyday lives. There are at 
least two primary considerations in this task. First, an expanded definition of visionary art 
holds that it is the product of the dialectical relationship between sensuousness and 
rationality. The core spirit of rebellious art consists in a dialogue between our emotions 
and senses, on one side, and reason and reflection, on the other. Second, are the 
characteristics of “visionary” art and its potential as a tr nscendent force within 
individuals, and as a progressive force in society. The general accept n  of mass 
opinion, and of popularly supported accounts of experiences, prevents rather than 
enables, vital knowledge of human universality and vulnerability. The recognition of a 
whole universe of which we are but one part is necessary to the desire to participate in 
community and in politics because it alerts us to our own susceptibility to a variety of 




In the creation of art, the intention, and the process of reflection that the artist 
experiences, is equal in importance, if not more so, to the aesthetic result. To look only at 
the end product of artistic expression is to miss the emotions and intentions that lie in the 
complex web of intersecting gazes involved in any artistic interac ion. Art is not merely a 
material end-product of creativity and skilled craft; it is alo not simply that which is 
aesthetically pleasing or entertaining. These are two connected but distinct points. The 
first regards the importance of the artistic process (versus the result), beginning with the 
idea. The second refers to the transcendent properties of art and hints at the societal 
dangers of mainstream art. What connects these two points is the role of ideas and 
imagination in art-making.  
Much of Plato’s (2000, G. R. F. Ferrari, Ed.  & T. Griffith, Trans.) philosophy 
focused on the difference between appearance and reality. He felt that all art was 
appearance and provided escapism from the reality of reason and knowledge and thus 
from politics. Among his many differences with Plato, Aristotle (1996, S. Everson, 
Trans.) believed that art can serve a healthy function in society as a unique, and thus 
valuable, form for the expression of ideas and emotions about everyday realities. This 
classic debate on the value of art in society has been elaborated by many thinkers, in 
modernist conceptions of the aesthetic as the beautiful (Schiller, 1974/2004, Novalis, 
1798/1997), and then the sublimely transcendent; and in postmodernism’s confrontation 
with this understanding of aesthetics, keeping in mind the constraint  and challenges of 
late capitalism. Historically, art has thus moved from highly mimetic or realist forms to 




movements have employed ideas of flux and impermanence, language and dialogue, 
interaction with the spectator, transformation of the found into art, and both the process 
of art, and the ideas behind the art, presented as the art itself.  
The notion that the process of creation, and even the initial idea that spurred the 
creation, is valuable in itself is important to our overarching argument that public and 
social art, in its freedom from institutional constraints, can readily experiment with a 
variety of directly political, and indirectly inspirational conceptual works, using 
language, emotion, human interaction, sounds, sights, and smells. Public and soci l art in 
this country could be more strongly encouraged and made available, so it could serve as a 
positive force against a lack of community and participation. The expansion of 
individual, and collective, imagination – the ability to envision change and progress 
beyond the status quo – and the increased importance in society and political life of 
artistic knowledge and experience will encourage people to participate, to b come more 
actively involved in their everyday decisions and in the greater qu stions of humanity. 
The most direct way to create this expansion is through democratic and frequent access to 
the benefits of artistic experience. If art and creativity could create and maintain a 
stronger presence on our streets, and in our public squares, it would enable individual 
engagement in new and challenging ideas that explore sublimated ideas and collapse 
accepted norms, and conceptions of difference. This inner reflection will lead to an 
interest in one’s community and eventually to a desire and willingness to participate in 
the development of that community. Art on the streets is more unrestrained, more 




brick and mortar institutions. This public creation can be material, performative, or in the 
form of an idea expressed through dialogue or a process. It is not necessarily its beauty or 
its physicality that makes the difference but, rather, its ability to disrupt, to engage, and to 
invert or subvert everyday perceptions and limitations. Public art, especially 
noncommissioned works, can and should employ their less regulated boundaries in their 
ability to be experimental and critical. 
The difficulty of defining art 
The history of Western art has evolved along a particular narrative that can be 
roughly divided into three main eras of approaches to art-making (Danto 1984). Danto 
locates the beginning of this story in the 15th century, when art was understood as the 
beautiful and as direct copy, the second major period being the modern period of 
experimentation. The culmination of this long development is the postmodern era, when 
craft and popular media joined with the fine arts, and it became difficult to see the 
difference between art and non-art. Although Danto does note that art (versus non-art) 
must hold and exemplify meaning, in this brave new world where art becomes primarily 
about philosophy creative pluralism is the dominant credo. He does not imply that there 
is not plentiful worthy art being created, just that the art is being formed within less 
stringent philosophical and social boundaries with each year that passes. Found art, 





In Danto’s Hegelian framework,50 the history of art is a teleological endeavor that 
develops and expands until it reaches its ultimate goal and becomes itself- until it is a 
philosophy. According to Danto’s understanding, art and art history “died” or “ended” in 
the mid-1960s with the advent of conceptual and pop art. According to the conc ptual 
movement’s focus on the process and ideas within art, art could be anything and could be 
created anywhere. Danto argues that the avant-garde in art was al ys seeking to invent 
and create the new and unexpected and that, once art had become even the process, and 
the idea, and the words involved in creation, that once it became clear in the 1960s that 
avant-garde art had become its philosophical end, in a way it then s opped growing and 
“ended.”  
Danto says that art always exists in relation to its interpretation (Houkema, 1998). 
Further, he writes that “we live at a moment when it is clear th t art can be made of 
anything, and where there is no mark through which works of art can be perceptually 
different from the most ordinary objects” (Danto, 1998b, p. 139). This observation of the 
contemporary art world – that of two objects ostensibly the same in every way, one can 
be art and the other not – led Danto (1987) to the conclusion that the task for the 
philosopher of art is to identify differences between works of art and “real things” (p. 64). 
An object is art when the art is intertwined with the art’s (or artist’s) meaning: 
“Craftwork is art when it is about what it embodies" (Danto, 1988b, p. 137). In other 
words, there must be creative self-consciousness in artistic creation. Contemporary art, in 
its newest endeavors and particularly in the desire to be both social and public, has 
                                                




moved away from a focus on the material end result and toward an appreci tion of the 
idea behind the artwork, the process of creation, and the interaction between artist and 
observer. As it is more difficult to preserve and care for an object of art when it is out on 
the street and susceptible to crowds and poor weather, street artists employ a wide variety 
of conceptual and sensual tools and artistic elements that create atmosphere, sensuous 
experience, and critical thought. Their avant-garde methods can remin free from societal 
assimilation longer than artistic methods that are created with institutions and specific 
authorities or platforms in mind. 
 
 
The Dionysian literary point of view 
Two very different, but equally rebellious and infamous artists in late 18th and 19th 
century France, are examples of modern men who expressed the raw emotions of the 
Dionysian realm, both in their lives and in their words, but ultimately n eded the balance 
of reason and reflection to achieve their desire for true freedom and lasting relevance. 
The libertine Marquis de Sade51 promoted an antisocietal viewpoint that favored an 
individually determined and unrestrained morality, where man obeyed the law according 
to his “ability.” The other, the young French poet Arthur Rimbaud,52 exhausted himself 
seeking the truths of the modern age through the expression of unrestrai ed p ssion and 
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experience. Both pursued sensation above all; de Sade lived his philosophy that pleasure 
can be pain (pain as knowledge) and that one can have (and live by) art in place of 
authority, and Rimbaud fully submitted his being to his self-motivated project of feeling 
and experiencing all the pain and beauty of the world and savoring from all experiences 
that which is universal. These two artists staked a place for the role of the anti- in modern 
life. The anti-political tradition of the modern age was anti-community i  the traditional 
sense of community-building – through struggle, man naturally adapts to life in a stable 
and safe civil society. Writers like de Sade and Rimbaud demonstrated the need to 
understand people as anti-social individuals. These authors believed that the project of 
bringing the individual, the body, and empiricist understandings of life back into modern 
society, with all its ability to frighten and confuse, is necessary if we are to get in touch 
with our own sublimated passions and thus with our natural universal relations to one 
another. 
As Rimbaud described, to live artistically is to believe in the importance of the 
knowledge that is attained through instinctual and sensuous experience (1869-
1891/1975). His personal revolt is not a surprise when seen in the context of the 
Romantic Movement, whose proponents attacked the Enlightenment because they f lt 
that the mechanical and objective nature of Enlightenment thought stifled creativity, 
imagination and spontaneity. At this time then, art and reason were necessarily on 
opposite sides of the spectrum. To fight against the virtue- and reason-ob essed 
philosophies (including those of Rousseau and Voltaire), it was necessary to b ing the 




compromise; instead, the brightest few believed they had to ignore the voice of reason as 
much as possible, and live through the passions alone. True Dionysian rele se transcends 
and creates some change within the individual immediately. Despite this important 
release, without the reflective “visionary” consciousness, self-destructive behavior may 
take the place of visionary “research” where the “quintessence” of life’s many 
experiences are not savored or used to transcend the age. Both Rousseau, a philosopher, 
and Rimbaud, a notorious libertine, were searching for revolutionary answers to the most 
essential of concerns of human existence; this quest naturally employs some dialectical 




The public value of de Sade’s private creation 
Louis-Alphonse-Donatien53 de Sade, better known as the Marquis de Sade, known 
for his libertine novels and his similarly libertine lifestyle, holds a rightful and pivotal 
place in the history of post- (or counter-) Enlightenment modernity. Al hough his detailed 
descriptions of violent sexual acts and bloody mutilations gave rise to his infamous 
reputation, de Sade was very much a visionary for his time. His Ph losophy in the 
Bedroom [La Philosophie dans la Boudoir] (1795/1990) is a story of the sexual 
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education of a bourgeois young girl, as well as one about transgressin  the morals of 
society and the relationship of such transgression to violent revolutionary action. The role 
of the articulate and aggressive sexual educator, Dolmancé, and Rimbaud’s (1869-
1891/1975) notion of the poet visionary (poets are born, visionaries are creatd) show 
how transgression creates the leaders of the creative and societal avant-garde. Both 
thinkers understood the need for visionary artists who create art of nd for the future, and 
seek answers to the modern age’s great questions through the elements of art (unguarded 
passions, instinctual and sensuous experience), rather than through the tools of reason and 
science. Hegel (1807/1977) argued that reason constantly evolves dialectically toward a 
goal, but art is best not characterized as goal oriented. Instead, we could say that art is 
experience oriented, sensory, and spiritual. 
De Sade was primarily an artist, not a philosopher, and who infamously claimed 
that some choose suffering because pain is a form of knowledge (de Sade, 1795/1990).  
De Sade, writing almost a century before Nietzsche, (1886/1989) envisioned a society 
where morality was understood on an individual basis, where all private and public action 
was “beyond good and evil.” He used frequent images of sodomy, homosexuality, and 
other taboos to invert societal mores. The young girl’s mother in the story of "Genie," 
whose rape and mutilation ends the story, is representative of societal rules and authority 
– the obstacle to natural passions and urges that is mainstream culture and the knowledge 
of reason. Simone De Beauvoir (Dinnage, 1951/1962) noted that de Sade “chooses 
imagination,” which he used as agency for liberation and revolution. “In order to escape 




itself escapes us” (p. 80). This statement seems to echo Rousseau’s (1750/1993) worry 
that the arts and sciences, through both university curricula and mainstre m art like 
popular opera productions, had created a universe of mere appearances unaid d by the 
Dionysian experiences of truly living life, of living art. For de Sade, the physical – the 
body – was crucial to inner discovery, and to good art, but was often unknown territory in 
societal life. Beauvoir reminded us that “to sympathize with de Sade too readily is to 
betray him. For it is our misery, subjection and death that he desires … what he demands 
is that … one engage himself concretely in the name of his own existence” (p. 79).  
De Sade created a philosophy of extreme individual self-interest as the true 
expression of freedom. He believed that morality and religion (that of both monarchy and 
the Catholic Church), along with empathy and ideas of human unity, were all societal 
constructs that worked only to limit our expression of self-interesd desires. De Sade 
believed, too, that society was in need of the knowledge and expression of true freedom.   
He argued that man should naturally allow the freedom of nature to prov ke him, rather 
than to conform to the rules and values of our false gods. He encouraged the xperience 
of pain and suffering for the very reason that society is constructed to ameliorate our 
discomforts and injustices. He endeavored to feel and understand the ideas and 
experiences that society had collectedly banned. It is possible, though, that, as was the 
case with the philosophy of the American Transcendentalists, this extreme individualism 
is only the first step- in the withdrawal from society. The second step is to relearn our 
relationship to society. In so doing, we can access and understand a truly free connection 




De Sade (1795/1990) examined everything under the “torch of reason” (p. 126). 
He still employed reason in his discussion and defense of the self-policing of morals and 
of an evolving and malleable justice system. In other words, he used reason – the very 
tool of society that he challenged – to formulate an argument that encourages experience 
with our instinctual and creative selves. Unlike Hobbes (1651/2009),who tried to restrain 
what he also saw as our inherent and dangerous human passions, de Sade (1795/1990) 
freed them and worked to justify their existence and importance, even within the 
constraints of institutionalized justice: “man receives sensations from nature” while, de 
Sade said, law is always naturally in opposition to nature. He continued, [N]not having 
the same motives [nature and the law], it cannot have the same rights” (p. 126) "[I]t 
would be a palpable absurdity to wish to prescribe universal laws; it ould be like the 
ludicrous procedure of a general who dressed all his soldiers in uniforms of the same 
size; it is a fearful injustice to expect men of different temperament to bow to the same 
laws” (p./ 125). Here we can see that de Sade is antipolitical, antisociety, and anti-
Rousseau and Rousseau’s (1993) concept of the “general will.” 
Pierre Klossowski (1947/1991)54 argues that there is an interrelationship, though a 
distinction, between writing about the sensuous and actually experiencing it. Klossowski 
says that, for de Sade, once we write about an emotion or an action, we are unable merely 
to be descriptive, as we are already interpreting that emotion or action. In this way, 
sensuousness can exist only in the initial emotion or act. “For de Sa e the fact the 
sensing, the irreducible element in perversion, does not have to be justified. It is the 
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aberrant act issuing from sensuous nature that de Sade wishes to moralize” (p. 17). 
According to de Sade, we experience the aberrant when we cannot locate reason. He 
asserted that the aberrant is within all humans, and Klossowski makes the point that de 
Sade was attempting to understand and defend the aberrant by using the dominant 
framework of reason. George Bataille (cited in Allison et al., 2006) writes that some 
critical assessments of de Sade’s ideas believed that the “brilliant and suffocating value 
he wanted to give human existence is inconceivable outside of fiction; that only poetry, 
exempt from all practical applications, permits one to have at his disposal, to a certain 
extent, the brilliance and suffocation that the Marquis de Sade tried so indecently to 
provoke” (p. 19).  
Maurice Blanchot (1949/2004)55 wrote that de Sade’s philosophy was one of 
simple self-interest. In other words, de Sade failed to experience mpathy and connection 
with others, and was thus concerned only with his own pleasure and pain. Blanchot said 
that de Sade criticized both the focus on reason and the focus on equality, th t the 
Enlightenment had introduced, and that this revealed itself in de Sade’s peculiar 
understanding of natural human equality. It was de Sade’s claim that, bec use all humans 
are equal, no one has to help another person to have to help others (p. 10). DeSade’s 
aggressive form of free will was a philosophy of strong visionary leaders. He believed 
that the powerful few could rise above society values and fulfill only their own needs and 
desires (p. 12). Blanchot agreed with Klossowski that de Sade employed an vil form of 
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reason that displayed aggressive human instincts. De Sade’s reasoning can also be seen 
here as a response to the sort of argument that Sartre makes, that one must be actively 
participatory in order to be committed to a political life, by which one who does not 
speak out to help others is essentially helping to hurt them. 
Rimbaud as Dionysian rebel 
The sensuous verse of the avant-garde poets of 19th--century France, Charles 
Baudelaire and then Arthur Rimbaud and Paul Verlaine, rose from the ashes of the 
revolution in France, and the Enlightenment triumph of science over the church, to 
develop a style of poetry that leaps from one sharp sensuously detaie  image to the next, 
often from one line to the next. Although he wrote poetry only for five years and had 
given it up by age 21, Rimbaud made famous this style of tactile free verse. His details 
were more vivid, more colorful, more sensual, and more grotesque than those of 
Baudelaire and even Verlaine. This “chains of images” style also worked as a linguistic 
device that paralleled the rapidly changing raw experience of his life, physically and 
emotionally. But Rimbaud really becomes vital to the story of the modern age in those 
lines and in those poems where he speaks of revolutionary praxis and of the liberating 
powers of art.  
Edmund White (2008)56 recently published a relatively short and footnote-less 
biography of Rimbaud. Focusing primarily on Rimbaud’s personal life and on Rimbaud’s 
art- and violence-fueled relationship with the poet Paul Verlaine, White concludes that 
Rimbaud’s artistic experiments with antisocial and chaotic behavior, th ugh ultimately 
                                                




destructive, inspired Verlaine to new poetic freedom and genius. Quite different in his 
approach, Neal Oxenhandler (2009) examines Rimbaud’s life and philosophy through a 
detailed examination of his poems. Oxenhandler successfully weaves literary analysis 
with historical events in Rimbaud’s life against the philosophical backdrop of 
modernism. Though academic and ambitious, his tone is straightforward and allows 
Rimbaud’s poetry to play the leading role. 
Similar to Sartre’s (1937/1960) concept of the pre-reflective versus the reflective 
self, Oxenhandler's claim is  that Rimbaud viewed reason as necessary but mechanical 
and not entirely reflective of our experiential life: “[This] ubiquitous reason distances the 
speaker from the here and now of his engagement” (p. 53).  He points out that Rimbaud’s 
(1869-1891/1975) language in his poem “A Une Raison / To A Reason” (one of the 
Illuminations) is more structured and less “informal or free” (p. 53). Further, 
Oxenhandler postulates that it is no coincidence that Rimbaud began to admire reason 
some time after his many poetically documented experiments with rebellious freedom 
had likely already begun to wear thin: “'A Une Raison' seems to mark—inauspiciously—
the midpoint in the rise and fall of Rimbaud’s career.”(p. 53). 
Oxenhandler examines Rimbaud's interpretation ofthe idea of reason.  
This poem is the drumbeat of rationalism in the service of the right
action, a use of cognition that attracted Rimbaud, despite the deep 
currents of irrationality that stirred so powerfully in him and 
inspired his greatest poetry. The rationality of this poem is primarily 




hommes / new men” and their “nouvel amour / new love.” Reason is 
the faculty in us that connects us to an order of things in the 
universe, which itself can be called rational (pp. 52–53). 
That extract shows Rimbaud's awareness, to create political change, he needed to 
apprehend, and even befriend, reason. It was the combination of rationality and 
irrationality that created the visionary, and produced a new way of knowing our world.
In a letter dated May 13, 1871, to his former teacher, Georges Izambard, Rimbaud 
(1869-1891/1975) described his theory of the visionary:  
A Poet makes himself a visionary through a long, boundless, and 
systematized disorganization of all the senses. All forms of love, of 
suffering, of madness; he searches himself, he exhausts within 
himself all poisons and preserves their quintessences. Unspeakable 
torment, where he will need the greatest faith, superhuman strength, 
where he becomes among all men the great invalid, the great 
criminal, the great accursed – and the Supreme Scientist! For he 
attains the unknown! (p. 102). 
Rimbaud seems to have understood that the visionary is a universal figure: “[S]o 
Baudelaire is the first visionary, the king of poets, a real God. … [but] the inventions of 
the unknown demand new forms” (p. 104).The visionary transcends the times, and in so 
doing serves a particular role in  revolutionary change. Visionaries lways seek to change 
their conditions to propel history forward, not necessarily towards a teleological endpoint 




journey: “Right now I’m depraving myself as much as I can. Why? I want to be a poet, 
and I am working to make myself a visionary” (p. 100). 
In the poem “Tale,”  about a prince who has become discontent with his stable 
and peaceful status quo life, Rimbaud wrote  “He desired to see the Truth, the time of 
essential desire/ and satisfaction …Is ecstasy possible in destruction?/ Can one grow 
young in cruelty?” (p. 157).These lines point to Rimbaud's belief in a Truth that liberates 
man as well as to his Faustian ideas of creation and destruction, which explored pain and 
cruelty as potentially redemptive knowledge sources, similar to the exp rimentations of 
de Sade. These hopeful early lines led to poetry that screams revolutionary ecstasy. 
Included in this collection is the poem “Democracy,” its entirty a fiery battle cry. 
Rimbaud describes the greed and exploitation of modern industry and the military, and 
then proclaims the manifesto for the antipolitical, antireason tradition:  
Goodbye to all this, and never mind where. 
Conscripts of good intention, 
We will have policies unnamable and animal. 
Knowing nothing of science, depraved in our pleasures, 
To hell with the world around us rolling … 
This is the real advance57! Forward … March!  
(Rimbaud, 1975, p. 168). 
 
                                                




In Second Delirium: An Alchemy of Words, after five difficult but exciting years, 
Rimbaud bids farewell to his poetry and to his life of art. He explains that his mind has 
“turned sou.” The poet is by this point in his life weak, –physically spent – and 
disillusioned from his self-imposed journey of magic and discovery, two words he often 
used to describe his youth, the time of his quest to become a visionary. He sings the 
praises of a life of happiness, not pain, and of science, not art. In “A Song from the 
Highest Tower,” a combination of traditional verse poetry with prose po try, as if to 
emulate the chorus-verse-chorus structure of the piece, the poet sings to his new-found 
(or re-found) home in reason and stability: Finally O reason, O happiness, I cleared from 
the sky the blue which is darkness” Further along in the several-page prose poem, though
Rimbaud seems to remember what he is now claiming to be leaving behind and calls for 
attention to the senses and to our passions: “You must set yourself free/ from the striving 
of Man/ And the applause of the world!/ You must fly as you can. … The fire within 
you,/ Is our whole duty-/ But no one remembers” (pp. 207–208).  
Rimbaud here seems an old man, tired and worn, a refugee from a sort of thrilling 
war that has taught him a love of peace. In the late letters, his sarcasm erratically plays 
with his semi-madness. It is not quite clear what he means when Rimbaud announces 
suddenly that “[he] will become involved in politics. Saved” (p. 195). 
 
Marx, Rousseau, and the problem with mainstream art  
The philosophies of de Sade and Rimbaud call for a rebellion from the social and 




sensuousness rather than the dominant reliance on reason and order.58 It is interesting to 
consider the rebellious ideas of these two artists alongside the work of Rousseau and 
Marx. Although the work that Rousseau and Marx are most famous for in the Western 
canon does not directly concern rebellion through creativity, all these philosophers were 
keenly aware of the difference between a visionary, or truly free, cr ativity and a 
mainstream, or alienating, artistic experience. Although all art in its very creation is a 
negation of the given reality, this distinction between visionary and mainstream art is the 
difference between art that challenges the ruling ideas of society, and art that is in the 
service of the sublimated passions of the status quo and the Establishment. Rousseau 
(1762/1993) criticized mainstream artistic endeavors for their acquiescence to the order 
and morality of popular culture, whereas Marx (1844/1978) differentiated between 
alienating experiences and healthy self-unifying ones that capture and encourage 
universal human connection.  
Marx (1844/1978) defined ‘species being’, as the feeling or knowledge of human 
unity that needs to be accessed to subvert the alienation of modern man. He described 
how the men who labored in the factories of modern industrial Europe had, in becoming 
alienated from themselves and from the objects they produced for others’ us  each day, 
become estranged from their natural but latent feeling and knowledge of universal unity 
with all humans. “Man is a species being … not only because he treats himself as the 
actual, living species; because he treats himself as a universal and therefore a free being” 
p. 75). For Marx, species being was a vision of a world without property and capital, 
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where the unity and wholeness of the community of man could be acknowledged and 
appreciated. He argued that it is not merely economics that cre tes alienation, but rather 
the conformity and complacency that is bred by the conditions of everyday life in 
contemporary American democracy. It is not merely species being of which we could 
make a goal, but also Rousseau’s (1750/1993) idea of "empathy", and Emerson’s theory 
of "Oneness". All these philosophical ideas point to the same conclusion: that a feeling of 
universal human community among individuals is not only valid and in need of renewal, 
but is also a key to solving the lack of participation in American public and political life. 
The ever-growing individualism among Americans needs to be balanced by more 
frequent interactions with visionary art, which fosters feelings of community and genuine 
interest in the public domain and in civic involvement.  
Danto (1998b) writes:   
Hegel, thinking of philosophy as the domain of thought and art the 
domain of sensation, was obliged to think that art had come to an 
end when it became suffused with critical thought about itself. The 
sharp division between thought and sensation is pure Romanticism 
… art has in its own right become part of art’s own reflection on 
itself” (p. 136).  
The stark division between experience and reflection is a mislead ng 
characterization of human experience – as Danto argues, a misleading description of 
postmodernity or “after the end of art”. Whereas experience by sensation is vastly 




realms. But instead of using reason to progress, one can employ art, r rather be art, to 
transcend. To be art is to accumulate experience without regard for moral convention or 
societal taboos, not to mention experience often without regard for one’s own health and 
safety. It is to face pain; not always to create pleasure, saf ty, self-sustainability, the 
“good.” To live art can be scary and difficult and often, when truly accepted, debilitating. 
Nonetheless, art can enlighten and reveal; it can transcend the ages and be the catalyst for 
change and progress in society- the very society from which it seeks to separate itself. Art 
can lead us to vital and latent truths and can inspire a change in consciousness. Artistic 
experience leads to a reawakening of ‘species being’; people become not only self-aware, 
but gain the potential to be connected to all others in the species and to recognize their 
interdependence. For Marx, it was through the alienation of labor that species being was 
lost for the individual, and it is through revolution (and the end of the alienation of labor) 
that it can be found again. 
In the "Discourse on Arts and Sciences," Rousseau (1750/1993) expressed a two-
pronged problem with modernity: the effects of capitalism (for Roussea , property) on 
society and on our morality, and the effects of a re lpolitik theory of governance on 
modern politics. Rousseau lamented that “the politicians of the ancient world were 
always talking of morals and virtue; ours speak of nothing but commerce and money.” (p. 
17). In Part Two of this discourse, although disdainful of and sarcastic about both the role 
and the content of art in mainstream bourgeois life, Rousseau still acknowledged the 
importance (he said “genius”) of true or transcendent art. By hat very definition, he was 




true artist of this sort must live in poverty and struggle, and should only be recognized 
after his death. “It is only those who feel themselves able to walk alone in their footsteps 
and to outstrip them. It belongs only to these few59 to raise monuments to the glory of the 
human understanding” (p. 27). He cited even the great writer and fellow Enlightenment 
intellectual Voltaire (the two did not get along) as being guilty of censoring his own 
words to please the masses. This accusation is interesting in the context of his theory, not 
only because of his allowances for “genius” even in an essay that is a polemic against art, 
but also because Rousseau importantly targeted and articulated the universal problem of 
the repressive nature of the mainstream. In Danto’s (1998b) words: “[Art becomes] an 
object rather than a medium through which a higher reality made itself present” (p. 130).  
In Rousseau’s time, the foundations of capitalism and advanced industry, and the 
culture that accompanied them, created a whole realm of normalizing distractions in 
entertainment, academia, and bureaucratic institutions. Rousseau wrote of the "end of 
art," or at least of the end of a mainstream appreciation for "virtuous" art. He maintained 
that the theaters and galleries of 18th-century Paris had done little more than sedate the 
bourgeois population into complacency. For him, art that merely entertai s simply 
appeases the masses, and is in this sense anti-citizenship (which is likewise anti-
revolutionary). True citizenship, according to Rousseau, requires the ability to sustain 
enough of a sense of universality, and to transcend and pull far enough away from the 
pragmatism and conformity of society, to be able to question our everyday existence and 
society’s established rules. Status quo art (and music and poetry and eve  philosophy) 
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functions in society much as big screen televisions and oversized SUVs do – as material 
distractions from our species being (Marx, 1844/1978), or our natural compassion or 
"pity"’ (Rousseau, 1762/1993), and as accepted normalizing and disciplining (Foucault, 
1991) forces that maintain anti-revolutionary order. All these issues go far to keep the 
masses happy and distracted, not only from society’s ills but also from the true 
community of man. “As the conveniences of life increase, as the ar s are brought to 
perfection and luxury spreads, true courage flags, military virtues disappear; and all this 
is the effect of the sciences and of those arts which are exercised in the privacy of man’s 
dwellings” (Rousseau, 1762/1993, p. 20).  
Rousseau is often cited as the intellectual forefather of the Romantic Movement, 
and his many references to the lost virtues of honor and courage are a testament to this 
claim. But that he used such terms to show how appreciation for community and public 
citizenship had given way to private, insulating, and ultimately “meaningless” luxuries, 
his call to arms against the conventional arts and sciences is r levant to the present day. 
With the masses satisfied and entertained, most of society remains st unchly in the 
mainstream. Mainstream art is one of the elements that the Establishment uses so that 
society can continue to build the very system that oppresses them (Marx’s, 1844/1978, 
idea of false consciousness). Visionary art is a way to bring the mentality of everyday 
revolutionary praxis into the lives of many. It is not impossible that its rebellious 
rearrangements could eventually incite physical and violent social revolution, but, more 
importantly and more commonly, it can begin the project of changing or “enlightening” 





The Modern age was certainly industrious; it quickly gave birth to radical philosophical 
departures like liberalism and democracy, but it also fostered significant reactionary ideas 
that threatened the newly established status quo. Rousseau was one of the first of the 
Modern era to point out not only that there is a difference between transcendent art and 
mainstream art, but also that there is special importance in history for the role of the 
visionary artist. While Rousseau remained convinced that the visionaries of his age were 
the founders of scientific rationalism, who largely marked the dawn of the Modern era, he 
acknowledged that there are such “geniuses” for every age. Calling on his readers to 
revolt against the arts and sciences, he depicted a societal condition from which there was 
no escape except through revolution. His was a revolt of simplicity, pragmatism, and 
citizenship against the culture of wealth, decadence and self-absorption that the bourgeois 
class exemplified. Ordinary readers of his discourse on the evil of the arts would perhaps 
reflect on their own “alienation” in the culture of mainstream life. In much the same way, 
a citizen of 19th- century France who came across the novels of the Marquis de Sade or 
the poems of Arthur Rimbaud might be incited to attack the monarchy or members of the 
bourgeoisie or the many symbols of moral convention – the whole society.  
Now, in the 21st century, what is most striking about the relationship between art 
and politics is the speed with which the current Establishment is able to embrace 
visionary art and dilute it for the masses, until it is more easily digestible through known 
mainstream concepts. This sucks from it its potentially revolutionary and raw emotional 




popular assimilation, now moving at increasing speeds to match the increasing levels of 
mechanization and globalization, can create almost immediate turnover of new and 
rebellious ideas. The struggle to be an artist “beyond one’s own age” (to be a visionary) 
has become, paradoxically, both easier and more fruitless – easier, because an “age” is 
now far shorter than it was during the time of the Enlightenment in Europe (time sees to 
pass more quickly and, with it, art too). Yet looking forward has becom  more difficult 
and at times even futile. Visionary artists struggle against the anti species being 
component of the Establishment, rather than directly against material conditions. Even if 
the Establishment were to become entirely in the service of society, art would still 
address other, more primal needs. There remains an infinitely expanding role for art. 
The connection that art has to the ability to change individual consciousness, and 
to the development of a rebellious consciousness, is vital to a stronger recognition of 
species being in social life. Species being is, of course, unreachable in perfect form, for 
the dialectic must continue, but it can be pursued so that society can change and develop. 
Change fosters a better understanding of the dialectic of art and reason, and the 
continuation of that dialectic is what keeps art alive without limit. The journey toward 
species being may seem teleological in that it can be seen to fu ction as a meta-narrative. 
But if we accept that the “goal” is unreachable (and that even a journey without a goal 
can be fruitful), and that the quest itself can yield a deeper knowledge of the endless 
tension that creates movement or change, and the necessary movements that sustain the 
tension, then the journey can enrich us. Art exemplifies a universal understanding among 




the Apollonian realms, respectively) meet in an ever-blossoming and ever-colliding 
partnership. The particulars of art will vary, and sometimes confound the viewer, but all 
powerful art provides a valuable journey using the senses, that established contact with 
that which is common among all humans. 
Rimbaud called for living through the senses and through art. This aim requires 
that one live anti-politically, in other words, to live primarily privately and not through or 
for society, but rather, without it. Rimbaud believed that we could reinvent society’s 
concepts of the everyday, so that they are true to us individually – so that we can learn 
them through our own experience rather than just accept them as they are collectively 
described. Just as Rousseau argued against the mainstream ideas ofHobbes and Locke by 
refusing to accept that humans could not be naturally good and just, Rimbaud also 
warned of the ways in which society – property, industry, and its cul ure –corrupts man’s 
natural state.  He was echoing Rousseau that, using the tools of culture, and often art 
itself, society casts a veil over its members by mass-manufacturing the Dionysian 
elements of life. Once bureaucratic structure and order, and the whit washing that comes 
with frequent repetition, are placed upon Dionysian moments, these moments lose their 
ability as a transcendent force, and become a part of their tim, rather than ahead of their 
time. Rimbaud preferred a sort of self-corruption wherein he adopted the individual 
morality system that de Sade espoused.  It is likely that neither de Sade nor Rimbaud, in 
his artistic expressions and assertions, ever intended that his experiments and anti-societal 
ideas would become the foundation of an ordered society. Their private transgressions 




about their experiences – by placing their private lives in the public domain and thus into 
the cultural collective – they were transforming their private experiences into public 
knowledge. Their visionary combinations of art and thought attest to the importance of 
the knowledge attained through emotional and spiritual, rather than merely rational, 
experience.  
My conclusions are again twofold. It remains an important task to increase mass 
access to an alternative, “visionary” way of life – to allow everyone to live by the 
dialectic of art – both as a response to the mechanization of contemporary life, and as a 
tool by which to transcend our temporal conditions and enjoy the universal f elings that 
propel individual interest and participation. Without a doubt, an acceptance of art as a 
source of knowledge can lead to transcendence of the limits of society that fosters a 
significant increase in community and civic involvement. When we can feel ourselves as 
part of something greater, as part of a whole, we have begun to transcend those 
limitations.  
Capitalism, from its inception in the French Revolution to its contemporary 
sophisticated and global claims, creates and sustains the individual as  single unit, 
encouraged to feel compassion only for those it is allowed to love – oneself, one's family, 
one's spouse. Capitalism dictates even our aesthetic tastes, as it produces the arts and 
sciences of convention that Rousseau, writing over 200 years ago, warned of. More 
recently, Foucault explained the ability of a person to reproduce himself as a subject of 
the state willingly as discipline and normalization. Camus (1951/1991) and Marcuse 




change in material conditions (i.e., the toppling of capitalism to make way for 
communism) that will bring recognition of empathy and interconnectivity. Rather, it is an 
acceptance and development of the eternal dialectic of instinct and reason, as exemplified 
by visionary art. Through the universal and transhistorical experienc of art, and the 
empathy it engenders, people can engage a revolutionary consciousness within 






RECENT EXPERIMENTS WITH PUBLIC AND SOCIAL ART: 
NEW YORK CITY AND BEYOND 
 
I believe that the artist and his art are only a part of the total human experience; 
the viewer in the world at large is the essential other part. 
– Ansel Adams 
[T]the alchemical essence known as the sublime, the primal buzz of it all, is no 
longer in God or nature or abstraction…the sublime has moved into us … we are 
the sublime; life, not art, has become so real thatit’s almost unreal. Art is being 
reanimated by a sense of necessity, free of ideology, r the compulsion to 
illustrate theory. Art is breaking free. 
 – Jerry Saltz 
There is a shallowness to the current state of Americans' partici tion in 
democracy. To combat this complacency, we need to seek new ways to revitalize social 
and political life in America. The solution lies in the connection betwe n visionary 
artistic experience, defined here as the union of free and individual Dionysian moments 
with the reflective power of Apollonian reason, and the desire to partici te, which is 
encouraged primarily by the feelings of unity and connectedness that come from such 
knowledge. This desire to participate- to be interested, to feel empowered is the true key 
to active citizenship. Dionysian glimpses contain the necessary ene gy and imagination – 




status quo mindset. Just as flesh-and-blood revolutions need an opening (first a 
weakening) in the structural elements of the ruling regime in order to move forward with 
a higher probability of success, revolutions (re-understandings) of the mind also need that 
opportunity for at least momentary disorder from which to reassess and grow. 
Revolutions, coups, and strikes against a system of government or any institution 
of power are essential to dynamic and lasting change in the minds of individuals in 
society. This is true despite mainstream history’s attempt to relegate most short-lived 
revolts to “failed” status. A revolutionary attempt can never be a failure, and it should 
never be regarded as such. Throughout history, regardless of whether a revolt lasted 
minutes or years, each has contributed to a revolution of the mind. All revo utionary 
movements engender some form of change within their respective communities and 
within the collective imagination, in that they pose questions and altern tives previously 
not considered. 
Once we can expand the limits of what we perceive is possible for our lives, there 
is the possibility of the destruction of previous values and the creation of new needs. 
Arousal awakens. With physical attack on the government or authority st ucture, our 
senses and perceptions are also aroused. It is not the momentary (historical, material, 
immediate) result of bloody revolt that connotes its success, but, instead, the paradigm 
shift that it introduces. In the metaphorical sense, the violent moment begins change that 
only the mind can continue complete. The chaotic feelings that encourage, or make clear 
the need for change, is the Dionysian moment; the reflection on these new needs is the 




As Nietzsche (1872/1967) said, the metaphorical bloodshed of creation is 
necessary, but it cannot, and should not, stand alone. A joining of the Dionysian and the 
Apollonian realms of life is exemplified in visionary art, and this relationship of 
interaction and balance is the key to a revolution of the mind. It is with this partnership 
that one overcomes everyday struggles. A “successful” revolt by an organized militia 
overtakes one government and replaces it with another, presumably one that proffers 
more freedom to the people. While this kind of revolution alters the structural façade of 
political life, the closing of the opening [of the mind that results from the Dionysian 
moment comes too quickly for the change to enter and remain in individual 
consciousness.  
The prevailing myth of individualism in the United States convinces us that we 
are able to prosper alone, “prosperous” being defined through commercial pursuits and 
through the possession of property. Dionysian moments collapse previous individual 
conceptualizations of reality and allow for our often latent visions of universal 
connectedness to become possible and natural. This new sense of our own connection to 
others enables us to view our own needs in a new light. These new needs instill empathy 
for all people into our feeling of being individuals, and demonstrate to us our 
vulnerability and interdependence. Without society, identity, happiness (or neurosis), 
even the very ability or need to use our democratic rights and liberties, would cease to 
exist. To aid the recognition of this universal connected vulnerability, Dionysius 
underscored the primacy of the community, rather than the individual.  




There are many different ways to approach theories of subjectivity and 
objectivity, and their overlap, in art. It could be argued that all artistic endeavors are 
subjective and should not be subject to objective classifications of taste. There are many 
different types of art, infinite types in fact. From traditional art forms like painting, dance, 
and musical composition, to interactive performance, mail art, gift art, dialogical art, 
street and communal festivities. The more broad that our definition of art has become, the 
more difficult it is to argue for the value of a transferrable matrix by which to evaluate 
artworks against one another. Even if we decide to use a series of matrices- one for say 
precision (of stroke, or arrangement of notes), one for use of color, one for emotional 
significance- it is easy to immediately see the many difficulties such categories yield. 
These comparisons become near impossible when often the best artworks and artistic 
styles first enter society as enigmas, as less than ‘correct’ or appealing, as revolutionary 
attempts to invert or subvert the reigning approaches to art and creativity. It is still more 
difficult to immediately ascertain the value of an artwork when often a less than 
traditionally beautiful or technically magnificent artwork can illicit powerful responses in 
individuals and in the populace at large. Often, it is time that illustrates the most affecting 
artworks. Art moves with time as do other aspects of our common culture. Significant 
changes in art mirror major changes in society, and vice versa. No one could have 
predicted the force on modern art history and culture, created by say Pic sso’s 
rearrangement of body parts, or Duchamp’s unaltered use of everyday objects as art in 




While these questions are better addressed with greater nuance in a different 
work, it is enough to say that subjective determinations of ‘beauty’ in art are linked to our 
individual emotive conditions and histories, and not necessarily to the merit of the 
artwork itself. Therefore, to say simply that any artwork that inspires emotion or a 
declaration of beauty by an individual, is then a ‘great’ work of art, is entirely too loosely 
subjective. Still, it is clear that there are ‘better’ works of art, as compared to lesser 
others, and that there are artworks and artistic styles that endure over large spans of time, 
and many that are naturally deemed masterpieces. There are broad guidelines for a 
combination of forces that create a better artwork, but none of these can be absolute or 
definitive. Innovation in style and approach, range and variation in technique, pow rful 
use of imagery and color (in music, dance, and art), and an evocation of relatable 
universal ideas and emotions within the work, are perhaps the most imporant variables 
for evaluating a work of art. Sometimes we are moved by an artwork because it captures 
a moment or person particularly well, and thus transports us to that place or to them 
through the work. Other times, an artwork may call attention to an issue or problem in a 
new or strikingly powerful way. Other times, we may look at, or listen to, an artwork, and 
perhaps not yearn to put it into our homes and our daily lives, but yet we may still value 
its relevance to change, progress, and justice. 
What in this work I term ‘visionary’ art, also referred to alternately as 
transcendent or rebellious or avant-garde art, is described here in oppositi n to 
mainstream or conformist or ‘plastic’ art. There exist two prima y forms of artistic 




by seeking alternatives and provoking deeper individual engagement with the world 
around us.  This is the artwork I term visionary or rebellious. Art, that is, on the other 
hand, supportive, of both the content and form that defies the boundaries of our daily 
existence, and enables us, as does the power of popular opinion, to delay or even entirely 
avoid, a truly independent and critical examination of how and why mechanisms of our 
world function as they do. This sort of art has historically been employed both to uphold 
the materialistic drives of society, as well as to create support for unjust decisions and 
regimes. There have been examples, particularly in the bloody experi nces of the 
twentieth century, of aesthetics being employed in service of totalitarian ideas and goals, 
such as the vast array of propaganda art that was created in both Nazi Germany and in the 
Stalinist Soviet Union. It is because art is always indirectly re ated to politics, and to 
issues of ethics, that it can be employed so effectively in the ame of negative ideas and 
ideals. 
The notion of creativity is linked intimately with art. The twentith century writer 
Arthur Koestler, in his Act of Creation (1964, 1990), argues that creativity- let us define it 
here loosely as the creation of new ideas- can, and often is in modern society, repressed 
by the dominance and strength of rational thought, action, and moral codes. It is when we 
can release ourselves from the bonds of rationality that we can access the highest levels 
of creativity. 
Surrealist philosophy provides an interesting corollary in discussion  of the 
importance to society of irrational explorations within the self. Surrealism as a 




developed in Europe, primarily in Paris, in the beginning of the 1920’s. It was borne at 
least partially out of the equally anti-rationalistic, though explicitly ‘anti-art’, Dada 
movement in art and culture of the previous decade, that likewise argu d that society 
functioned through, and relied upon, too strong a focus on rationalism, and not enough on 
the knowledge of irrational instincts. 
Surrealist artists strove to create visual artworks that encouraged a fantastical or 
dreamlike irrational state within both the artist and the viewer through disorienting and 
unusually composed images. The Surrealists, headed intellectually by the ideas of the 
writer Andre Breton among others, and guided by both a Freudian and a Marxian ethos, 
believed that looking at art that temporarily disoriented, and aimed to reorient in a new 
way, the viewer with unfamiliarly juxtaposed and strung-together id as and concepts 
from the everyday, could encourage a search within the unconscious, similar to the style 
of inner discovery developed by Freudian psychoanalysis. Besides publihing a journal 
on Surrealist ideas, Breton also wrote three manifestos for the Surr alist movement in 
1924, 1930, and 1934, that expressed the movement’s philosophical goals of creating a 
revolution in society through creating images that served to unleash the workings of the 
unconscious into everyday reality. 
George Kateb’s argument about the potentially malignant character of aesthetic 
experience (2008), through his concept of aesthetic cravings, is a seeming foil to the main 
idea presented here about the positive value of art for society. His belief is that t is in fact 
the natural human instinct for the very same order and accord, which Camus nd 




detrimental cohesion. This false unity and logic, he argues, was a leading cause of many 
of the worst political experiments, especially of this last century. With this notion I agree. 
It seems to me that although Kateb’s analysis is rich, it is simplistic to reduce aesthetics, 
or even ‘vulgar’ notions of aesthetics, to a desire for unity and homogeneity. In his 
theory, he equates aesthetics with the sort of beauty yielded by harmony and order. This 
is what in this work is referred to as conformist or status-quo-affirming art. I equate 
‘aesthetics’ here with the ‘plastic’ arts, as they attempt to create order out of a hopelessly, 
though in my opinion pleasurably, disorderly and vastly pluralistic world. The positive 
value of art that is expressed here pertains not to the harmony and order of aesthetics, but 
rather to the self-awareness, innovation, and empowerment that exists within creativity, 
and within experience with visionary art. When this work asserts tha notions of empathy 
and oneness can be found in creative visionary experience, the argument is not for a 
perfect or forced or homogenous oneness, but rather for a source for intercon ected 
empathy that is the foundation for true justice. 
It is also necessary to flesh out the nature of what I call here ‘experience’. 
Experience, as it is used here, implies a ritual, or a process, aptured within even just a 
momentary pause from our daily lives. An ‘experience’ with art contains more than one 
idea. The initial Dionysian moment begins the experience with temporary spiritual pause, 
and reflection creates empowerment and desire for change from it. Artistic experience 
includes the participating and looking, the listening, the being captivated, the being 
moved emotionally and spiritually; these feelings during the viewing experience mirror 




habitual experience, is a relevant distinction, but only to demonstrate th t episodic 
experience with art can become habitual once the inner awareness of our own creative 
individual will is confronted. This is achieved more broadly and inclusively with art that 
is situated in outdoor public spaces. 
From Joseph Beuys to the contemporary theorists of the social and participatory 
art movement, their main arguments about artistic experience mirror this as they believe 
that art becomes art not when the initial artist produces its foundatio s, but rather when 
the viewers participate—either directly (physically) or indirectly (through feeling)- in the 
artwork.  Those intangible moments where we feel the spirit within art is a form of 
artistic creation itself. The art then flows within us. This is the experience of art. 
 
 
Marcuse’s revolution through art 
Marcuse’s (1969/1974) work on the political possibilities of creativity and art 
combined Freudian psychology with a post-Marxian critique. He believed, following 
Freud, that some individual repression is vital in society, but that other repressive 
qualities of society not the Establishment, or the powers that determine the very desires 
of society) were unhealthy and hindered  individual liberty.60 He argued that art could 
                                                
60  "Only if … the scientific and artistic imagination direct the construction of a sensuous 
environment, only if the work world loses its alienati g features and becomes a world of human 
relationships, only if productivity becomes creativity, are the roots of domination dried up in the 
individuals. No return to precapitalist, pre-industrial artisanship, but on the contrary, perfection of the new 
mutilated and distorted science and technology in the formation of the object world in accordance with 'the 




allow for endless possibilities, and thus enable not escapism from society and politics but, 
rather, opportunity for individual resistance, revolt, and liberation, throug creativity and 
imagination.61 Kellner (Marcuse, 2007) quotes Marcuse as saying that art can take us 
back in time, as much as it can envision the future, and propel us into the still unknown: 
“Marcuse sees social change prefigured in artistic subcultures and in the productions of 
artists and intellectuals.” (p. 13). In an interview between himself and Richard Kearney, 
Marcuse said, “Art, therefore, does not just mirror the present, it leads beyond it. It 
preserves, and thus allows us to remember, values which are no longer to be found in our 
world; and it points to another possible society in which these values may be realized.” 
(p. 228). Here he distinguished between art as a positive force that conforms to the 
constraints of mainstream culture, and art as a protest and negation of the accepted 
reality.62 
Marcuse, like Camus before him, struggled with the injustices and political 
horrors that were taking place around him and yearned to find a philosophical way to an 
alternative society. Marcuse (1969) believed that the unifying and healing power of Eros 
needed to overcome the dark force of Thanatos in society. Specifically, M rcuse argued 
                                                                                                                                                 
real existence … but that harmony between man and his world which would shape the form of society." 
(Marcuse 2001, pp. 138–139). 
61  In Douglas Kellner’s Introduction to Marcuse: Art and Liberation (2007) he elucidates 
the most common criticism of Marcuse’s philosophy, that it enables escape from, not interaction with, 
society. Referring to Timothy J. Lukes' work, he writes: “[H]is book The Flight into Inwardness (1985), 
also affirms 'the central role of aesthetics in Marcuse’s work,'” agreeing with Katz concerning the primacy 
of aesthetics in Marcuse. Lukes claims that Marcuse’s work leads into a withdrawal and escape from 
politics and society in aesthetic “flight into inwardness' ”. (Marcuse, 2007, p. 2). 
62  “As part of the established culture, Art is affirmative, sustaining this culture; as 
alienation from the established reality, Art is a negative force. The history of Art can be understood as the 




for a “radical transvaluation of values [that]  involves a break with the familiar, the 
routine ways of seeing, hearing, feeling, understanding things so that the organism may 
become receptive to the potential forms" (p. 6) and thus the desire to participate in 
change. Marcuse believed that, as a system, capitalism is a self- ffirming prison. He 
argued that capitalism yields immediate material satisfacons that serve only to create 
new needs and desires for more material satisfactions.63 This is not unlike Tocqueville’s 
(1835/2002) thesis on the self-limiting nature of American democracy. Marcuse’s 
critique of advanced capitalism is linked to a critique of modern democracy. In a sense, 
Marcuse’s arguments are specific to the politically tumultuous 1960s and to the 20th 
century, but there is both a contemporaneity, and a timelessness, to his assertion that true 
individual liberation, which seeks unity with all others, can be attained through 
interactions with, and expressions of, the aesthetic or creative realm. It is in this aesthetic 
realm that people can expand their imaginations. Marcuse believed that art’s re lization is 
political struggle, or praxis. I believe this statement to be tru , although the relationship is 
not quite so direct or simple as it may imply.  
Marcuse, not unlike Camus, and in a different context Nietzsche too, believed that 
in order to create the foundations for true justice in society (and in this sense, re-create 
the social order), it was necessary to step back from, rearrange, reinvent, and revolt 
against established reality, and the ruling ideas of the Establishment. Once this liberation 
is achieved, and once a more natural understanding of justice, understood as univer al 
                                                
63  “Capitalist progress thus not only reduces … the 'op n space' of the human existence but 
also the 'longing,' the need for such an environment.  [Capitalist progress] militates against qualitative 
changes even if the institutional barriers against radical education and action are surmounted” (Marcuse, 




empathy, has emerged within the individual, the development of the ‘new society’ could 
begin. He was insistent that this still unknown future world could not be det rmined, in 
all its details, upon the initial move toward significant change; th  ‘new society’ would 
develop from the bottom-up, rather than be placed upon a people. The primary nature of 
this new humanist society, besides its reliance on empathy among individuals, is that it 
evolves through the involvement of interested and willful citizens who are guided by the 
teachings of artistic experience. Marcuse believed that art was a positive force in society 
through its very negation of the Established reality, and in this way, of the established 
structures of power and morality. 
Marcuse’s project was heavily focused on resurrecting the life-building power of 
Eros (in contrast to the death drive of Thanatos) in everyday life, and in the mechanisms 
of societal justice and governance. He believed that Eros, accessed in the creative and 
life-affirming abilities of art, could redefine the terms of s cietal relations and justice. It 
makes sense that in the context of the mid-Twentieth century, Marcuse believed that the 
forces of Thanatos had overpowered the knowledge of Eros in society, and a variety of 
violent horrors had ensued around the world, and now life itself had to be revived.  
As Nietzsche and Camus both argued, Marcuse (1970a) believed that art and 
imagination are dependent on the union of the Dionysian and Apollonian drives. “In the 
work of art, form becomes content and vice versa (p. 40). Form captures the Dionysian 
moment of instinct and emotion, and content is akin to the Apollonian reflection. Their 
eternal dialectical dance keeps visionary art alive, as well as critical. In Marcuse’s 




reality, even though their perpetual interaction is inherent. In his p ilosophy Marcuse 
feared destructive and angry forces and believed that they should be replaced by the life 
energy of Eros. Yet we must not eradicate our natural desires for death and destruction 
but, rather, to encourage repressed people, “satisfied” by the desires and material goods 
of popular opinion to experience both the chaos and the freedom of creativity. In this 
way, they may temporarily disorder their reality and, with thisre pite, become able to 
imagine change and gain a genuine interest in pursuing change. 
Following Camus, Marcuse (2007) believed that creative rebellion is a 
confrontation with, and an expression of, a unifying understanding that is revealed 
through the vital knowledge of human co-dependency that exists within individuals, and 
in the spaces between all people. Marcuse asserted, “The aesthetic i  more than merely 
'aesthetic'. It is the reason of sensibility, 64 the form of the senses as pervaded by reason 
and as such the possible form of human existence. Beautiful form as the form of life is 
possible only as the totality of a potential free society and not merely in private, in one 
particular part or in the museum.” (p. 129). He elaborated, “No matter how much Art may 
be determined, shaped, directed by prevailing values, standards of taste and behaviour, 
limits of experience, it is always more and other than beautification and sublimation, 
recreation and validation of that which is” (p. 143). Marcuse was pointing here to the 
distance that art naturally keeps from reality. Although art is a human creation and is thus 
embedded in the desires and behaviors of its time, its form is one of r flection, 
commentary, distortion, enhancement. Art is displayed in the particulr, but it is an 
                                                




expression of that which is universal – the Other force in life that c llenges our 
immediate concerns with the tugs of universal and communal experience. 
Marcuse wrote extensively on how one can attain liberation from the constructs of 
everyday reality through spiritual and sensual connections and access to the latent 
knowledge of universal community. A great believer in the power of Eros to awaken 
revolutionary spirit, Marcuse (1970a) claimed that art – the realm of the Dionysian (in 
opposition to the Apollonian) spirit – can be a liberator of repressed and t boo 
“dimensions of reality” (p. 19) because “[t]he nomos which art obeys is not that of the 
established reality principle but of its negation” (p. 73). By "established reality principle," 
Marcuse was referring to the prevailing societal obstacles, which v sionary artists 
constantly seek to overcome. Visionaries create the aesthetic dimension, which “may 
require them to stand against the people” (p. 35) or oppose mass opinion and the status 
quo. Douglas Kellner writes: Although Marcuse enthusiastically projects an ideal of the 
merging of art and life and overcoming alienation through integration int  a harmonious 
community, he is aware that the development of bourgeois society created new forms of 
alienation which were reflected in the artist novel. In his dissertation, he often discusses 
artistic revolts as conscious rejections of bourgeois society and capitalism that were 
destroying previous forms of life and were generating new obstacle  to overcoming 
artistic alienation (Marcuse, 2007, p. 13). 
Marcuse also argued (at least in his later work) that not even socialism and its 
institutions could ever dissolve the tension in the dialectic between the universal and the 




never be resolved, as both of its poles are perpetually created and re-created in life’s 
experiences and emotions. Its fluctuating tension maintains art’s central role in our 
internal life because in art not only can the impossible be created, but our universal 
experiences of human existence can be explored and elucidated through p werful 
moments of creative expressions. Truly independently-conceived individual, and social 
change, could begin with the acceptance of art’s role as being fundamental to progress 
and to ultimate societal order, as well as to the more immediate goals of increased 
participation and feelings of genuine interest and inclusion in both civil soc ety, and 
eventually in the mechanisms of procedural democracy. This would lead to increased 
support of public and social artistic endeavors, so that this vital knowledge of visionary 
art can be tapped into more frequently and more broadly, and by more pe ple, in the 
democratic forum of the streets, rather than in the often intimidating renas of the art 
museum and other cultural institutions.  
The power of public and social art to empower individuals, aid community, and 
transform society 
Several important recent arguments favor the value of art in society and for 
political life and create a foundation for all assertions of art's central role in the positive 
transformation of individuals and groups. Frances Borzello (1987), from a historical view 
on industrial Britain, says that art can create community, education, empowerment, and 
even refinement. For Jacques Ranciere (2009), art is political in its ability to challenge 
and transform everyday reality and thus can serve as a vehicle for individual revolt in 




the newest movements in contemporary art that stress interaction nd communication 
enhance these positive effects of art. Borzello65 argues that, in addition to art’s obvious 
aesthetic value, it has also often been used to aid society and politics.66 She holds that art 
has been used in Britain since the 1870s to educate, encourage, and refine the criminal 
and the neglected in society. In late 19th--century Britain, “All shared a basic belief that 
bad environments led to bad people and that bad people led to bad environments. Art had 
the power to break this circle. Reformed by art, the people would improve their way of 
life, and once reformed there would be no chance of their ever again being gripped by 
vicious habits or dragged down by hopeless surroundings" (p. 32).Further, she points to 
the power of public art that is shared by a whole community. Similar to the use of public 
art in Ancient Rome, a celebration of creativity and a shared culture that all could take 
pride in, and learn from, was in Britain an important key to empower and uplift those 
who had been disillusioned by society’s ills and to foster feelings of community by 
creating genuine connections among citizens across class divides: “Culture was to be the 
means of achieving this dream of a united society in which rich and poor stood side by 
side instead of eyeing each other with hostility. As Barnet said, ‘There can be no real 
unity so long as people in different parts of a city are prevented from admiring the same 
things, from taking the same pride in their fathers’ great deeds, and from sharing the 
glory of possessing the same great literature’” (p. 32).  
                                                
65 British writer on art and society. 
66 Blake (2007) examines how historically the arts, public life, and the state have interacted 
in America. Gerald Raunig’s (2007) text on the relationship between art, activism, and revolution examines 




Jacques Ranciere, known for his early work on Marx as a student of Louis
Althusser, has in recent years become one of the most salient and popular figures in 
aesthetic theory (Davis, 2006). The focus of his many studies on the politics of aesthetics 
is a reconsideration of the relationship between art and politics and an insistence on the 
importance of aesthetic experience in contemporary society (Ranciere, 2004), and on a 
defense of modern aesthetic theory for a new and alternative concepti  of politics:  
“Politics, indeed, is not the exercise of, or struggle for, power. It is the configuration of a 
specific space, the framing of a particular sphere of experience, of objects posited as 
common and as pertaining to a common decision, of subjects recognized as capable of 
designating these objects and putting forward arguments about them” (Ranciere, 2009, p. 
24). 
Ranciere’s project, in the tradition of Camus and Marcuse, seeks to revitalize and 
reformulate our understanding of aesthetics. He argues that aesthetics is inherently 
political because it is by nature in a realm separate from both p litics and reality: “the 
politicity of art is tied to its very autonomy” (p. 26). This statement is not unlike 
Tocqueville’s observation that religion played such a pivotal role in American political 
life for the very reason that it was consciously separated from politics. Following Lyotard 
(1984), Ranciere (2004) believes in an aesthetics that serves the political function of 
creating opportunity for revolt in society. He links this modernist otion of the sublime 
aesthetic as a way to transcend the constraints of society with the contemporary art 
practice of relational aesthetics67: 
                                                




Art is not, in the first instance, political because of the messages nd 
sentiments it conveys concerning the state of the world. Neither is it 
political because of the manner in which it might choose to represent 
society’s structures, or social groups, their conflicts or identiti s. It 
is political because of the very distance it takes with respect to these 
functions, because of the type of space and time that it institutes, and 
the manner in which it frames this time and peoples this space (p. 
23). 
Art’s situation today might actually constitute one specific form f a much more 
general relationship that exists between the autonomy of the spacs reserved for art and 
its apparent contrary: “art’s involvement in constituting forms of common life.” (p. 26). 
“[C]ritical art is a type of art that sets out to build awareness of the mechanisms of 
domination to turn the spectator into a conscious agent of world transformation.” (p. 45).  
Knight (2009) draws on the contemporary art practice of relational, and di logical 
(Kester, 2004) aesthetics, to assert the necessity of participation and populism in public 
art. She, too, argues that the observer of an artistic act is vital to the creation of the art 
itself. She broadly discusses a definition of public art that focuses on its function in 
society, a history of public art projects in the United States, and, most interesti gly, offers 
an analysis into the current populism68, or lack thereof, of our cultural institutions, from 
                                                
68  “Populism is not communal, although it calls for deeper awareness of our social 
relations. It is also not anti-individualist; in fact at its fullest, populism encourages independent exploration, 
development of personal viewpoints, and critical interrogations of our public and private selves. Ultimately, 





the traditional museums to commercial public spaces like Disney World. She is less 
concerned in this book with evaluating and comparing the artistic value of different 
public art projects, and rather focuses on the depth of public involvement in the artworks. 
“A museum becomes most fully public when it prompts us to examine our aesthetic 
tastes, cultural beliefs, and social practices, and when a variety of visitors feel 
comfortable and properly equipped to actively partake in such investigations.” (Knight, 
2008, p. 62). As Kester (2004) similarly argues, “Conceiving 'art as communication,' new 
genre public art seeks to move beyond metaphorical investigations of social issues with 
the hopes of empowering often marginalized peoples.”  
Kester’s (2004) text on the value of dialogical art aims equally to defend 
dialogical art as a distinct form of art practice, and attemp s to develop a theory in 
support of his own idea of a dialogical aesthetic.69. He identifies the “new” genre of the 
public art of the 1990s, which had its basis in community life, and aimed to connect 
people across various social divides. He locates that movement in arti the social, 
conceptual, performance-based, and feminist avant-garde artworks and happenings of the 
1960s and 1970s, which widely expanded definitions of art. He argues that this dialogical 
art practice uses the “interactions with collaborators and audience members” as the 
medium of the artwork. This means that the communicative interactions involved in this 
                                                
69  There has been an ongoing dialogue between Kester and art theorist Claire Bishop. They 
disagree about the value of collaborative art. The crux of their disagreement lies in Kester's belief  Bishop 
is too exclusionary about  constitutes art, and  Bishop is critical of  Kester's seeming refusal to appreciate 
“shocking” art and stepping back from comparing the value of various artworks. Kester believes there is 
great social value to interactive art projects, which can connect people and engender participation in social 




type of artwork are both the tool by which to create the art and actual holders of the 
artwork.  
Kester (2004) begins his argument by explaining why it is necessary to defend 
such communication and interaction-based art practice. He argues that it is a mistake to 
cast aside artwork that is not shocking or opaque, as is the tendency with modernist 
notions of the artistic avant-garde (Lyotard’s, 1994, notion of the sublime).70 He says that 
there has been a, “gradual consolidation in modern and postmodern art theory of a 
general consensus that the work of art must question and undermine shared discursive 
conventions” (p. 88). He explains how avant-garde art developed as a challenge to and a 
relief from industry, science, and the market, and that it was intended to shock the 
audience out of their everyday urban lives. Challenging Lyotard’s basic premise 
regarding the creation and experience of art,71 Kester argues that, whereas Lyotard 
differentiates between shocking and easy art, he does not question the definition of art as 
something which is created by the artist, and fails to see that the interaction between artist 
and viewer could be the art itself (Kester, 2004, p. 87).  
                                                
70  “In short, there is the idea that links political subjectivity to a certain form: the party, an 
advanced detachment that derives its ability to lead from its ability to read and interpret the signs of history. 
On the other hand, there is another idea of the avant-g rde that, in accordance with Schiller’s model, is 
rooted in the aesthetic anticipation of the future. If the concept of the avant-garde has any meaning i  the 
aesthetic regime of the arts, it is on this side of things, not on the side of the [45] advanced detachments of 
artistic innovation but on the side of the inventio f sensible forms and material structures for a life to 
come. This is what the ‘aesthetic’ avant-garde brought to the ‘political’ avant-garde, or what it wanted to 
bring to it – and what it believed to have brought to it – by transforming politics into a total life 
programme” (Ranciere, (2004),  pp. 29-–0. 
71  “Modernist faith had latched on to the idea of the ‘aesthetic education of man’ that 
Schiller had extracted from the Kantian analytic of the beautiful. The postmodern reversal had as its 
theoretical foundation Lyotard’s (1994) analysis of the Kantian sublime, which was reinterpreted as the 




Along similar lines, art critic Ted Purves (2005) has studied contemporary artists’ 
creations of "gift-based" projects, such as the creation of free commuter bus lines, 
medicinal plant gardens, commuter newspapers, democratic low-wattage radio stations, 
and various other free services as creative offerings. He cites, for example, Ben 
Kinmont’s self-defined “street actions,” which offered strangers free housework. This 
creation of a generous relationship, particularly among strangers, is the aesthetic as well 
as the social value of the artwork, inasmuch as these realms have merg d within the 
concept of “new genre” art. The relationship formed in the interactive artistic act or 
process, he argues, compels a change within the audience from passive viewer to 
dynamic participant.  
 
The relationship between public art and feelings of community in our social and 
political lives 
Let us consider two of the most famous, or perhaps infamous, visionary public art 
installations of the last several decades. Isamn Noguchi’s "Shinto"’ (installed, 1975-
1980) was created for a bank building in Tokyo and reminded the Japanese public of an 
enormous guillotine. Similarly, the New York City public claimed that Richard Serra’s 
"Tilted Arc" (installed, 1981-1989), created to block the entrance of an ffice building on 
Wall Street, made people feel alienated, and inconvenienced by the obstruction. In 
response to a dissatisfied public, both works were eventually taken down. 
Some propose that public artworks and projects should be approved, maybe even 




realm, simply because it is in the public realm? The general public would most likely 
never choose any work that would impede, shock, distress, or otherwise challenge them. 
Aesthetic "lightness" and appropriateness would determine the choice, and although 
beautiful sculpture might still be valuable and might renew a public space,  that the public 
is given a choice precludes the possibility that the art will challenge, and ultimately lead 
people to question, to rebel against established reality. 
The purely aesthetic experience of art is valuable because it aids the reinvention 
of our public and private environments. Through its ability to make beautiful, even 
mainstream or “plastic” art can transform and humanize public spae  without character 
or atmosphere, which creates stronger feelings of community ad a higher respect for 
public life. This connection between art and community life, is not entirely unlike the 
ideas behind the creation of religious art in places of worship –- to create a beautiful and 
inviting space so that there is more of a desire to believe and to spend time in these 
spiritual homes.  
Beyond the basic relationship between the beautification of public space and a 
heightened willingness by the public to respect, experience, and participate more in that 
public space, the visionary art experience propels the creator, and likewise the viewer, out 
of complacency and comfort and into rebellious thought and action. My goals here have 
been to examine the process of art-making and art-viewing throug  a philosophical lens, 
to study the political role of the artistic process, and to establi h the importance of this 
political role in an invigorated democracy here in America – all with the aim of 




in the most meaningful way.  The current movement in art is ever-more oriented toward 
public artworks and socially interactive performance created and produced on and for the 
street, not the traditional institution-based style of art exhibition.  
To provide new and challenging examples of social and public art projects to 
support the arguments made here, my focus has been on art in New York City, primarily 
because it is a major cultural center in the United States. Pick up any cultural publication 
and evidence of the expanding horizon of art can be immediately seen. Within just the 
past two years, as can be seen through regular searches in the cultural media for a social 
and political turn in artistic creation, there has been an increase in the amount of art 
produced that is either directly or indirectly political in nature, and this is only what is 
covered by the media. Whether this collaborative turn in art (Bishop, 2006) is a result of 
the political participation that developed in reaction to the landmark election of 2008, or a 
sign of a deeper resistance to the ever-individualizing and ever-commodifying political 
undercurrent in contemporary America, the civic desires and behaviors that bloomed 
during the 2008 campaign, while still commendable and exciting, werenot sustainable 
indicators of American civic health.  
Rather, the increase in participation was centered on a refreshing and charming 
newcomer candidate who effectively used the social media networks n w prevalent in 
American society, particularly among the younger set, to engage a largely disengaged, 
comfortable, complacent citizenry. This seeming steep increase in citizen participation in 
political life could not be sustained after the conclusion of the campaign race because it 




material desire. It was an important, but ultimately hollow, demonstration of citizenship 
in a country where often even the most capable simply choose not to get involved. Not 
since the politically turbulent 1960s have large numbers of Americans left the ease and 
comfort of their individual experiences to work towards change on a larger scale. It is 
clearly time for a resurgence of participation on all levels and in all aspects of our social 
and political lives. 
Art that engages us in the public sphere puts us into spaces, emotions, and ideas 
outside our accepted beliefs and beyond the immediate concerns of pragmatism. A potent 
experience with art is akin to the change that occurs inside u when we leave our daily 
existence and travel to an unknown land, where our most basic expectations are ignored 
and our concerns transformed. It is disconcerting and powerfully rejuvenating when this 
type of self-critique is enabled. Similarly, visionary artistic experience disorders, and this 
chaos produces a metaphorical clean slate within our inner selves that enables an 
expansion of the imagination and a space for new possibilities. Many art forms – both 
mainstream and transcendent – can infuse the prosaic with beauty or entertainment value 
or at least the novelty of experimentation. But only truly transcedent visionary art opens 
the way to freedom of thought, real conceptual change, and an expanded worldview that 
extends and transfigures individual concerns into concern for the greater human 
community.  
Public and social art projects in New York: 2007-2009 
In late September 2008, Creative Time, which, along with the Public Art Fund, 




funding public artworks, unveiled its timely, city-wide exhibition, titled, “Democracy 
Now! Democracy in America: The National Campaign.” Its aim was both a conscious 
examination of the intersection between art and politics, and a way to educate the public 
about history and democracy through art. The project included a several-movement 
performance art work by Mark Tribe, the Port Huron Project. The historical public 
lectures are Tribe’s response to the current political climate through a resurrection of the 
radical past through reenactments. Tribe has staged the performances of six historical 
speeches by Stokley Carmichael, César Chávez, and Angela Davis, among others. He is 
attempting to make connections between the past and the present through echoing the 
revolutionary words of his parents’ generation and tying them to today’s less politically 
outspoken generation. Recycling features of the radicalism of the past, Tribe says, 
"Access to our shared history is crucial for the functioning of democracy.,” . He 
advocates that the speeches of the past be made available to anyone to appropriate, to 
present, or even to reconfigure. He believes “in politics that question not only the means 
but the very assumptions upon which our society governs” (cited in Orden, 2009, p. 70).  
Various other contemporary artists – including Jeremy Deller, Omar Fast, and Allison 
Smith – are currently producing art that involves this idea of reenactment (Blumenkranz, 
2008). 
The Post Huron Project was part of one of the largest undertakings in Creative 
Time’s 34-year history, and was, in its emphasis on a directly critical politics, reflective 
of both the 2008 presidential campaign and the legendary 40 years-past demonstrations 




endeavor by artists to simulate a grassroots political movement by recycling features of 
the radicalism of the past. “Democracy in America” has sponsored five “town-hall 
meetings” and protest-performance art pieces across the country. The project culminated 
at the end of September 2008 with a seven-day exhibition at the Park Avenue Armory, 
including work by more than 40 artists, and an ongoing lecture series. With similar 
attention to social concerns, but on a smaller scale, a 2009 blurb from New York 
Magazine described a street-art project that created a portable living space resembling a 
small tin garage. The work was originally part of the "House of Cards" show at the 
Invisible-Exports gallery, and the makeshift home will now remain in the Brooklyn Navy 
Yard in New York City for a year. Made from scraps of garbage and placed on the street 
for public consumption, it highlighted the enduring problems of homelessness ad the 
societal and governmental efforts, or lack thereof, to provide enough shelter for the 
homeless.  
The American public has long embraced the idea that a creative spin and glossy 
packaging can elevate even decidedly unappealing products and ideas, as the rise of the 
advertising industry in the 1950s and 60s attests. Since those early yes, the glossy 
packaging has become elusively ubiquitous in all areas of life, and disseminated across 
the board of daily experience. As a recent example of this phenomenon, in the spring of 
2009, the New York State Senate hired Christopher Sealey, the celebrity disk jockey and 
marketing impresario, as their first creative director. His job is to consult with the 
politicians in Albany on the design of multimedia created in the Senate. One of his first 




to Facebook and Twitter. Another effort is the launch of his new campaign, “Your New 
York Senate,” which aims to make the role of the New York Senate mor  relatable and 
thus more efficient for the citizenry. “Art” is often used in this way to make ideas and 
processes that are initially boring or intimidating or controversial more palatable or 
enticing.  
While those are excellent examples of how art can be used directly to educate and 
to politicize, there are countless, equally important examples of street and public art 
projects that achieve their political ends by virtue of their very existence. These are 
projects that aim to heighten emotional and bodily awareness, not necessarily of any 
particular political issue but, rather, awareness of people's accepted beliefs and even their 
sense of what is a public space, and how they relate to that space. For xample, since 
January 2008, the 25-year-old known as Poster Boy, has creatively manipulated more 
than two hundred underground subway posters in New York City, and has likewise 
turned MTA stations into his own public galleries. His pieces are conceived on the spot, 
his “improvised mash-ups recall … the cut-and-paste aesthetic." Although many of his 
changes to the posters are subversively political, his true art is in the process of speedy 
and public creation. He makes his spontaneous pieces while people are waiting for their 
trains, and his work is often ripped down by authorities, sometimes before he has even 
completed it. His mission is the formulation and encouragement of a decentralized art 
movement, with no copyright or authorship attached to works, thereby giving the 




Street art takes many different forms. On the Lower East Side of Manhattan, 
situated between the Bowery Mission homeless shelter and the New Museum of 
Contemporary Art, was for a short time in November 2008, an exhibit by Filip 
Noterdaeme (Koppel, 2008). Consisting of a small wooden stand (like a puppet theater) 
adorned with a sign that read, “Homeless Museum of Art (HOMU),” underneath which 
was the phrase, “The Director is IN.” He placed a small chair adjacent to the structure. 
The artist, costumed as the “Director,” spoke to passers-by in one-on-one “encounters”, 
in which the performance, in Noterdaeme’s words, “open(s) up minds and eyes to these 
complete separate realities.” Many persons spoke to the artist, most often of their 
experiences inside the nearby museum as well as about its proximity to the Bowery 
Mission, which has been providing shelter to the city’s homeless populati n since 1879. 
The artist successfully explored  the controversial issues behind a rapidly changing urban 
landscape by showing how the Bowery, a traditionally destitute area that had recently 
been heavily gentrified as a result of the installation of the NewMuseum, maintains a 
symbolic juxtaposition as the homeless shelter’s presence against almost unnerving 
backdrop of the shiny new looming building. 
Beyond awareness of our physical environments, among the density and diversity 
that is New York City, there are constantly evolving experiments wi h the social and 
performative aspects of our daily routines. In the summer of 2009 alone, c untless 
smaller projects that focused on bringing the emotions and concerns of the private sphere 
into the public realm, as well as several key city-funded public art initiatives, 




Among these was the “High Line,” built as a public promenade on top of a l ng-
abandoned railroad track above the Chelsea neighborhood in the city. Since the train 
stopped running in the 1980s, the space had gone unused but the city’s transformtion of 
this public space immediately created an instant community of those eager to fill the new 
public playground with activity as well as one public art project inspired by the 
renovation of the space itself. One woman who lives in an apartment that now overlooks 
the new High Line has created a fire escape cabaret of sorts, where she regularly invites 
her friends to perform opera alongside her artistically displayed “laundry installations,” 
for the benefit of passerby. The other major public space to receive a much-need 
makeover in New York City in the summer of 2009 was the long-neglectd Governors 
Island. The small island in the East River began as a military b se but has recently been 
transformed into an oversized and constantly-in-action experiment in social art. The 
public art organization Creative Time organized a variety of outdoor artworks and 
experiences, indoor installations, and film works. The experience of being among the 
high density of public artworks on the small island is further enhanced by the picturesque 
beaches, and the miniature golf course that is itself an artwork as each hole was designed 
by a different artist. 
In the spring of 2009, the artist Roxy Paine transformed the naturally 
performative space that is the magnificently open rooftop of the New York Metropolitan 
Museum of Art into a dense, movement-filled steel forest. His installation, titled 
Maelstorm, opened in April 2009 at the Cantor Roof Garden. It appropriated the heavy 




natural landscape that echoes some wild vegetation-filled place far beyond Manhattan. 
The effect is both transformative and mystical, like being in an urban secret gard n. 
Marilyn Minter’s 5-minute video called Green Pink Caviar was shown during the 
week of April 24, 2009, as part of Creative Time’s video screenings (Siegel, 2009, p. 65) 
in Times Square – the center of New York City tourism and a major midtown meeting 
point. Her video was shown alongside other short films by artists Pa ty Chang and Kate 
Gilmore.72 An enormous HD screen, borrowed from MTV, lit up the bustling intersection 
with these artists’ striking images yet seemed to fade in co trast to the massive 
installations of flashing lights with brand names and streaming advertising videos that fill 
what seems like every inch of possible air space in Times Square. Creative Time’s project 
is not only a display of new otherwise gallery-bound artworks in a very public space, but 
also a protest against the display of these pieces in a particulrly throbbing center of 
commerce. The art here is sensually captivating – it instantly distracts the mind from the 
desire to acquire material things and pulls the spectator into a realm of momentary 
disorder and emotion. Perhaps after the experience has passed and daily work has again 
begun, it also provokes thoughtful critique that may begin with the very contrast between 
the everyday and the creative.  
                                                
72  In her striking and chaotic works, the feminist (as she is sometimes labeled) video 
performance artist Kate Gilmore aims to highlight both human existential struggles and the distinctly 
feminine struggles of our time. In her most recent work, part of a group video project in Times Square 
sponsored by Creative Time this past spring, she fights to break her head through a too-small hole in a sheet 
of plywood. In other works, she struggles to place heavy objects onto shelves dripping with paint, andin 
another drops herself to the bottom of a deep ditch and attempts to crawl out. She regards her work as a
protest to some of the unfair struggles of women in society, but also as an homage to determination ( 
LaRocca, 2009). 
 The artist Patty Chang similarly creates, and stars in, films and performance works that 
explore feminine roles and their particular challeng s, as well as the cultural differences within this, in 




Jenny Holzer has been making public and socially based artworks for decades. 
She tends to highlight words and phrases, often filled with existential warning or political 
or social commentary or controversial and thought-provoking ideas. In 2009, the Whitney 
Museum of American Art ran a major exhibit of her work dating from the thirty years 
previous (Purvis, 2009, p. 234). Her artistic philosophy centers on confronting people 
with a vision of penetrating words and phrases in their daily lives. In 2007 in Rome, she 
used light to project the words: “I want peace right now. While I’m still alive. I don’t 
want to wait. Like that pious man.” To protest and bring awareness to the wartime 
atrocities against women during the genocide in the former Yugoslavia in 1993 and 1994, 
as part of her project Lustmord, she wrote on human skin phrases like, “I am awake in the 
place where women die” and “My nose broke in the grass my eyes are sore from moving 
against your palm.” She calls all these phrases her “truisms” (p. 234), such as the more 
general, “You can’t get away from yourself” and “Abuse of power comes as no surprise.” 
Many critics believe that, beginning with her work in the 1980s, which ran  her “truisms” 
on ticker tape billboards, she has created her own genre of public art – that of direct 
public communication with the intent to inspire awareness and critique. Sh  is said to 
have “invent[ed] a new form of public address that advertised the necessity for thought 
itself” (p. 234). 
Despite the creation of avant-garde work, the tentacles of society ar  always 
grasping for more material to twist into its likeness. Even about the challenging and 
controversial Holzer, it has been said that, although she began her carer by co-opting 




been co-opted, as the general public has democratized and made public their own truisms 
by way of Twitter and other online forums (p. 234). Her most recent work, which was 
shown at the Whitney Museum in 2009, continued her desire to communicate and raise 
awareness through the dissemination of penetrating phrases, but without the aid of 
technology. In these new pieces, inspired by the secrecy surrounding America’s 
involvement in the war in Iraq, she relied instead on a more traditional art form to create 
pristine oil paintings of declassified government documents obtained through the 
Freedom of Information Act. Holzer reflected on these works in a 2009 interview, “I 
thought paintings, which tend to be studied and conserved, could keep information before 
people. And when I had it right, the hand-rendered oil backgrounds were appropriately 
grave and emotional” (p. 234).  
Some works, usually noncommissioned ones, take on a more spontaneous form. 
In 2009, at the New Museum downtown and at the MOMA, there were several 
experiments with performance art that involved artists laying down and sleeping in the 
middle of the gallery space. Museum-goers ended up experiencing both the art they paid 
to see when entering the institution and the guerilla confrontation of the obstructive 
public art performance. The same performance – to configure the human body as a 
physical obstacle with mysterious intent – has played out in several public venues and 
streets by a few anonymous social art experimenters. Despite where it was performed, the 
seemingly passive performance resulted in inspiring new communicatio  and community 
among those watching (and stepping over the artists). 




Since its heyday in the 1970s and 1980s, graffiti and street art has inspired lovers 
and detractors. The debate usually involves choosing between the “defacem nt” of public 
spaces and property and the beauty and awareness that is created from street art. Graffiti 
has a long history, particularly in New York City, and has become more accepted by the 
mainstream establishment in recent years, as many street artists gained international 
acclaim. NYC artist (he rather calls himself a curator) Michael Anderson has for decades 
collected graffiti stickers –  the small stickers, stuck on walls and other surfaces,  bearing 
tags and phrases that are ubiquitous around downtown New York. His collection numbers 
around 40,000 stickers. In a recent testament to the submission of even graffiti – a self-
declared guerilla art form – to the tentacles of mainstream society and commerce, the 
new Ace Hotel in Manhattan has commissioned 4,000 stickers from his collection to be 
installed in their lobby (Kurutz, 2009). Although Anderson claims to be preserving art 
that would wither away left on the street, some of the artists d agree. One, Steve Powers, 
says that, “stickers are meant to be ephemeral, not to be poached and hoarded” (Kurutz, 
2009). It is interesting that once street art reached the point where it became more often 
praised than criticized, it was literally lifted from the street and placed either into 
institutions of art or, perhaps even more dauntingly, into places of business. 
 
 




Through its freedom to enrich everyday life and break down the boundaries of 
reality, art invokes fantasies, possibilities, and alternatives. But some artworks attempt to 
reawaken and reconfigure people's minds in a more self-conscious way. Big Art Group, 
created by Caden Manson and Jemma Nelson, based in New York and appearing off-off-
Broadway, is a live-art ensemble that combines performance with video projections to 
create an experience where viewers simultaneously watch a live show and a movie of the 
same show as it is happening. The group often performs loud, tangled, chaotic works that 
engage the audience (such as SOS, in March of 2009) to put spectators under a “spell” 
during which they hope viewers will re-imagine and re-vitalize their thoughts and their 
lives. “Big Art aims for something more alchemical than mere entertainment.” Manson 
spoke of ways to make “a combination of actions that literally changes the future… like 
infecting the audience with a certain set of contexts for their conversations.” (Shaw, 
2009). He [Manson] explained that he wanted the performers and the audience “to think 
about celebration, specifically the kind of pagan ritual that creates the ‘new’ through 
sacrifice.” 
In another example of a recent conceptual work that uses spectator involvement 
and atmospheric immersion to encourage contemplation of universal human questions 
Japanese artist On Kawara displayed his own inner reflections in an nteractive gallery 
show in New York. Kawara has had a self-professed obsession with time since his 
earliest works from the 1960s. It was then that he began his ongoing series, “The Today 
Paintings,” where he paints only the date on which that painting was made. If he is not 




anew the next day. One Million Years, his most recent work, from February 2009, 
employs two volunteers per hour (one man and one woman) to sit in an enclosed g a s 
and plaster box inside the David Zwirner gallery and recite a progression of years, 
running either a million years forward or backward in time (Saltz, 2009a).This exercise, 
both listening and actually reciting, forces even inactive participants to consider and 
reconsider time and their relationship to the passage of time. The performance of reading 
the dates pushes the volunteers to form the years from their own voices, using physicality 
to heighten the experience.73  
Interaction in art 
Observing the newest trends in contemporary art, critic Jerry Saltz has explored 
the fruitful relationship between art and the environment in which it is presented. He 
would likely agree with the contention that galleries and museums are pl ces of ritual and 
reawakening. From the creators of the Big Art fringe performance group to academic 
voices like that of Carole Duncan, many have attempted to show that viewing art is a 
creative process in and of itself, and to elevate the experienc of viewing art to that of  a 
spectacle, a transformation of mental space. Saltz (2009b) describes a newly established 
gallery space inside a former boiler factory in Brooklyn as “using the extraordinary 
human and architectural infrastructure already here” to give the ar  extra life. He explains 
that “too much purity, architectural or aesthetic, is bad for art righ now … art needs to 
                                                
73  Jerry Saltz (2009a) wrote about his experience as a volunteer for this on-going 
performance work, and kept a running diary of how he felt and thought during the exercise. It is clear from 
these notes that he was very invigorated by the performance, engaged with the reading, and consumed with 




feel more connected to the world.” Presenting artworks in re-conceptualized spaces rather 
than in bare, white-walled, cube-shaped rooms provides a personal or historical or 
societal context for the works. The Tenement Museum on the Lower East Side of 
Manhattan is one of the larger institutions to experiment successfully with this added 
element. Its small, cramped exhibition spaces emulate the conditions of life that the 
museum attempts to re-create. The Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, DC also 
tries to draw visitors into the horrific suffering and unspeakable sadness of the historical 
era that it brings to life.  
Of interest, too, are the exhibition spaces that do not so readily nd directly 
correlate to the objects on display but rather serve as a contrast to the art on display or 
complement it with an unexpected connection. In this sense, when the space cre tes a 
feeling or draws on a realm that is distinct from the primary focus of the exhibit, then the 
final presentation of the art becomes cross-disciplinary and  more stimulating for viewers. 
In a social and economic environment that desperately needs to protect and invigorate 
ties of community, it is ever-more vital to create an experience with art that reminds 
viewers of the life around them. Either the room displaying the art should disappear as 
one is left alone to experience the art, or the space should enliven the works with added 
dimension, so that one's inner gaze into the self and into one's needs and vulnerabilities 
that reflect,  and connect, us  to all others. 
Beginning with the “happenings” of the 60s and the conceptual turn of the 70s, 
through to the theoretically based “relational aesthetics” and community revitalization 




interactive works, the concepts of community, communication, and interaction have been 
employed as the art itself. The interactive performance art movement that began with 
artists such as Yoko Ono, who once wore an enormous tangle of cloth layers and invited 
the audience to cut everything off her in a slow ritual until she was nude, continued with 
Gordon Matta-Clark creating his Food restaurant inside a SoHo gallery nd Rirkrit 
Tiravanija, who prepared Thai curry for gallery goers. The movement has evolved into 
the most recent projects in this realm, which include Kate Levant, a Yale student artist 
who created a running blood drive inside a gallery, Eduardo Sarabia, an L.A. artist who 
set up a working tequila bar, and Bert Rodriguez, an  artist who offered free therapy and 
poured its murmured sounds throughout the gallery space.  
Another example of an artist employing the audience as a key element of the 
artwork is the work of experimental British artist and filmmaker Mike Figgis. In his mid-
2009 gallery show he created a direct reflection of the audience, adding an element of 
immediacy in the reflection. He picked a high-traffic, designer sto e in the SoHo 
neighborhood of New York City and took photographs of both famous and no-so-famous 
locals shopping over the course of two weeks. He printed all the photos in the store right 
after they were shot. At the end of the two weeks, he installed the resulting collection of 
candid portraits in the Milk Gallery exhibit space. Figgis wanted to show that most 
galleries and museums frame and display works that are “a little dead” as they capture 
moments long gone. While there is much to learn and feel from historical and universal 
moments exemplified in an artwork, and life can be found even in that which is “dead,” 




of a celebration while still in revelry – an embrace of instant nostalgia (Nelson, 2009). 
This perspective enables visitors to the gallery to see themselves from the outside, to look 
with distance at the party they are experiencing, all in the context of an institutional 
display of art. It encourages viewers to remember that all is rt, that they themselves are 
art in action – in other words, that they have a creative will to become acquainted with, 
and to nurture. This realization leads to the type of questioning and self-as ssment that 
results in deeper self-awareness, which is essential to one’s own creativity. A creative 
will is also a political will, for creativity displays the power of the individual to create 
change, and thus inspires interest in public life and its reform.  
Institutional examples of the social turn in art: experiments with interaction and 
inclusivity 
Several major examples around the world of art institutions take interactive and 
performative, if not exactly public, directions with their collections and exhibitions. This 
social focus in the creation and exhibition of art acknowledges art's ability to express 
universal concerns, and encourages an experience with art where the artwork is actively 
in dialogue with its surroundings, its time, and its audience. Many of the newest curators 
in the upper echelons of the art world have embraced the idea that where and how you 
experience art is transformative in itself. This idea can be seen in the increasing numbers 
of smaller and alternative spaces showing interactive pieces and in the acceptance of 
performance and interaction-based artworks in traditional art insti utions. These trends 
are striving to improve the problems of access and elitism that traditional museums face, 




interactive, artworks. Francois Pinault’s new contemporary art museum located in 
Venice’s historic former customs house Dogana da Mar, the new Russian center of 
contemporary art in Moscow, located in a monolith of an abandoned Communist-era 
warehouse, are museums that are showing contemporary art, in keeping with social and 
interactive tendencies in the newest art ideas. These institutions are using smaller and 
more atmosphere-creating spaces that, rather than displaying the art, give the artwork a 
place to live and continue to create.  
This new trend away from the conventional museum style of presenting ar  and 
reconceptualizing previously used, often historical spaces, into homes for the newest 
ideas in art, is well exemplified by Lismore Castle Arts, the project of William 
Cavendish, Earl of Burlington. He and his wife, Laura, dedicated a long-unkempt section 
of their family castle, located in remote corner of Southern Ireland, as a summer 
exhibition space for performative, conceptual, and interactive projects. “I wanted to do 
something that was a bit more ephemeral, not so acquisitive,” William explained. An 
interesting example of work like this is that of Brooklyn artist Corey McCorkle, whose 
project involved his all-day brewing of wild dandelion wine made from the plants on the 
castle grounds, in order to perform the transformation of an undesired plant into 
“something ceremonial” – a reconfiguration of an ordinarily unnoticed object into a 
useful and beautiful one, and a focus on interaction among the individual spectators. 
Touching on the issue of supporting and displaying spontaneous and interactive works of 
art, London gallerist Iwan Wirth has said of Lismore Castle Arts, “It displays a deep, 




98). William agrees: “We are not bound in the way that institutions a d commercial 
galleries are … we can offer the artists a chance to do something out of their normal 
cycle” (p. 98). 
In November 2008, the Los Angeles County Museum of Art hosted an event 
titled, “A Machine Project’s Field Guide to the Los Angeles County Museum of Art,” 
which, as its name implies, encouraged its audience to  explore freely the “natural 
habitat” of the museum (Finkel, 2009). In the words of its creator, Mark Allen, “Los 
Angeles has so few public spaces where people can gather, we wanted to tr at the 
museum as a sort of park, creating these pockets of social activity. … Visiting a museum 
can be like visiting a very rich person’s house, where you feel pressu e to admire the 
furniture. We wanted this to feel more like hanging out with friends” (Finkel, 2009) As 
Margaret Wettheim, co-founder of the Institute for Figuring, observed, “It’s also about 
breaking down the wall between artist and audience. We don’t want to pontificate from 
on high.” (Finkel, 2009). Machine Project shares this democratic ideal, “which in 
programming corners would be called open-source, and in art circles sounds a lot like 
Dada.” (Finkel, 2009). Also in Los Angeles, Jeffrey Deitch’s appointment to head the 
Museum of Contemporary Art there, sets a precedent in the institutional art world that 
links the academic or educational art world of the museum with both the commercial side 
of art exhibition (Mr. Deitch has famously run a pair of cutting-edge galleries in 
downtown Manhattan for years) and the social and public turn in art (he has heavily 
supported social and public projects, even to the detriment of sales, as many of these 




In recognition of the need for greater creative inclusion and institutional 
representation, and the quandary of exhibiting ephemeral works of art, in 2009 New York 
City’s Museum of Modern Art (MoMA) began its commitment to more actively support 
and exhibit both performance art and female art and artists (Orden, 2009). In late January 
2009 MoMA launched a two-year long series of live performance pieces that will 
conclude in 2010 with a retrospective devoted to Marina Abramovic, the self-described 
“grandmother of performance art.” Pipilotti Rist’s multimedia installation show, which 
opened in January 2009, exemplifies both important realms of art-making (Saltz, 2009c, 
p. 69)). Jerry Saltz commented that, “MoMA is – even with this [the Pipilotti Rist show] 
and the current Marlene Dumas survey – a place where very little work by women is on 
view. Rist’s installation comments on and reacts to this misogyny. … MoMA seems to 
swell and stir to new life” (p. 69). The environment that Rist create for MoMA in her 
work combines raw, feminine video images of red and pink, with an open, inviting sual 
and tactile womb (in the form of an oversized circular couch that dominates from the 
center of the room and is accompanied by dramatic, blood-colored walls and draperies) in 
which to experience the bleeding world on the screens. Given the societal restraints 
placed upon institutionalized artworks, Saltz reported, “A widely circulated rumor has it 
that MoMa asked Rist to edit out the red between the legs. … In classical terms, the 
Dionysian is still more fraught than the Apollonian. Thinking about this installation 
without the blood is like thinking about life without blood” (p. 69). This would-be 
censorship is an indication both of the regulation that institutions commonly place on 




between showing art in a museum and creating art in the streets. Th re have been signs 
that institutions are attempting to bridge this gap by increasing the diversity of artwork 
they display and to take part creatively (and carve a place for themselves) in the greater 
movement in social, interactive, and publicly based art. 
In June 2008 the MOMA bought its first piece of pure performance art, Eu opean 
artist Tino Sehgal’s Kiss74 and thus heralded in a new age in the art world that signals a 
acceptance of a wider definition of art by the art establishment (Orden, 2009, p. 70). 
Sehgal believes that we need to leave behind unsustainable and overused object-based art 
and rather focus on the living art of human relations (Lubow, 2010). The museu  i  
tasked with preserving ephemeral art, which in the case of the Kiss, is undocumented (in 
the piece, couples dance, touch, and make-out for two hours, moving freely through the 
large space), and proceeds without a script or manual. Instead, the guidelines are passed 
on orally. Accordingly, MoMA obtained the piece through an oral contract. “The artist 
will explain its workings to a curator; he or she will pass it on, down the road; and 
MoMA will have the rights to reproduce the performance forever. (Sehgal’s Kiss is an 
edition of four; two other museums have bought it so far. And it can be lent, like a 
painting).” (Orden, 2009, p. 70). 
The MoMA wants to ensure the preservation of the revolutionary work of the first 
generation of performance artists, now 40 years in the past. The heart of their debates has 
focused on the question, framed by the curator of the Rist show, Klaus Bien enbach: 
                                                
74  Sehgal’s Kiss, along with other works, constitutes the entirety of the unique architectural 





How do you create, conserve, preserve a moment?” In some cases there is nothing 
material to purchase, only the idea of a particular experience. Th  Tate Modern in 
London and the Walker Art Center in Minneapolis, are also facing this same daunting 
task in 2009 and 201075.  
Invigorating effects of the recession of 2008-2009 on public and social art  
In still another indication that the creation of art, particularly self-consciously 
social and public art, is intimately linked with its environment and thus political life, the 
deprivations of the recent recession have encouraged both our public culture and the art 
world to give primary attention to public spaces, and to community. Following 
Hobbesian theory (1651/2009), the materially acquisitive desires in life should be kept 
private, while political concerns are to shape the public realm. Because Americans tend 
to favor individual acquisition of material goods, it took the power of this recession to dig   
even a small hole in Americans’ tightly knit relationship with money. Their 
disillusionment made for greater consideration of both spiritual and sesuous needs. 
During the March 2009 record stock market lows, “A Day Trading” installation popped 
up at the Museum 52 gallery and, for its four-day run, encouraged visitors to barter and 
swap personal goods, services, and talents. Peter Simensky, the artist who created the 
interactive and communication-based installation, also made his own “neutral” currency 
bills with which he “bought” the artworks and objects he most liked and at the end of 
                                                
75  In March 2008, the MoMA started scheduling private workshops to establish some 
guidelines for preserving and displaying temporary t. These meetings addressed everything from “the 
discrepancies between a performance and its remnants to legal quirks to the appropriateness of an 




each day at “A Day Trading” displayed them in the gallery space downstairs. 
(Artbeat.com, 2010). The living, dialogical sculpture of sorts worked both as satirical 
commentary on the financial crisis, and as an opportunity to experi nc  first-hand an 
alternative, social and need-based, version of market interactions. 
Similarly, the difficult economic realities that the recession created, and the 
cultural turn it spurred towards a life less geared to private possession (the collective 
reminder that money can be here one day, gone the next, drew public attention to the 
enduring value of community and the satisfactions found in that which cannot be 
possessed or assessed monetarily. In line with this revitalized cultural appreciation for all 
that is traded and shared according to use value rather than market v lue, as well as for 
pointed experimentations with ideas of currency, the “Free Store” was installed  on a 
nondescript corner of downtown New York City near the financial hub of Wall Street. 
From February 19 to March 22,d 2009, artists Athena Robles and Anna Stein pursued a 
socially cooperative economy where goods were traded for goods and others “bought” 
with the global currency termed “World Bills,” which was both offered and accepted by 
the project. The stated goal of the project was that the “Free Stor aims to reinforce and 
build connections based on trust and mutual exchange among the people of and visitors to 
Lower Manhattan. The project is designed to be a model of community a d financial 
support that could also be used in other cities around the world” (Artlog.com, 2009).  
Along the same lines, the artists behind “freepublicrentals.com”, a website that 
arranges the trade of community and personal services among pe ple, created their site to 




believed in the need to foster public exchange and communication, and they recognized 
that much of our social lives revolve around the purchase of goods and the daily grind of 
our lives. They also produced a project based on the social aspect of the free barter of 
experiential goods and services, but by way of the Internet. These s rvices for barter 
range from a walking partner, to “plant petting”, to the reading of bedtime stori.  
In these humbling times, there has been ample discussion of how the high-priced, 
insular art world fares during a recession. Besides the guerilla and grassroots art projects 
and performances that have tended more and more to appear as social, interactive and 
otherwise public art, the lack of cash flow in the economy has forced some adjustments 
among those who hawk art. Some critics have said that the art boom was a great loss to 
the quality of art being produced and appreciated. They argue that art had begun to 
pander to the masses, and though many were finally buying art, this trend detracted from 
the quality and authenticity of the art itself. In an art world that revolves around the major 
commercial art fairs, like the Armory Show, Art Basel, Pulse, and Scope, a lack of 
wealthy buyers has resulted in fairs' and galleries' selling more traditional and less 
challenging artworks, and in their taking emerging artists’ works (which tend to be more 
difficult to sell) off the gallery walls (Peers, 2009). Yet ar ists always make work, and 
great art, as we say of the truth, will always prevail and make itself known. The lack of 
financial support that has created a narrower and more challenging iche for art has also 
deprived many artists, especially younger ones and those who produce challenging or 
controversial art, of their livelihoods and career opportunities. Many art galleries, unable 




for art right now may be an artist’s ability not to want to know or dictate what’s coming 
next … [as] an open embrace of the confusion. … while the market is dying, art is in the 
process of being reborn.” (Saltz, 2009d). 
Conclusions: Reclaiming through art the American heritage of community 
Buckminster Fuller devoted both his scholarly and his personal life to the public 
and democratic accessibility of ideas, to interdisciplinary pursuits of knowledge, and to 
the need for human connections across ideological and geographic divides. He believed 
in and lived a life that revolved around striving for clarity when explaining challenging 
ideas. “He argued that if complex science wasn’t easily comprehensible to a child, it was 
in danger of faulty logic” (Carlin, 2008, p. 53).  He was an advocate of the individual and 
recognized that only when we nurture the individual can we truly connect with diverse 
individuals. He famously designed living units that were not only self-sustaining but were 
to be simply constructed by the average citizen. 
In the summer of 2008, the Whitney Museum of American Art in New York City 
hosted a retrospective on Fuller’s life and work and showed, among many other examples 
of his philosophy, a video called Buckminster Fuller Meets the Hippies in Golden Gate 
Park. In this short film, Fuller engages long-haired men and women seated on grass in a 
conversation about how they relate to, and feel about, the “spiritual constraints of his 
geometric designs” (p. 53). His genuine interest and concern in this situation 
demonstrates his belief that our visual world – the art and architecture around us – has a 




work that strong lines and hard angles could limit the spiritual or emotional life of people 
shows a unique attention to everyday experience and the role of publicspaces within that 
experience.76 Specifically, he brought attention to the power that a nurturing public 
environment has in the promotion of both the individual capacity to imagine change and 
the encouragement of human connectivity. 
The argument that the most effective way to “convince” people to participate in 
the public sphere more actively – whether in their communities, in the political process, 
or in their own lives – lies in the conditions imposed by an overarching authority, such as 
the government's offering financial incentives for conforming to their strictures, is like 
saying that the best way to deter smokers from continuing their dangerous habit is to 
place a tax on cigarettes. Likewise, there have been recent discussions among the 
American public that the cure to our national obesity problem (the most recent statistics 
being that more than 26% of Americans are officially obese) i a so-called fat tax, 
whereby fast food and soda – what many claim is at the root of the problem – would 
carry an extra tax that would deter consumers from choosing to buy fast food rather than 
a more healthy alternative (Bittman, 2010).  
                                                
76  Yayoi Kusama is a Japanese artist who came of age in the 1960s era of happenings and 
early conceptual experiments. In August 1969,she gained somewhat notoriety for her "Grand Orgy to 
Awaken the Dead" performance, where she and her likwise naked assistants danced into New York’s 
Museum of Modern Art’s sculpture garden and proceeded to paint each other in large, brightly colored 
polka dots. Kusama is famous for working only in polka dots and in their inverse of negative space dots. 
This creative assertion yields some questions: What is the effect of shapes in everyday life on the individual 
spirit? For example, do circles imply continuity and unity, with the possibility of eventual existential crisis 
in the lack of perceptible limits or boundaries? Similarly, while sharp corners can clearly stake out the
corners of a landscape, allowing for more immediate comprehension, they may resist the flux that is human 
life through the force of its lines. Can shapes, and more generally, the way we physically structure our
public spaces, help to encourage the need and capacity for participation (desire to improve public life), and 




That has been a common approach in dealing with the much-acknowledged free- 
rider problem in political life in this country. Many argue that, if we could only provide a 
valued (and tangible) incentive to those who participate, we would be more likely to get a 
faster and more significant response than if we work more slowly to genuinely inspire 
people with political possibilities. This is misleading reasoning a d only supports the 
status quo. We need a new approach to confront the problem of low participation in this 
country, and supporting public and social artworks brings much-needed attention to he 
true freedom of our creative and sensuous lives. The knowledge gained from such access 
to the spirit can open the inner doors within individuals, to develop new ideas of empathy 
for the plight of others, and ultimately, of political life as foundationally empathetic. In 
other words, you can catch a fish for a man, but if you teach him to fish, he will catch 
many fish and teach others to do the same. 
The conceptual trend in today’s art world reflects the primacy of philosophy in 
art. The primary characteristic of art is that it is self-r flective – creating art, even if only 
in the imagination, involves both sensuousness and thought. In other words, visionary art 
is conscious of its transcendent qualities; it is a manifestation of our passions and our 
reason as they dance endlessly in tension. Art can also be a way of viewing and living 
life. In this sense, to be artistic is to embrace a sensuous dialectic l world view. 
Dionysian release enables us to begin to experience true art in its instinctual and sensuous 
revelations, but it is the visionary conception that the Dionysian must engage the 
Apollonian in a transcendent dialogue that allows us to define art and he participation, 




The American Abstract Expressionists were among the first to emphasize the 
physical activity of painting over the accuracy of the strokes and the resulting image. 
Like the American Transcendentalists before them, they strove o express the feelings 
involved in the process of creation rather than the details of its material manifestation. 
This is the emphasis in a Dionysian, and visionary, philosophy – to focus on how we feel, 
and not on how we think. An increased presence of public and social art projects on our 
streets, and in our daily lives, can foster within us a brief but necessary retreat from 
reason and everyday concerns and thus encourage an exploration of the sensuous and 
spiritual realm of life. Social and public artworks, both consciously po itical projects and 
indirectly political, conceptually arousing events, are needed to imbue our quotidian lives 
with Dionysian breaks that disorder imagined boundaries and lead to inner revitalization, 
visionary reflection, and the accompanying feelings of empowerment and positivity. This 
change can provoke true freedom and individuality and, as a result, can un over within 
each of us (without direct material incentives) the true empathy and community that are 
the first step to an active citizenry in a democracy.77  
 
                                                
77 Barbara L. Fredrickson (2007) concludes that positive emotions are the active ingredients that allow 
people to be optimistic and resilient. Feelings persuade us to speak or act'; encouraging the emotions 
of empowerment in our public spaces is vital to the goal of participation. She argues that the answer to 
both the lack of positivity and the lack of participation among Americans lies in, “[p]ut[ting] emphasis 
on the power of relationships and small-scale pragmatic action, rather than on making policy or 
protests. In some ways we’ve become a culture of what psychologists called ‘learned helplessness,’ 
and as we wait for others to solve our problems, the problems get harder to solve. But resilient peopl 
don’t wait; they think their actions make a differenc  in the world. Any changes that would happen 
from the ‘prosperous way down,’ could…allow people to have more frequent positive emotions, 
greater connection to the people in their lives, the natural world … as opposed to ‘work, achieve, 
work, achieve.’ The satisfaction and pride that youget out of creating something, growing something, 




Some ideas for further research: idea art and the creativity of the homelss 
Ideas are a powerful force in society, politics, and especially art, as for they lie 
that unique realm where the impossible can become possible, imagined, envisioned. If 
many successful artists today have become mere directors of the construction of their 
artwork, then it is clear they are being paid, and valued, for their abil ty to produce for 
society and for the history of art, a novel or visionary idea. If artwork can be contained 
within an idea, why should there be any limits on its vision? If one can describe 
something in words and otherwise, what can be imagined, then we can re- reat  the 
image of the proposed artwork, or creative interactive concept, in the minds of the 
viewers or readers. In this sense, the words are art themselves, but that which they 
describe is visionary, for it transcends the realm of the materially possible. So, why not 
propose even fantastical art projects that reconceptualize our public spaces, and our 
world, in fundamentally new and surprising ways? Idea art could create public and social 
art that is impossible to create but valuable to consider. Imagine if we were able to throw 
enormous nets over vast land areas. The nets could be cast broadly or narrowly, and 
deliberately aimed. It could connect city with city, or country with country; or could 
drape over oceans and continental divides, drawing together vastly different climates, 
political beliefs, religious paradigms, and cultural behaviors and norms. Envision dense 
netting strewn over New York City and stretched west until it encompasses the land all 
the way to St. Louis! Suddenly New Yorkers and the people of St. Louis would be forced 




Or one could connect Paris with Algiers, the capital of its former colony, Algeria, 
and the site of many struggles for independence from its European master. Not only 
would their shared past have to be re-examined, but two opposing cultural forces would 
be forced in a particular, literal way to recognize their commn ground. A net, or any 
physical obstacle imposed literally from above, creates the mat rial environment for 
community. Despite the many inevitable differences between the newly linked cultures, 
differences that would, at first, likely intensify and highlight what is disparate between 
the two halves of the new entity, people would have to recognize the many needs and 
desires that they all share and be reminded of their ultimate reliance on others, for life 
and love but also for the very definitions of their private and public identities. Without 
our relationships to each other, we would not have the use of many of our tools of self-
identity and self-understanding. This type of idea-based public art that could encompass 
different ends of the earth, and its theoretical support, is valuable in a contemporary 
world that is increasingly interdependent in economy and trade, yet not in cultural and 
political beliefs.  
On a quite different trajectory, I am intrigued by "outsider" individuals and 
populations, and what they can teach society about how to address and encourage our 
natural needs and desires in political life. I believe that the homeless create a political life 
that resembles our everyday political life (Morris, 2010), but in a more “natural” way 
(without the bounds of traditional society, or at least with less of an ability (or is it 
desire?) to follow rules or to “sublimate” their inner passions into the order and relative 




the political and moral boundaries of the homeless. Like the mentally ill nd others living 
in asylums, homeless people develop a sense of self that exists out ide of mainstream 
society and often "reality" (Glass, 1993). Rather than merely viewing them as less able, 
or less normal, it is helpful to try to understand the worlds they have constructed.  
Those who are mentally ill, or otherwise emotionally detached, exist on the 
outskirts of society in their own perceptions of reality. Similarly, homeless people live 
according to their own self-made adaptations to reality. There is diversity among the 
homeless. Some who refuse the mores of traditional society and seek to live without its 
rules and boundaries; others have not been able to succeed in traditional society, now 
wish to recapture the trappings of everyday life that will allow them to now succeed in 
their own way. To live on the fringes of society is often difficult work, for each person is 
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